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Abstract
This thesis concerns the effectiveness of computer-based Decision Support Systems 
(DSS) to assist integrated environmental management (IEM). The conventional 
rationale for DSS, based on positivist epistemology, argues that the objectivity, 
expertise and efficiency of these systems frames an indispensable role for DSS in 
enabling stakeholders to cope with the demands of modem environmental decision­
making.
Drawing on theory of the construction of knowledge, this thesis challenges the 
purported objectivity of DSS, and argues that bias is an inescapable feature of DSS.
Bias implies that the use of the technology systematically promotes (elements of) one 
perspective over another, either because the output of the technology systematically 
promotes one perspective over another, or because use of the technology limits the 
opportunities of certain actors to participate in environmental decision-making. A 
taxonomy of bias relevant to environmental DSS is proposed. Challenging the 
purported expertise of DSS, I draw on contemporary development, adaptive 
management and other literature to argue that, like knowledge, interpretations of 
expertise are also multiple and socially constructed. Alternative approaches to DSS 
development are explored which respond to the democratisation of expertise. Each of 
these approaches is presented as political processes in which validation of the structure, 
form and content of the DSS is enmeshed in systems of power. Consequently, I argue 
that regardless of the DSS development approach adopted, a commitment to equity and 
transparency dimensions of the IEM paradigm demands critical appraisal of the systems 
of power engaged during development, and their implications for bias. Addressing the 
purported efficiency of DSS, I further argue that the interrogation of potential biases 
during DSS development is imperative for effective - and efficient - delivery of decision 
support.
In response to recognition of the constructedness of knowledge and the partiality of 
science, this thesis proposes a reorientation of the processes of development and use of 
DSS to better recognise and manage the potential for bias. A new theoretical 
framework is proposed which reconstitutes DSS development as reflexive, 
precautionary practice. Drawing on the taxonomy of bias, an analytic framework is 
proposed to facilitate an interrogation of bias by developers and users of DSS to enable 
the anticipation, avoidance and minimisation, both prior to and during DSS design and 
development, of potential biases likely to interact transformatively with the decision­
making environment.
To test the theoretically-derived frameworks in practice, the frameworks are used to 
guide reflexive DSS development in a joint Thai-Australian project which is developing 
a DSS to assist Integrated Land and Water Resource Assessment and Management 
(IWRAM) in the highlands of Northern Thailand. Firstly, the analytic framework is 
used in conjunction with a review of the highland environmental history and the 
political culture of highland decision-making to foreshadow potential biases if a DSS is 
introduced into the highland decision-making environment. Secondly, the theoretical 
and analytic frameworks are used to catalyse researchers collaborating in the IWRAM 
project to interrogate potential biases and negotiate convergent framings of decision 
support. In the light of the case study experience, the utility and effectiveness of the 
analytic and theoretical frameworks are assessed.
1Contents
Statement of originality i
Acknowledgments ii
Abstract iii
1. Introduction 6
1.1 Supporting integrated environmental management 6
1.2 Research focus and approach 7
1.3 Key concepts 8
1.4 Thesis structure 11
2. Methodology 14
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Philosophy and approach 14
2.3 Forming and framing the inquiry 16
2.4 Data collection 18
2.5 Data analysis: Relating data and theory 24
2.6 Credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability 26
2.7 Confronting reflexivity: Role of the researcher 27
2.8 Sensitive research 30
2.9 Limitations of the methodology 30
2.10 Summary 31
3. Environmental decision support systems 33
3.1 Introduction 33
3.2 Conventional environmental DSS 33
3.3 DSS, objectivity and bias 34
3.4 Taxonomy of bias 44
23.5 DSS as conditional expertise 47
3.6 From (in)efficiency to effective decision support 55
3.7 Conclusions 58
4. From critique to progress: Reorienting DSS development 60
4.1 Introduction 60
4.2 Reflexivity: Probing the frame 60
4.3 Precautionary practice: Managing bias 61
4.4 Learning through reflection on practice 63
4.5 Collaborative learning 64
4.6 Critical dialogue to interrogate biases 67
4.7 Weaving the threads: A new theoretical framework for DSS development 68
4.8 Analytical framework: Anticipating and interrogating bias 69
4.9 Conclusions 71
5. Locating the decision-making environment 74
5.1 Geographic profile 74
5.2 Highland environmental history: Politics and pressures 76
5.3 Political culture of environmental decision-making 95
5.4 DSS for the Northern Highlands 99
5.5 Locating the IWRAM project 100
5.6 Politics of highland decision support: Anticipating bias 103
5.7 Conclusions 108
6. Framing environmental decision support and anticipating biases 111
6.1 Introduction 111
6.2 The unfurling of the IWRAM project and DSS 112
6.3 Testing the analytical framework with the Australian team 119
6.4 The analytical framework and the Thai team 132
6.5 Confronting divergence? Meeting of the two teams 148
6.6 Postscript 153
6.7 Conclusions 153
7. Probing the frames 156
7.1 Introduction 156
7.2 Framing environmental decision support: Tensions 156
7.3 Shaping the DSS: Contributing factors 168
7.4 Effective reorientation? Assessing the frameworks 172
7.5 Conclusion 175
8. Conclusions and discussion 179
8.1 Environmental decision support: Anticipating bias 179
8.2 Implications for DSS development 183
8.3 Implications for integrated research 185
8.4 Limitations of the research: Opportunities for future research 185
8.5 Reorienting environmental DSS: A critical future... 187
Appendices
Appendix 1 Questionnaires for Part A of Australian trial of frameworks 189
Appendix 2 Interview guide for Thai trial of frameworks 196
Appendix 3 Agenda for Thai group dialogue, November 1997 197
Appendix 4 Coding frame for analysis of transcripts 198
3
References 202
4List of Boxes
Box 2-1 Excerpts from field notes 22
Box 2-2 Analysis of modes of framing 25
Box 4-1 From the precautionary principle to precautionary DSS development 62
Box 5-1 Highland development projects: Non-coordination and non-participation
revealed 87
Box 6-1 Framing the IWRAM project and the DSS: February 1996 115
Box 6-2 Framing the IWRAM DSS: September 1996 118
Box 8-1 Contributions of this thesis to theory, method and practice 179
List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Generic DSS architecture (adapted from Sprague (1980:24)) 10
Figure 1-2 Structure of this thesis 12
Figure 2-1 Evolution of the research design 19
Figure 5-1 Northern Thailand (Source: Kanok and Benjavan 1994:4) 75
Figure 5-2 Selected state agencies with an interest in highland natural resource
management 98
Figure 5-3 Procedural framework of the IWRAM project 103
Figure 6-1 Collaborators in the IWRAM research project referred to in narrative 112
Figure 6-2 Distinguishing a DSS research component, August 1996 118
Figure 6-3 Framing the DSS: Australian project leader, August 1997 129
Figure 6-4 Framing the DSS: Australian DSS leader, December 1997 151
Figure 6-5 Framing the DSS: Australian sociocultural leader, February 1998 152
Figure 7-1 Amstein’s (1969) ladder of participation 165
Figure 7-2 Thai team’s conceptions of participation and the DSS 165
Figure 7-3 Potential participation in DSS development 170
List of Tables
Table 2-1 Dimensions of research philosophy and approach 15
Table 2-2 Data collection methods 20
Table 3-1 Taxonomy of bias associated with environmental DSS 46
Table 3-2 Taxonomy of ignorance: Smithson (1991) (Abbreviated) 46
Table 4-1 Framework for anticipating bias in DSS 72
Table 5-1 Spatial disparities in per capita income in Thailand (baht/yr) 85
Table 7-1 Divergent framings: Comparing DSS-for-research and DSS-for-practice 157
Table 7-2 Alternate framings of the DSS: Differing construing of stakeholder
relationships 161
Table 7-3 Disciplinary within Australian team: Framing decision-making scales 167
Table 7-4 Altered framework for anticipating and reflecting on bias in DSS 177
Introduction
The Northern Highlands o f Thailand -  the case study environment o f this thesis.
61. Introduction
1.1 Supporting integrated environmental management
In the 1950s, the dramatic social advancements enabled by new technological 
innovations led to a widespread public euphoria about the seemingly limitless capacity 
of humans to use science and technology to progress towards a modernised, utopian 
world. During the 1960s, several seminal critiques, notably Carson (1962), Mumford 
(1967), and Ehrlich (1968), highlighted the failings of the prevailing technocentric 
approach, including its role in instigating and exacerbating environmental crises. Over 
the ensuing two decades, public recognition increased of the threats that resource 
depletion and environmental degradation pose to human survival, and calls intensified 
for a radical change in approaches to dealing with environmental problems. A particular 
focus for critical attention was the fragmented nature of traditional state responses to 
environmental management, an administrative manifestation of the scientific 
reductionist belief that complex problems are best solved through disaggregation into 
their component parts. Critics argued that fragmented approaches were inadequate 
given the increasing complexity of modem environmental problems, and that they 
obscured the interrelationships among ecological, cultural, political and economic 
spheres in shaping environmental problems (Caims and Crawford 1991, Bartlett 1990). 
In response to dissatisfaction with the management outcomes of disjointed, narrowly 
focussed environmental management, a shift was proposed towards a more holistic and 
integrated approach (Margerum and Bom 1995, Bom and Sonzogni 1995). Within this 
context, Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) gained support in both political 
and academic discourse as a better framework to guide environmental management 
(Lundquist et al.. 1985, Easter et al.. 1986, Lang 1986, Caims 1991, Burke 1994, World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987, United Nations 1992).
Under the rubric of IEM, environmental decision-makers now face an increasing torrent 
of information which they are expected to consider and analyse if they are to produce 
‘good’ decisions. For example, Chapter 8 of Agenda 21 discusses the need to make 
systematic and simultaneous use of social, economic, developmental, ecological and 
environmental data, and to adopt comprehensive analytical procedures for prior and 
simultaneous assessment of the impacts of decisions (United Nations 1992:65,66). 
Accordingly, decisionmakers must monitor, process, assess, validate and analyse larger 
quantities of complex information, often within shorter time periods and more 
constrained financial resources. Perceiving some decision-makers to be drowning under 
the enormity of comprehending and managing the information deluge, developers of 
computer-based Decision Support Systems (DSS) have offered their systems as tools to 
navigate through the complexity of the incoming information. Advocates point to the 
potential efficiency, expertise and objectivity gains to be made through the use of DSS. 
On the surface, their arguments are compelling, and place DSS as an indispensable tool 
if we are to cope with the demands of modem environmental management. As a result, 
the past decade has witnessed escalating enthusiasm for, investment in, and 
development and application of environmental DSS.
7However, from both academic and management spheres, an alternate perspective 
suggests that computer-based DSS may be more of a burden than a blessing. Some 
claim that, far from enhancing objectivity, DSS have been used to bolster particular 
political positions while invalidating alternate perspectives. Justifying their reluctance 
to incorporate DSS within their decision-making, other targeted users have argued that 
the DSS developed for them has failed to present as either expert or efficient. By 
attending to these latter concerns, this thesis will explore the (in)effectiveness of DSS to 
assist integrated environmental management.
1.2 Research focus and approach
This thesis will use the concept of bias (See Section 1.3.3) to argue that the 
effectiveness of conventional DSS to assist IEM has been undermined by the modernist 
and positivist underpinnings of DSS development and use. This research grew from a 
critical concern with exaggerated claims about and faith in environmental DSS, and a 
practical interest in a constructive reorientation of DSS to reconcile this concern. The 
thesis thus represents an attempt to link critical and reconstructive theory and practice.
Broad aims of this thesis are:
1) Drawing on post-positivist theory, to develop a critique of the conventional 
rationale for environmental DSS.
2) In response to this critique, to reconstruct the process of DSS development.
3) To trial the proposed reconstruction in practice.
As will be detailed in Section 2.2, this thesis has followed an evolutionary approach. As 
each of the general research aims above were addressed, themes and concepts emerged 
which refined subsequent aims. In particular, while addressing Aim 1, the notion of 
bias emerged as having explanatory power, and thus Aim 2 was amended to include 
development of theoretical and analytical frameworks which would guide an 
interrogation of bias. Aim 3 was consequently revised to include trialing these 
theoretical and analytical frameworks in practice.
As will also be detailed in Section 2.2, the focus of this research evolved through a 
dynamic interplay between theoretical concerns and practical experience as part of a 
joint Australian-Thai project which is developing a DSS to assist Integrated Water 
Resource Assessment and Management (IWRAM) in the highlands of Northern 
Thailand. To achieve Aim 3, the IWRAM project provided a case study to trial my 
reconstruction of DSS development. The case study research aims were:
3.1) To gain an understanding of the decision-making environment of the 
highlands of Northern Thailand.
3.2) To catalyse and facilitate IWRAM researchers to engage in an 
interrogation of bias guided by the proposed theoretical and analytical 
frameworks.
3.3) To gain insight into how different IWRAM researchers and other highland 
stakeholders construe decision support.
3.4) To explore the implications of differing construals for the anticipation of 
bias associated with the DSS.
83.5) To assess the effectiveness of the proposed theoretical and analytical 
frameworks.
Drawing on the experience of the IWRAM case study, two further general research aims 
emerged:
4) By drawing on the trial of the proposed frameworks in practice, to 
feedback to and refine the proposed frameworks.
5) By drawing on the trial of the proposed frameworks in practice, to evaluate 
the potential for the frameworks to be used in other contexts.
To fulfil the preceding research aims, I drew on both theoretical literature and 
substantive, grounded insights. As no single discipline emerged as having sole claim to 
the focus of this research, a transdisciplinary approach to both theoretical review and 
methodology was adopted. Literature discussing DSS is almost exclusively the domain 
of mathematicians, computer programmers, cognitive scientists and organisational 
decision theorists. My integrative approach to this inquiry, which drew on a variety of 
sociopolitical bodies of literature which are relevant to environmental decision support, 
but which have traditionally been neglected by DSS literature, enabled a new 
perspective on DSS development.
i.3 Key concepts
1.3.1 Integrated Environmental Management
Whilst environmental management literature notes diverse conceptualisations of the 
philosophy and process of IEM (for instance, Hufschmidt 1986, Bom and Songozni 
1995, Mitchell and Hollick 1993), general consensus has emerged as to several essential 
substantive dimensions. Underpinning IEM is an ecological sustainability ethic which 
connotes a commitment to favour management o f the environment for long-term 
sustainability over exploitation of natural resources for short-term profit. Another 
cornerstone o f IEM is an adherence to systems philosophy which emphasises 
interdependence between critical elements and processes of the ecosystem and focuses 
on those complex interrelationships, rather than solely on the behaviour of discrete 
individual components (Radosevich 1987). Consequently, a holistic, inclusive or 
comprehensive approach is promoted which directs the consideration of all relevant 
issues, variables and perspectives (Margerum and Bom 1995). Due to emerging 
criticism of holism as inapplicable in practice, many recent IEM approaches replace the 
holism principle with a strategic or pragmatic focus on crucial issues, variables and goals, 
and their linkages (Mitchell 1990). Another fundamental component o f IEM is 
integration among the multiple and often conflicting environmental perspectives of the 
stakeholders that comprise the community of interest within the management system 
(Margerum 1995). This yields an emphasis on participatory decision-making achieved 
through co-operation and collaboration instead of competition (Wallis and Robinson 
1991:32). Reflecting its sustainability roots, principles of equity (including 
intergenerational equity, equity between human and natural systems and a respect for 
diversity of values) are also a critical dimension of IEM, and reinforce transparency in 
decision-making.
91.3.2 Decision support systems
The concept of Decision Support Systems (DSS) emerged during the early 1970s as 
computer-based systems designers began to explore how direct interaction with data and 
analysis models might help business managers cope more effectively with ill-structured 
problems (Sprague and Carlson 1982, Gorry and Scott-Morton 1971). An ill-structured 
problem implies that formulation of the problem (including the structure, constraints, 
scope and objectives) and of potential solutions are difficult to determine, uncertain and 
may change during investigation (Konsynski et al. 1992, Abel et al. 1996:1). The term 
'Decision Support Systems' was coined to differentiate these endeavours from electronic 
data processing, management information systems (MIS) and operations research (OR) 
which deal with well-structured problems. Over the past two decades, the application of 
DSS has expanded beyond business spheres into broader arenas of decision-making, 
including medical diagnostics (Hudson et al. 1995), legal judgements (Nagel 1993), and 
military strategy (O’Neill 1998), as well as environmental management. Amongst 
numerous other natural resource decision-making problems, DSS have been developed 
to: support ecosystem and watershed management (Laacke 1995); perform 
environmental impact assessment for water resources development projects (Fedra 
1995:10); manage environmental flows (Young et al. 1995); optimise crop production 
efficiency (Reddy and Pachepsky 1997:1143); manage forest stands (Nute et al. 1995); 
and forecast the spread of crop viruses (Morgan et al. 1997:1128).
While there is not a single, universal architecture for DSS (Wu 1996:9), several 
elements common to conventional systems may be distinguished. Sprague (1980:24) 
identifies three principal components of a decision support system: a database 
management or ‘knowledge’ system; a model base management or ‘problem-solving’ 
system; and a software system to manage the interface between the user and the system 
(Figure 1.1). Although a variety of alternate, more recent descriptions have been 
proposed (Kersten and Michalowski 1997:5), Sprague’s classic description provides the 
essential conceptual elements.
To summarise the basic procedure, a decisionmaker interactively, via the user interface, 
accesses data stored in the database, generates alternatives using an appropriate model 
and arrives at a solution (Wu 1996:4). Data incorporated in a DSS might include 
electronic text documents, statistical data, tables of numerical data, rule-based 
representations of the knowledge of relevant experts, digitised maps or other 
electronically scanned images. The database manager processes and manipulates data to 
enable comparison, contrast, classification, and deduction. The model base may 
incorporate a variety of computer-based models which perform simulations or 
optimisations on data from the database for analysis, prediction or evaluation of 
decision alternatives. The model manager usually includes facilities for selecting 
models appropriate to a specified problem and for transforming the model output into a 
form suitable for display to the user. The interactive user interface system encompasses 
a variety of means which a user may engage to communicate with the system, such as a 
keyboard, touch screens, a mouse, or voice command, as well as ways of presenting 
information to the user, including the mode of graphic display and the problem 
description language (Mikolajuk 1996:8, Sprague 1980).
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Figure 1-1 Generic DSS architecture (adapted from Sprague (1980:24))
Although DSS were intended as a move away from MIS and OR, conventional DSS 
design and development has been strongly influenced by these traditions. A legacy of 
the influence of these disciplines on the field of DSS has been the inheritance of an 
instrumental techno-rational approach to decision-making, which emphasises 
quantification, rationality and computational efficiency (Angehm and Jelassi 1994:269). 
Accordingly, the dominant model of decision-making adopted throughout DSS 
literature is Simon’s (1957:60) ‘intelligence-design-choice’ rational theory, which is 
used both “to explain the process of decision-making and to derive the characteristics of 
computer-based systems aimed at supporting this process” (Angehm and Jelassi 
1994:269). Adherence to Simon’s model prescribes that effective decision-making 
entails: amassing optimal knowledge about the problem environment; selecting and 
ordering decision-relevant factors into a logical and transparent problem structure; 
generation, analysis and comparison of decision alternatives which satisfy specified 
decision criteria; and finally, selection of the optimal decision solution (Lein 1997:95, 
Kersten and Michalowski 1997:2). A further legacy of the historical context of the 
emergence of DSS has been inheritance of the traditional approach to computer systems 
development, whereby “a system is designed by computer specialists, in accordance 
with the technical and economic criteria set by management, but with little reference to 
current and future users; this design is then ‘implemented’ - with limited scope for 
modification” (Williams 1987:77). This approach is echoed within conventional 
environmental DSS design, where DSS tend to be “developed by groups of technical 
experts, quite separate from the ‘hoped-for’ end-users” (Ewing et al. 1997:3).
The features described above will be considered within this thesis as the conventional 
approach to DSS development. As will be highlighted in Chapter 3, a variety of new 
approaches are emerging within the DSS literature to challenge the conventional DSS 
paradigm. This thesis is located within this emerging critical literature.
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1.3.3 Bias
In this thesis, which takes the ontological position that knowledge is socially 
constructed, bias is conceptualised as a relative, political term, indicating promotion of 
one perspective over another. A DSS is described as biased if the use of that technology 
is perceived to systematically promote (elements of) one stakeholder perspective over 
another, either because the content or output of the technology are perceived to promote 
(elements of) one stakeholder perspective over another, or because the use of the 
technology is perceived to limit the opportunities of certain stakeholders to participate 
in decision-making relative to before the introduction of the technology.
Conceptualising bias in these terms recognises that bias, like knowledge, is socially 
constructed and negotiated, and that perceptions of bias will differ depending on the 
standpoint of the stakeholder who is attributing bias (cf Smithson 1989).
Within the positivist paradigm, ‘bias’ is defined as distortion from the true reality.
Good research is deemed to be that which is non-biased. Thus, conventional usage of 
the term ‘bias’ often invites negative connotations. This thesis seeks to overturn an 
automatic interpretive alliance between ‘bias’ and ‘substandard research’. As will be 
elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4 ,1 argue that bias is inherent in DSS development, and 
that reflexive treatment of bias may enhance decision support.
1.4 Thesis structure
The structure of this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Chapter 2 outlines the philosophical approach and methodology of the thesis.
The initial part of Chapter 3 outlines the conventional rationale (objectivity, expertise 
and efficiency) for the development and use of DSS to assist integrated environmental 
management. The latter and substantive part of the chapter challenges the assumption 
that the conventional approach to the development of DSS yields innately objective, 
expert decisions. Instead, it is argued that bias is an inescapable feature of DSS. A 
taxonomy is proposed which identifies sources of bias relevant to the development and 
use of environmental DSS. Chapter 4 describes a new theoretical framework for the 
development of environmental DSS which emphasises precautionary practice and 
critical learning via the discursive interrogation of bias. Based on the taxonomy of bias, 
an analytical framework is proposed to guide interrogation of potential and existing 
biases associated with a particular DSS.
To test the potential of the frameworks proposed in Chapter 4 to inform DSS 
development, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present a case study of the frameworks with the 
IWRAM project. Chapter 5 locates the case study analysis within the decision making 
environment of the Highlands of Northern Thailand. Note that to introduce and visually 
locate the highland environment, each of the chapter cover pages features images from 
the highlands of Northern Thailand. Chapter 6 presents a narrative of the evolution of 
the IWRAM project and the development of the IWRAM DSS, focussing on 
participants’ engagement with the proposed frameworks. Chapter 7 analyses both the 
framing of decision support and the interrogation of biases in the IWRAM project.
The concluding chapter draws together the arguments and findings of the thesis. 
Implications of the thesis for the development of DSS and for the practice of integrated
research are advanced. Limitations of the research are canvassed, and future research 
directions are suggested.
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Figure 1-2 Structure of this thesis
Analysis of case study 
Chapter 7
Research narrative 
Chapter 6
Reorientation of DSS development 
Chapter 4
Conclusions and reflections 
Chapter 8
Methodology 
Chapter 2
Introduction 
Chapter 1
Critique of environmental DSS 
Chapter 3
Decision-making environment of the 
highlands of Northern Thailand 
Chapter 5
IWRAM case study
Methodology
Over the past century, the northern highlands o f Thailand have been subject to 
extensive clearing, particularly for agriculture, including opium cultivation. 
This site, in a remote area o f the highlands, cleared o f all vegetation and on an 
open, sunny hill face, is probably intended for opium crops.
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2. Methodology
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the philosophy, approach and methods of this thesis. In much 
research, the process of inquiry is packaged as a neat hypothesis-testing study which has 
proceeded linearly according to its initial ideal research design. In this chapter, I have 
chosen an alternate style of presentation which reflects a commitment to transparency. I 
have aimed for an honest description of the research design as it evolved, including 
recognition of the unanticipated frustrations, opportunities, and insights which 
continually shaped the character and conduct of the research. This mode of presentation 
emphasises that the iterative (re)construction of knowledge manifested in this thesis 
occurred in a dynamic environment and was socially mediated by my relationship with 
my research participants (Steier 1991:4).
Section 2.2 discusses philosophical and epistemological assumptions that guided this 
inquiry and characterise key dimensions of my research approach. Section 2.3 recounts 
the narrative of the evolution of my research design. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe my 
data collection and analysis methods. Section 2.6 discusses the credibility, 
dependability, transferability and confirmability of these methods. Section 2.7 
examines my role as a researcher, including my interactions with the participants in the 
IWRAM research team which emerged as the case study for this inquiry. Section 2.8 
explores the sensitivity of this research topic. Finally, Sections 2.9 and 2.10 summarise 
the limitations and strengths of my methodology.
2.2 Philosophy and approach
The twentieth century, particularly since the 1950s, has been witness to multiple and 
mounting attacks on the dominance and validity of positivistic empirical inquiry. 
Critiques of the foundations and aims of positivism, and the practice of positivist 
research, have featured within numerous social research discourses, notably 
hermeneutics (Winch 1958), Marxism (Adorno 1967), feminism (Harding 1986), and 
communicative reconstruction (Habermas 1979, 1988). Among the new paradigm 
alternatives to positivist methodology which have been advanced are constructivism 
(Gergen 1985, Reason and Rowan 1981), naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln and Guba 1985, 
Erlandson et al. 1993) and deconstructionism (Derrida 1982).
Underlying and intertwined with both the research content and methodology of this 
thesis are ontological and epistemological themes common to many post-positivist 
approaches. Firstly, the positivist concept of a single external and tangible reality is 
replaced by the notion that there are multiple socially constructed realities. 
Methodologically, the acceptance of multiplicity and complexity encourages integration 
between and among different sociocultural perspectives, including conventional 
academic disciplines. Secondly, in contrast to the positivist norm of disengagement of 
the researcher from the researched, the researcher and the researched are viewed as 
interacting to influence each other. With disengagement rejected, inquiry emerges as an 
interpretive, personally and socially constructed process inevitably involving value
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judgements. Consequently, the positivist emphasis on demonstrating absolute neutrality 
or objectivity is displaced in favour of a concern for self-interrogation and transparent 
communication of subjective influences. The research process may thus be regarded as 
a circular or spiralling process constituted and guided by social and self-reflexivity1. 
Accordingly, evolving, flexible research designs are emphasised. The reflexive, inter- 
subjective model of research leads to another common feature of post-positivist 
approaches: a tendency to view research as a collaborative exchange, rather than 
research on a passive subject.
Of the suite of post-positivist approaches, contemporary critical theory, in particular, 
captures several philosophical threads underlying the content and methodology of this 
thesis. Firstly, my interest in critiquing conventional approaches to DSS development, 
articulated in Chapter 3, has parallels with a prevalent theme within critical theory of 
deconstructing the conventional scientific enterprise. Secondly, this thesis shares 
critical theory concerns about “the ways social relations also mediate power relations to 
create various forms of alienation and inhibit the realisation of human possibilities” 
(Morrow 1994:10), as well as an emphasis on the importance of the social context of 
production and implementation of technology. Thirdly, informing my research design 
has been a commitment to aim for constructive, useable research rather than purely 
abstract theory, echoing the critical theory contention that “a theory has no real value 
unless it can be demonstrated to have practical implications” (Habermas 1979).
However, this thesis is not situated strictly within either critical theory or any other 
particular post-positivist approach. As no single theoretical or empirical field could 
have had sole claim to inform this inquiry, I searched widely for illuminating constructs 
from multiple bodies of literature. This integrative approach was not eclectic, however, 
as the concerns of the thesis privileged certain strands of literature. For example, 
situated learning theory and social and personal constructivism informed both my 
theoretical framework, presented in Chapter 4, and the methodology I selected for 
application of my analytical framework. To inform my analysis of the development of 
DSS by the IWRAM research team for the Northern highlands of Thailand, I reviewed 
literature treating the power dimensions of knowledge creation and negotiation in cross- 
cultural rural extension and development.
Reality construed as: multiple, constructed realities
Knowledge construed as: personally and socially constructed
Values: transparency, pragmatism, critical thinking
Role of researcher: catalyst, participant within research
Research approach: integrated, reflexive, interpretive
Adapted from Carr 1994, Scoones and Thompson 1992, Morrow 1994
Table 2-1 Dimensions of research philosophy and approach
1 Reflexivity is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
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Although the rest of this chapter focuses on my case study methodology, it should be 
emphasised that my research approach and philosophy, summarised in Table 2.1, 
applies both to my interactions with the case study and to the theoretical dimensions of 
this thesis, as the concept of the reflexive research spiral implies.
2.3 Forming and framing the inquiry
I began this research in mid-1995 as a core member o f the IWRAM project which 
provides the case study for this thesis. At that stage, my intention was to conduct PhD 
research on integrated environmental assessment of the water resources of the Chao 
Phraya Basin, Thailand. My initial research focussed on literature reviews of the theory 
and practice of integrated environmental management, particularly watershed or 
catchment management, water resource conflicts associated with the Chao Phraya, and 
methods o f integrating biophysical, sociocultural and economic analyses. Based on 
these literature reviews, I refined my topic to exploring the usefulness of different tools, 
particularly an operational framework and a computer-based modelling system, to guide 
integrated environmental assessment and management.
In October 1995, members of the Australian team proposing the IWRAM project ran a 
workshop in Laos on Integrated Water Resources Management for South-East Asia. At 
this workshop, I co-presented a paper outlining the intended methodology for the 
proposed IWRAM project. An invited Australian academic in the audience later wrote a 
paper critiquing the IWRAM approach (Hinton 1996). An anthropologist who had 
undertaken extensive research in Northern Thailand, he suggested that the IWRAM 
approach downplayed, perhaps even neglected, the political dimensions o f resource use 
and management in Thailand:
“...the model has difficulty in allowing for the fact that the small farmer has 
infinitely less capacity to realise his or her ‘vision’ than the cashed up, well 
connected logger, or narcotics dealer. There is also the unrecognised fact that the 
model is itself being produced by actors in the regional drama, for the people who 
develop IWRAM are not detached scientific observers: by professional 
background and career experience they have an interest in promoting technocratic 
nostrums and will naturally tend to associate with similarly minded institutions... 
within the region” (Hinton 1996:6).
Hinton’s warnings resonated with several ethical issues regarding transfer of knowledge 
that I had been reflecting on during the previous months. After forays into dystopian, 
post-modern and community development critiques of technocracy, I had become 
concerned that conventional operational and modelling frameworks to assist integrated 
environmental assessment and management, based on Western conceptions of 
sustainability, may be unsuccessful in Northern Thailand, in terms of being supported 
by local actors, if  those actors perceived the assumptions underlying the frameworks to 
be irrelevant in the local context. I proposed to interview key stakeholders in highland 
environmental management to elicit their different perceptions of sustainability and 
resource use, and to develop alternate operational and modelling frameworks which 
would better incorporate these perspectives.
From April through June 1996,1 spent three months on field work in Chiang Mai, the 
Thai base for the IWRAM project. During this time, I also acted as a research assistant
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for the IWRAM project2. This latter role primarily involved liaising between the Thai 
and Australian teams, and negotiating and strengthening relationships with potential 
project collaborators. This experience impressed upon me the extent to which 
meaningful research integration seemed to depend largely upon the effort placed on 
sustaining and improving the fragile network of communication among researchers. 
During my field work, I also became aware of widespread negative sentiments towards 
previous foreign development and research projects in the highlands of Northern 
Thailand. The failure of these projects to achieve their objectives was often attributed to 
the imposition of Western solutions and approaches which later proved inappropriate in 
the political, cultural, and economic environment of the Northern highlands. I became 
concerned whether an environmental decision support system developed in Australia for 
generic application to Asian river basins could ever pay adequate attention to the local 
context. I was particularly concerned that attempts by developers to incorporate ‘the 
local perspective’ in the DSS (as I had proposed earlier) would prove cursory, and 
would fail to confront possible deep-seated divergence between the developers’ 
normative assumptions, embedded within the form and content of the DSS, and users’ 
worldviews. With Hinton’s (1996) warnings in mind, I was also concerned that those 
best situated to participate in development of (and ultimately use) the DSS would tend 
to be the more powerful and wealthy, which would have significant equity implications, 
and potentially create a tension with distributional and participatory dimensions of IEM 
theory.
My fieldwork experience led me to conclude that my topic should be reframed.
Although I had gone to Thailand searching for the keys to achieving integration in an 
external decision-making environment, my field work experience had provided critical 
insights into the difficulties and complexity of attempting integration within my own 
and the IWRAM project’s practice. Instead of seeking to construct an integrated DSS 
myself, I decided to concentrate on the process of development of a DSS for IEM. My 
interest lay in exploring whether it was possible to facilitate a more reflexive DSS 
development process which would provide a more effective tool for IEM by better 
recognising the potential for embedded biases and biases in access. Both Australian and 
Thai researchers involved in the IWRAM project expressed a willingness to participate 
in this research, and the IWRAM DSS development process became my case study.
A case study involves an in-depth, multifaceted investigation of a single social 
phenomenon in its natural, rather than an experimental, setting (Orum et al. 1991:2). 
Beyond providing a descriptive overview of the social context, a case study “entails an 
effort to discern and articulate the linkage between the phenomenon of interest and the 
actual social world in which it is embedded and sustained or reproduced” (Snow and 
Anderson 1991:154). Initially, I considered a comparative case study approach, 
contrasting the experiences of the IWRAM DSS development with alternate DSS 
development processes. However, because of difficulties in gaining sufficient access to 
other DSS development teams, I decided that an examination of those processes would 
be too superficial. Consequently, I decided to focus on the IWRAM project as a single, 
intensive case study. This decision accorded with the intensive research design 
approach encouraged by both critical theory and action research. Intensive research
2 This role is described in further detail in Section 2.7.
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designs emphasise “explicating the operations of causal processes and meaning 
structures in a single or limited number of cases” (Morrow 1994:250).
My supervisors at that time, both members of the IWRAM research team, advised me to 
explore action research as a potential method. Action research is a methodology 
popularised by Lewin (1946) which emphasises improvement of personal practice 
through self-reflective inquiry (McNiff 1988:1-3). Within action research, the subject 
of research is not external phenomena but professional practices (Robottom 1987:111).
I drew on action research principles in my framing of my thesis topic in that a key 
motivation was to improve the practice of integration and DSS development within the 
IWRAM project which I had been participating in through interventionist experiential 
learning (Argyris and Schon 1991:86).
Participatory action research is “a form of action research that involves practitioners as 
both subjects and coresearchers” (Argyris and Schon 1991:86). I incorporated 
participatory action research principles in this research in the sense that I did not seek to 
reform the IWRAM DSS development process by imposing my perspective of progress. 
Instead, I framed my role as catalytic. Thus, I focussed on facilitating and highlighting 
participants’ construing of biases associated with the DSS and also potential actions that 
might be taken to manage those biases. However, this thesis does not follow a strict 
participatory action research model. Firstly, from the point at which I reframed my 
thesis, I ceased to be directly involved in the DSS development. Furthermore, the need 
to preserve the academic independence I believed necessary to acquire a PhD for this 
research meant that I maintained control over the topic and direction of this research. 
Thus, the research was not a collaborative project driven by the negotiated agendas and 
concerns of the community of practice involved, as a participatory action research study 
would demand.
The evolution of the research design is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.4 Data collection
I employed multiple qualitative methods to elicit data to inform my research aims, 
illustrated in Table 2.2.
2.4.1 The decision-making environment of the Northern highlands
My first case study aim was to familiarise myself with the decision-making environment 
of the Northern highlands. To achieve this aim, I used document analysis and interview 
techniques. Document analysis entailed critical review and analysis of literature (mostly 
in English, also translations of relevant Thai literature) and other written material, 
including e-mail summaries of Thai newspapers, and relevant internet sites. In 
reviewing literature, I concentrated on constructing a chronological narrative of the 
evolving highland decision-making environment, from pre-modem settlement through 
to the present. This methodological approach was selected to highlight recurring 
themes, particularly persistent conflict between stakeholders’ alternate framings of the 
highland environment, environmental problems and environmental decision-making.
Further insights into the decision-making environment were gained through interviews 
with different highland stakeholders including: casual conversations; unstructured, 
semi-focussed individual interviews; and semi-structured, focussed individual 
interviews. A snowballing technique was used to identify prospective interviewees,
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Figure 2-1 Evolution of the research design
Preliminary research question: how useful are different tools, including computer- 
based technology, for I EM?
................ I................ ;
: Exploratory literature review and field work •
................... i...................
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Preliminary thesis: that conventional approaches to constructing and applying DSS 
to assist I EM are inadequate because they fail to incorporate local conceptions of and 
approaches to sustainability and resource management
1
Field work: 
interviews 
observation
Literature review 
triangulation
Research assistant 
within 1WRAM project
Further literature 
review
Development of taxonomy of bias and analytical framework for interrogating bias
New formulation of thesis: the use of DSS may undermine the transparent, 
participatory policymaking which IEM promotes, if the potential for bias is not 
recognised and managed during DSS development.
Subsidiary research question:
How effective is the framework in facilitating an interrogation of bias? 
How effective is the framework in terms of facilitating critical learning?
Preliminary research questions:
How do stakeholders in highland environmental management construe 
sustainability and resource management?
How might these perspectives be better incorporated within DSS?
Testing framework with IWRAM researchers
Analysing case study 
Assessing effectiveness of framework
: Completing write-up of thesis
Submission
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R esearch  aim s D a ta  collection  m ethods
To gain an understanding o f  the context o f  
application o f  the D SS , nam ely the decision­
m aking environm ent o f  the highlands o f  Northern 
Thailand
•  docum ent analysis
•  interviews: casual conversations; unstructured, 
sem i-focussed  interviews; semi-structured, 
focussed  interviews
To gain insight into how  different IW RAM  
researchers and other highland stakeholders frame 
dim ensions o f  decision  support
•  participant-observation
T o explore the im plications o f  these differing 
m odes o f  framing for the anticipation o f  bias 
associated  with the D SS
• participant-observation
• framework for anticipating bias: 
questionnaires, group d ialogues, sem i- 
structured and structured interviews
To assess the usefulness and relevance o f  my 
fram ework for anticipating and reflecting on bias
•  participant-observation
•  analysis o f  framework application
Table 2-2 Data collection methods
whereby an interviewee would suggest other people who would be useful to interview, 
and so on. Those people who emerged as key informants were generally reinterviewed, 
often over the course of several social engagements, such as lunches, dinners, and 
informal parties. Interviews were mostly conducted with English-speaking 
stakeholders. However, the perspectives of key non-English speaking participants in 
Thai environmental management were also sought. On each occasion, a translator was 
engaged with whom both I and the interviewee had already established rapport and trust. 
A tape recorder was not used during interviews because consultation with a range of 
interviewees suggested that the tape recorder would be invasive and would inhibit frank 
and open conversation. Instead, I recorded interviewees’ responses in a field notebook.
Insights gained into the decision-making environment are presented in Chapter 5 as a 
narrative of the highland environmental history and the political culture of highland 
decision-making. They also inform an interrogation of potential biases associated with 
introduction of DSS into the highland decision-making environment, Section 5.6.
2.4.2 Modes of framing decision support
Personal construct theory emphasises that “one need not actually adopt or share the 
constructs of another person (or culture) in order to understand them, but must be 
capable of construing what they are construing” (Ross 1996:181, Kelly 1955). To 
explore the different ways that IWRAM researchers were framing decision support, I 
needed to construe the IWRAM researchers construing of decision support. To this end, 
I engaged in participant observation. Observation has long been regarded by qualitative 
researchers as a fundamental method for understanding another cultural setting 
(Silverman 1993:9). Participant-observation presupposes that a researcher who 
becomes directly involved in the study context may gain insights into phenomena which 
would be obscured from the standpoint of a non-participant (Jorgensen 1989). As noted 
by Ross (1996:184), participant-observation provides a practical and less-intrusive 
method to gain insight into another’s construing.
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My participant-observation mainly took place at the Centre for Resource and 
Environmental Studies, where most of the Australian IWRAM researchers and myself 
were based. For approximately three years, I participated in and observed project 
meetings, workshops and everyday interactions between project personnel and other 
stakeholders. I took annotated minutes during formal and informal meetings and 
workshop discussions. Many critical insights emerged during the times I was employed 
by the project as a research assistant. This role is described in Section 2.7.
I also engaged in participant-observation with Thai IWRAM researchers and other 
stakeholders in highland environmental decision-making. I spent approximately six 
months, spread over five trips, on fieldwork in Thailand, mainly based in Chiang Mai at 
the Office of Highland Development (OHD)3. I observed work patterns and priorities, 
and talked informally with Thai project personnel and other stakeholders about the 
highlands. I observed and often participated in meetings involving Thai IWRAM 
researchers. On occasion, where language difficulties arose, a tape recorder was used to 
check written notes on meetings. I accompanied OHD workers on field trips into the 
highlands and observed the way they related to the landscape and other stakeholders. 
These field trips provided opportunities to gain insight into the complexities and 
paradoxes of the highland decision-making environment. These insights contributed to 
the circumtextual frame (MacLachlan et al. 1994:4) which shaped and informed my 
constructions and interpretations of the Thai IWRAM researchers’ personal and social 
interests and commitments. Box 2.1 reproduces excerpts from one field trip.
Other opportunities to gain an alternate perspective on the highland environment came 
in the form of social interactions, including being invited on a number of family 
holidays in the highlands with Thai collaborators in the IWRAM project. For example,
I was invited by a Department of Land Development (DLD) official to drive with him 
and his daughter to a wedding in Chiang Rai and then to tour the Golden Triangle 
region. During the journey, we visited his lychee farm, had a meal with his friend who 
runs one of the DLD regional field stations, and, at the apex of the golden triangle, 
discussed the stark differences between the Lao, Burmese and Thai approaches to 
highland development and management. As with the field trips, these social 
interactions provided valuable insights which would otherwise have been inaccessible.
Through personal field notebooks, I kept an ongoing record of my participant- 
observation experiences. I detailed observations of and reflections on activities 
pertaining to the case study. I also noted conceptual or practical difficulties I 
experienced, as well as substantive redefinitions or refinements of my research. As a 
visual reminders of events, informants and the environment, I incorporated photographs 
and slides in my notebooks.
Participant observation ranges across a continuum from full participant through 
participant-as-observer and observer-as-participant to full observer (Glesne and Peshkin 
1992:40). During my early involvement with the ANU-RPF project, my role was as a 
full participant in that I was an integral functioning member of the project team. From 
the point at which I decided to focus on the ANU-RPF project as a case study, my role 
oscillated between a participant-as-observer (primarily reflection on intensive
3 Figures 5.1 and 6.1 show how the OHD is situated amongst highland stakeholders and OHD personnel 
are situated within the IWRAM research team.
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interaction with the project) and an observer-as-participant (primarily observation o f the 
project and limited interaction with the project).
To complement my observations, I created a chronological archive o f email and other 
correspondence with different IWRAM researchers which I had collected since my first 
interactions in 1995 with the IWRAM project. Throughout the course o f my research, 
many o f  the IWRAM researchers routinely copied their email correspondence about the 
DSS to me, and provided me with their personal notes and sketches o f the DSS. These 
were added to the archive and have provided an invaluable source o f information 
detailing the different researchers’ perspectives on the DSS over time.
5 November 1997 - Hmong village in Pha Yao province
We have driven fo r  four hours to get to this Royal Project station. [X] is here to brief the new 
Governor o f  Pha Yao about his land use plans for the three villages in this area. [X] got in trouble 
with the last Governor because he agreed that the villagers could grow a small plot o f opium fo r  the 
elderly addicts so they didn’t turn to heroin. [X] told the Governor about it and the Governor 
agreed  -  then turned the situation into a campaign stunt by storming up to the village with army in 
tow, pretending to ‘discover ’ the ‘illegal ’ stash.
The new Governor arrived with an entourage o f about 25 officials, 5 policemen and 5 soldiers with 
AK47s. The Hmong villagers watch us unsmiling from behind tall grasses. This place is surrounded 
by land mines which the dirt road traverses carefully between. I  interviewed the Governor briefly.
He wants to help the highland people to raise their income by growing organic fruit and flowers, so 
they won't grow opium. He said he would help market their crops in Pha Yao. He also said he 
supported the use o f  computer technology because it leads to more effective decisions. This place 
makes it clear how much land use depends on the ability to market crops - the incorporation into the 
market economy.
The headman moved here about 20 years ago from higher on the mountains where he grew opium 
and hunted hawks, deer and other birds. Now he has about 20 rai* and grows rice, com and 
flowers. He showed me his land. His flowers this year weren’t successful because he picked them 
too late - the blooms had opened already. His favourite crop is flowers because o f the money they 
collect. He prefers this place to his old village on the mountains because it has a road and it is 
easier fo r  him to take his crops to the town to sell. He has a pickup now which he bought from his 
profits. He hesitated when I asked him what he liked to spend his money on - said finally that his 
wife likes to buy new clothes. Only one o f his four sons live in the village - one works in Singapore 
and two are studying in Chiang Mai, supported by monks. When I  asked i f  there was anything about 
the village he would like to change, he couldn't think o f  anything -  he said he leaves that up to the 
Royal Project people.
* 6.25 rai = 1 hectare
Box 2-1 Excerpts from field notes 
2.4.3 Framing decision support: Implications fo r  bias
My proposed analytical framework for anticipating bias (see Chapter 4) was the primary 
methodological tool that I employed to explore the implications o f different modes o f  
framing decision support for the reflection on and anticipation o f bias. As some 
methodological points were relevant to either the case study narrative or assessment o f  
the utility o f  the framework, the framework application methodology is partly contained 
within the case study chapters, Chapter 6 and 7. This section presents methodological 
notes about the techniques employed: questionnaires, group dialogues, semi-structured 
and structured interviews.
23
I decided to divide my testing of the framework into sessions pertaining to each of the 
three sections of the framework: (A) Background; (B) Embedded bias; and (C) Biased 
access. My initial plan was that each participant would complete a questionnaire on 
these themes, then the participants would meet and engage in a group dialogue about 
their responses to the questionnaire. I selected structured but open-ended questions in 
order to elicit participants’ responses in their own words, see Appendix 1. According to 
their preference, the participants filled out the questionnaires either in writing or in an 
interview. Generally, the participants chose to fill out their questionnaires in my 
presence and to provide me with a running commentary of their responses. The 
questionnaires provided a comparative source of data to establish participants’ 
individual positions prior to the group dialogue, as well as a point of triangulation for 
interview and observation notes. I selected group dialogues to provide insight into 
whether and how interaction between participants might promote learning in terms of 
exposing convergences or divergences in perspective.
The three Australian leaders of the biophysical, sociocultural, and DSS components of 
the IWRAM project agreed to participate in a trial of my framework for anticipating and 
interrogating bias. Other researchers in the Australian team had yet to be appointed. In 
May 1997, the Australian biophysical, sociocultural and DSS leaders engaged in a 
facilitated set of interviews concerning Part A of the framework. To keep the costs of 
participation in terms of time expended to a minimum, the group dialogue was limited 
to an hour.
The methods used for Part A had two key limitations. Firstly, participants tended to 
restrict their interaction to reading their prepared questionnaire responses rather than 
engaging in discussion. Secondly, the demands of facilitation hindered my note-taking. 
Consequently, for Part B, which was tested in July 1997, methods were altered. In order 
to stimulate greater debate, 1 prepared a set of discussion prompts based on issues which 
had emerged from the participants’ responses to the Part B questionnaire. Each 
participant was provided with a handout which comprised the collated responses so that 
they could view the diversity of responses. A tape recorder was used to complement my 
notes.
As Chapter 7 discusses, Part C of the framework was not trialed with the Australian 
team because they felt it was too premature to reflect on issues of biased access.
I had initially intended to test the analytical framework with the Thai researchers 
involved in the IWRAM project in parallel with the Australian application. Because of 
a lack of finances to fund field trips to Thailand, I attempted to interact with Thai 
researchers via e-mail. However, it soon emerged that e-mail was not an effective 
means of communicating, partly due to pragmatic reasons. For example, a single e-mail 
account was often shared by an entire department, leading to frequent instances of 
messages being lost, and computer-time tended to be rationed to around ten hours per 
month for a whole department, so communications were infrequent and brief. 
Consequently, I arranged with the Thai researchers that I travel to Thailand to test the 
framework in person. The Thai-based case study eventually took place in November 
1997, following the Australian application. The mode of using the framework with the 
Thai team necessarily differed from the Australian experience. Firstly, as a larger 
number of researchers (eight) were to participate, and as I had more limited time to test 
the framework, I condensed the three framework sections into a single interview guide
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(Appendix 2). As English was not the Thai participants’ first language, I simplified 
some of the questions, and reworded others in more everyday rather than academic 
English. Consultation with each of the Thai participants as to their preferred mode of 
interview and level of participation also led to alterations in the methodology from the 
Australian experience. For example, although most participants felt comfortable with a 
semi-formal interview, others preferred to respond to my questions over the course of 
several informal, and often more social, interactions.
I had originally intended that following the individual interviews with the Thai 
participants, I would co-facilitate a workshop in which issues emerging from the 
interviews could be discussed, in a similar fashion to the Australian group dialogues. 
However, several Thai participants advised that a formal workshop was likely to be 
consumed by protocol pleasantries, and that an informal meeting was more likely to 
result in frank discussion. In addition, the interviewees suggested that it would be better 
in terms of group politics if I arranged and facilitated the meeting alone, rather than 
seeking to co-facilitate. Consequently, I convened an informal meeting and sent each 
interviewee an agenda, Appendix 3, which comprised issues which I had distilled from 
the interviews as significant. The meeting was mostly conducted in Thai, and various 
participants translated the discussion where my Thai proved inadequate for me to 
comprehend the responses. As further checks on my comprehension of the meeting’s 
discussion, I asked the DSS leader to prepare a report of the meeting, and spent an 
afternoon with the GIS researcher discussing the dialogue and outcomes of the meeting.
During January and February of 1998,1 also facilitated a trial of the analytical 
framework, following the single interview guide method developed during the Thai case 
study, with four new members of the Australian team.
2.4.4 Assessing the framework for anticipating bias
The methods of participant-observation, individual interviews and group dialogues 
described above were also used to yield data which would allow assessment of the 
framework for anticipating bias. In addition, for the Australian trial of the framework, I 
provided participants with evaluation questionnaires following each group dialogue.
This enabled insight into participants’ own appraisal of the practicality and effectiveness 
of the analytical framework in terms of catalysing learning and revealing convergences 
or divergences in perspective.
2.5 Data analysis: Relating data and theory
The process of analysing data and comparing emergent patterns and themes with my 
theoretical concerns was ongoing and iterative throughout this research. Thus, although 
I am presenting data analysis as distinct from data collection, it should be emphasised 
that these processes were intertwined.
As a central part of the analytical process, I embarked on metatheoretical reflection 
within a series of journals on the relations between myself as researcher, the participants 
in my research, the data generated, and theory. In particular, I wrote about possible 
insights that my observations, interviews, documents and literature might offer for 
integrated environmental research or DSS development. I also continually queried 
whether patterns and themes emerging from data contradicted or lent coherence to 
theory, and vice versa.
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2.5.1 Dealing with transcripts
To analyse interview and group dialogue transcripts, I adopted a thematic analytical 
approach (Sadique 1996:28). Each of the interviews and group dialogues was 
transcribed into Microsoft Word. To begin coding interview and dialogue transcripts, I 
first selected and read one of the transcripts, noting broad themes that emerged from the 
data. I then printed out as many copies of the transcript as themes identified. For each 
theme, I examined the transcript, highlighting instances when that theme arose, and 
noting how each highlighted quote related to the theme. As I worked with the 
transcript, further themes emerged which were treated in the same manner. I repeated 
this process for the other transcripts, then compared the themes which had emerged in 
the light of my research focus. I realised that the themes accorded with three 
hierarchically linked categories: biases; the DSS and DSS development; and the 
decision-making environment.
I next constructed a table within Microsoft Word. Each transcript was copied in its 
entirety into the table. Cell breaks were inserted according to changes in theme. Each 
quote was thus coded according to theme, and then tagged with the identification label 
of the participant, the date of the interview or questionnaire, the theme, and the question 
number. Where a cell corresponded to more than one theme, the cell was copied and 
double-coded. Where existing themes proved inappropriate, the cell was coded as 
‘Other’. Recurring themes within the ‘Other’ category were promoted to their own 
category and sorted into the overarching hierarchical categories. Thus, coding 
categories emerged from the data, shaped by my theoretical concerns. The final coding 
frame is reproduced in Appendix 4. Sorting the data table by identification label, then 
date, then theme allowed examination of the evolution one participant’s perspective 
over time. Sorting the table according to date, then theme allowed comparison of 
different participants perspectives on a particular issue at a particular time.
2.5.2 Analysing quotes
Once the cells had been woven thematically into a chronological narrative, presented in 
Chapter 7, each quote was reanalysed in terms of the mode(s) of framing it portrayed, 
Box 2.2. During this iterative process, I noted patterns emerging from the data which 
suggested interests and personal or social commitments which shaped the modes of 
framing, including assumptions about the decision-making environment, particularly 
relationships between stakeholders, and assumptions about the best way to approach 
problem-solving including issues of scale. Each quote was then reanalysed in terms of 
these themes.
How is the DSS framed? How is DSS development framed?
• purpose • purpose
• form • form
• content • biases
• biases
Box 2-2 Analysis of modes of framing
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2.5.3 Analysing documents and observations
Throughout the research process, I intermittently reviewed my archive of documents 
and notebooks of observations to compare them to theory and insights from literature. I 
reviewed the archive more intensively once different participants’ modes of framing or 
approaching biases, DSS development and the decision-making environment began to 
emerge. Text, diagrams and observations pertaining to different participants’ modes of 
framing were highlighted. The chronological nature of the archive allowed me to 
compare these with the dated, coded quotes. This provided me with a richer picture of 
participants’ construing of biases, DSS development and the decision-making 
environment, and a means of gauging how issues raised during interviews or group 
dialogues may have affected the IWRAM project’s practice.
2.6 Credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability
Within the positivist paradigm of research, reliability and validity must be established to 
legitimise inquiry. Thus, Kidder (1981:7) argues that: “Research is valid when the 
conclusions are true. It is reliable when the findings are repeatable. Reliability and 
validity are requirements for both the design and the measurement of research. At the 
level of design, we examine the conclusions and ask whether they are true and 
repeatable. At the level of measurement, we examine the scores of observations and ask 
whether they are accurate and repeatable”. However, as articulated most convincingly 
by Lincoln and Guba (1985), this stance is problematic if a constructivist position is 
adopted. Firstly, internal validity conventionally refers to the extent to which the data 
of an inquiry represents the reality it is claimed to represent. This positivist definition 
presupposes the existence of a single objective reality which the researcher can 
determine. Lincoln and Guba (1985:296) suggest that if multiple constructed realities 
are assumed, then the credibility of the findings of an inquiry should rest instead on the 
extent to which the researcher’s reconstructions of realities are perceived as credible 
interpretations of the original multiple realities.
Several strategies suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to establish credibility were 
employed in this thesis. Firstly, prolonged engagement with the IWRAM project and 
persistent participant-observation of daily events within the project enhanced my ability 
to understand and interpret these events in context. Secondly, triangulation of 
information about events and relationships illuminated similarities and differences in 
constructions. This was achieved through: conducting multiple interviews, including 
interviews with highland stakeholders not participating in the project; and comparing 
individuals’ verbal statements with observations and project documentation (draft 
proposals, meeting minutes, emails, conference papers). I also reviewed my perceptions 
and analyses with other researchers both within and outside the project to explore 
alternate constructions. In the case of IWRAM researchers, I discussed my findings 
informally, and asked participants to verify my written case study narrative and analysis. 
In Chapter 6, where researchers argued for an alternate reconstruction of events or 
themes, these are footnoted.
Reliability conventionally implies that “the findings of an inquiry would be repeated if 
the inquiry were replicated with the same respondents in the same setting” (Lincoln and 
Guba). However, replicability rests on the notion of an unchanging tangible reality. If 
‘reality’ is perceived as ephemeral and changing, then “observed instability may be
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attributed not only to error but also to reality shifts” (Erlandson 1993:34). Promoting 
the dependability of the research thus necessitates detailed communication of the 
research process and setting in such a way that future researchers may assess likely 
sources of variance between research settings (Lincoln and Guba 1985:299). To this 
end, I have made a conscious effort to describe both my methodology and the IWRAM 
project in sufficient detail in this thesis to facilitate future comparison. I have also 
maintained an archive of documentation, questionnaires, interview notes, participant- 
observations, and several reflective journals relating to my research.
External validity pertains to the generalizability of research findings. The constructivist 
paradigm does not seek to develop generalizable results, as it is assumed that “all 
observations are defined by the specific contexts in which they occur” (Erlandson et al. 
1993:32). However, this does not imply that knowledge gained in one context is 
regarded as irrelevant to other contexts. Instead, the constructivist paradigm maintains 
that transferability of theoretical concepts between contexts is possible if the contexts 
possess similar characteristics (Marshall and Rossman 1989:146). Hence, the 
significance of this study is not limited to the IWRAM project, but instead yields 
insights relevant to the theory and practice of both DSS development and integrated 
research. In Chapter 8 ,1 draw links between my findings and broader theoretical 
concerns, and suggest lessons for DSS development and integrated research.
If one accepts that objectivity is an illusion because the researcher can never be 
completely disengaged from the methodology they select and construct, then the 
credibility and trustworthiness of research findings also rests on the extent to which a 
reader may interrogate the biases of the researcher. As Bruner (1990:25) notes, 
“Constructivism’s basic claim is simply that knowledge is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in light of 
the perspective we have chosen to assume... The best we can hope for is that we be 
aware of our own perspective and those of others when we make our claims of 
‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’”. To communicate the partial and positioned character of 
research, I have drawn on techniques of self-reflexivity, and emphasised transparency of 
method, data and analysis in presentation of this thesis. In Sections 2.3 and 2.7 of this 
chapter, I explore how my role as a researcher has influenced the conduct and outcomes 
of this inquiry. In particular, I attempt to illuminate how my interactions with and 
reflections on the IWRAM project, as well as my constructions of meaning, 
interpretations, emotions and actions may have influenced both my own and the 
IWRAM project’s research process. Meanwhile, in the case study chapters, I have used 
interviewees’ quotes liberally so that readers may assess my interpretations and analysis 
of their verbal constructions for bias.
2.7 Confronting reflexivity: Role of the researcher
From the outset, my background shaped the way in which I chose to frame the topic of 
this research. For example, previous disenchantment as a physicist with the limitations 
of models in adequately capturing the phenomena under investigation has prompted 
greater interest in what technology cannot do rather than what it can. This has led to a 
focus in this thesis on the risks of technology rather than on the opportunities. As a 
New Zealander, I have observed the resentment shown by many Maori people towards 
perceived instances of the imposition of Pakeha (European) institutions, logic, laws and 
expertise. This heightened my awareness of manifestations of neo-colonialism, and 
contributed to my concerns about the imposition of Western technology on the Thai
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highland decision-making environment. My interest in the implications of divergent 
perspectives was further attenuated by personal experience of alienation and cultural 
difference following my move from New Zealand to Australia, and later to Thailand.
It is important to detail my interactions with the IWRAM project to acknowledge 
intersubjectivity within my research. My relationship with IWRAM participants was 
multidimensional. My early interactions were solely as a PhD student formally 
associated with the project, intending to undertake an integrated environmental 
assessment of the water resources of the Chao Phraya Basin, Thailand. In this context, I 
circulated literature reviews relevant to my thesis topic amongst prospective IWRAM 
researchers, and selected a procedural framework to guide the IWRAM project’s 
research, which was subsequently adopted by the project proponents as their conceptual 
framework for research. At various stages during my thesis research, I also acted as a 
part-time research assistant with the project. In this capacity, I assisted with 
coordinating individual submissions for the IWRAM funding proposal into a coherent 
draft, synthesised a summary of the IWRAM project from the funding proposal, and 
prepared drafts of several conference papers detailing the approach and methodology of 
different components of the project. I also assisted in running workshops, establishing 
links with collaborators, and liaising between the Thai and Australian IWRAM 
researchers.
2.7.1 Access and rapport
Rapport describes the character of effective field relationships and is marked by 
confidence and trust (Glesne and Peshkin 1992:93,94). Many texts intimate that gaining 
access and establishing rapport are stages through which the researcher must pass before 
‘uncontaminated’ data may be derived (May 1997:142). However, in my experience, 
negotiating access and building rapport were both ongoing processes throughout the 
research.
As access and rapport did not present as significant an issue in the Australian case, I will 
mainly focus in this section on the Thai context. However, a few points regarding 
access and rapport with the Australian participants are worthwhile noting. Firstly, my 
initial role as a core member of the Australian IWRAM team, and my subsequent, 
intermittent, role as a research assistant for the IWRAM project, were key factors in 
developing and maintaining trust and rapport with the Australian IWRAM researchers. 
However, over time, my research assistant activities also caused me to feel significant 
tensions in terms of both time-management and intellectual space, leading me to decide 
to restrict access during 1997. In order to demarcate the end of my thesis-related 
interaction with the IWRAM project, and allow me to concentrate on my write-up, I 
elected to further restrict my access to the project after November 1997.
There is a widely held perception amongst Thai people that Western academics and 
consultants often disregard and undervalue the capacity of Thai people to plan for their 
own future and to develop effective strategies for coping with problems. Until their 
credibility has been established, Western researchers may thus be treated with 
ambivalence, or even distrusted as intellectual colonialists who seek to impose Western 
‘solutions’ on an ‘undeveloped’ country. These attitudes presented a challenge in terms 
of engendering trust and credibility for my research, and also significantly influenced 
the direction of my study. As I interacted with key Thai informants, I continually 
emphasised that my thesis research was not intended to follow the colonial tradition, but
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rather was intended to offer insights to Thai and Westerners alike into difficulties 
presented by the application of Western-designed technology in a Thai context. 
Achieving consistency between these assertions and the character of my research 
required considerable and continuous reflection on and modification of my research 
approach and design.
My identity as a young Eurasian woman helped to distance me from the older 
Anglosaxon (often American) men who have generally undertaken research and 
consultancies in Thailand according to the colonial model. Having lived and worked in 
several Asian countries, my familiarity with the customs, history and etiquette of those 
cultures, combined with demonstrated interest in learning nuances of Thai traditional 
dance, music, cuisine, and language, enhanced my assurances that I wished to gain 
insight rather than to impose a Western worldview. None-the-less, infrequent, casual 
remarks from one key Thai informant throughout the course of my thesis warning me 
that “What works in Australia may be unsuitable to the Thai” served as a reminder that 
suspicions run deep.
The time required to develop and maintain sufficient rapport with Thai participants to 
elicit confidential, personal responses rather than the “official line” should be 
emphasised here. Again, my identity as a young female often assisted in this, with 
several participants identifying me as the same age as their daughters. I was 
subsequently encouraged to make friends with their daughters and invited to a number 
of family social occasions. Playing the guitar also assisted in breaking down barriers 
during informal social occasions. Once social rapport had developed, this carried over 
into work settings, and informants would volunteer confidential, explanatory 
commentary of events, including the politics behind the scene.
The role of patronage, or at least introductions from a trusted source, in establishing 
rapport should also be emphasised. In many instances, particularly with government 
officials, rapport increased dramatically when my association with the Royal Project 
Foundation was established4. However, in the case of villagers and some NGOS, 
rapport improved when I cited my collaboration with the Thai sociocultural team, who 
were well known as supporters of a collective of highland villagers campaigning for 
environmental and social justice.
After July 1997, the unanticipated severity of the Thai financial crisis exacerbated 
difficulties in arranging and conducting interviews as potential interviewees were no 
longer secure about their future (including their employment). Thus, many found it 
difficult to focus on theoretical concerns about a hypothetical computer system. Initial 
interviews were often dominated by the interviewee relating the difficulties they were 
confronting personally as a result of the economic situation. Considerable patience and 
extra time (repeat visits) were required to encourage interviewees to attend to the topic 
of the interview.
4 The Royal Project Foundation (RPF) is described in Section 5.5. The Thai collaborators in the 
IWRAM project were coordinated under the umbrella of the RPF. Due to its association with the King of 
Thailand, it accords respect amongst many Thai people.
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2.8 Sensitive research
Lee and Renzetti (1993:5) describe a sensitive research topic as one which poses a 
substantial threat for either the researcher or the researched, therein raising 
methodological, ethical or political problems. Two aspects of this research presented 
difficulties because of sensitivity. Firstly, re framing my research as a case study of the 
IWRAM project was problematic in that two of the Australian IWRAM researchers who 
would be subjects of my research were also members of my supervisory panel. Given 
their roles as project leaders, I felt that it was imperative that I include them in my 
research process. However, I also needed to be assured of the independence of my 
analysis. To cope with this situation, an alternate supervision panel, including a new 
primary supervisor, was instituted to assist in my preparation of the interviews, to 
oversee my research during this period and to critically examine my subsequent 
analysis.
Secondly, I recognised that the success of the IWRAM project would be likely to 
influence the subsequent funding of similar projects proposed by the IWRAM team. In 
the light of this, I was mindful that a critique of the project could be construed as 
threatening. The IWRAM researchers did not raise this as a problem; instead, many 
professed support for a critical approach. None-the-less, reflecting on the post-positivist 
norm of collaborative research, I felt that ethically I did not wish to jeopardise the future 
of the participants in my research. This contributed to my decision to incorporate action 
research principles, including recognising the improvement of the practice of the 
IWRAM project as a central intent of my research. During the write-up of this thesis, I 
have consulted participants about whether they accord with my analysis and 
conclusions, and invited them to note divergences. I have also emphasised my 
willingness to negotiate restricted dissemination of this thesis if the content or 
conclusions are construed as threatening.
2.9 Limitations of the methodology
Although methodological and theoretical pluralism may enhance research, it also 
introduces limitations in terms of the depth that may be achieved. Integrating 
perspectives for transdisciplinary research inevitably requires the researcher to invest 
trust in other researchers’ analyses or syntheses of theory and methods. More extensive 
review of critical theory, organisational learning, rural development and personal 
construction literature may have contributed additional insights. However, the time 
constraints of a PhD thesis determined otherwise.
Despite the measures taken to enhance credibility and confirmability, limitations remain 
in terms of accurate representation of IWRAM collaborators’ and other highland 
stakeholders’ constructions of environmental decision-making and decision support. As 
Ellemor (1998:26) emphasises, a researcher’s representation of another individual’s 
constructs will tend to differ, to varying extents, from the way in which that individual 
would represent themselves. Representation issues compounded when I sought to elicit 
constructions not only across cultures, but also across languages. Although I studied 
Thai language during my first year, my field experiences soon showed that my language 
proficiency was insufficient to rely on to yield detailed and still credible representations 
of the constructions of Thai-speaking stakeholders. Similarly, my lack of fluency with 
any of the tribal languages, or intimate knowledge of tribal cultures, provided a key
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limitation in terms of representing the constructions of hill tribe villagers living in the 
highlands. Furthermore, time, funding and access constraints meant that I was unable to 
spend extensive time interacting with the latter groups. Consequently, this thesis 
focuses, in descending order of emphasis, on the Australian IWRAM collaborators, then 
Thai IWRAM collaborators (most of whom were fluent in English), then other highland 
stakeholders.
The Thai mode of testing the analytical framework, in which the three questionnaire 
sections of the framework were condensed into one interview guide, was more effective 
in providing insight into participants’ construals than the Australian application. This 
was partly because the interview format enabled probing and thus facilitated more in- 
depth responses, and partly because participants’ responses to questions from one 
section of the framework tended to reinforce and elaborate their responses to questions 
another section, thus providing a richer picture. Thus, in hindsight, the Australian mode 
of testing the framework may have benefited from a similar approach.
The quality of interaction in the group dialogues in both Australia and Thailand was 
limited by time constraints which arose when one or more participants arrived late, 
while others were required to leave early. In the Australian instance, continuity was 
compromised by breaking the dialogues into three sessions. To address both of these 
problems, a better method may have been to frame the group dialogues as a formal half­
day workshop, rather than as a series of short, semi-formal meetings.
The method I employed to code and analyse interviews, questionnaires and dialogue 
transcripts was time and labour intensive, and would be cumbersome if a larger group of 
participants was involved. Firstly, the computer I was using had difficulties coping with 
the size of the coded tables and frequently crashed. Secondly, I treated each transcript 
intensively to ensure that all potential coding categories which emerged from the data 
were given consideration. Preparation of the coding frame on the basis of a smaller 
sample of transcripts would have saved time, but would not have yielded as rich an 
analysis.
2.10 Summary
The methodological approach of this thesis emphasises critical thinking, reflexivity, 
transdisciplinarity and constructive research. The research design of this thesis evolved 
through a complex and dynamic interplay between substantive theorising, emerging 
from my practical experiences with the IWRAM project, and conceptual concerns. 
Rather than predetermining methods, I allowed the gradual unravelling of the research 
problem to guide the selection of methods, which were drawn from a range of socio­
political fields of inquiry. Participant-observation, document analysis, interviews, 
dialogues, questionnaires and meta-analysis were among the suite of methods used to 
gain insight into how decision support development might be reconstructed, how 
participants in the IWRAM project construed decision support, and the usefulness of my 
proposed framework for interrogating bias.
Environmental 
decision support systems
In the past decade, deforestation of the northern highlands of Thailand has 
become a contentious political issue, and has been widely blamed for 
exacerbating both drought and flooding in the lowlands.
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3. Environmental decision support systems
3.1 Introduction
Through policies aimed at implementing or furthering the Rio Declaration, Agenda 
21 and related conventions, many governments have formalised their commitment to 
a sustainability paradigm. However, the operationalisation within public 
policymaking of the principles of sustainability, and of its managerial adjunct 
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), has proved challenging. In recent 
years, the development and application of computer-based Decision Support Systems 
(DSS) has increasingly been promoted to assist in resolving the dilemma of 
translating IEM theory into practice.
Through challenging and critiquing the conventional rationale for environmental 
DSS, this chapter argues that an unreflexive approach to the design of environmental 
DSS, which neglects the potential for bias, may serve to undermine effective IEM. 
Thus, this chapter paves the way for Chapter 4, which explores a framework to 
anticipate, interrogate and make more transparent existing or potential biases within a 
particular DSS. Section 3.2 outlines the conventional rationale for environmental 
DSS. Section 3.3 challenges the purported objectivity of DSS, and proposes a 
taxonomy of bias relevant to DSS. Section 3.4 examines the notion of DSS as 
expertise, and suggests that the reification of science and technology as the most 
authoritative and reliable basis for decision-making is undermined by local critiques 
of universal knowledge. Drawing on theory of the democratisation of expertise, 
Section 3.4 also discusses the potential for and limitations of a more participatory 
approach to the development of DSS in terms of assisting in managing for bias and 
ignorance. Section 3.5 argues that claims of the efficacy of DSS are undermined by 
anecdotal evidence that instances of sustained adoption of DSS by targeted users are 
more the exception than the rule. Section 3.5 further argues that recognition and 
management of bias is imperative not only from an equity and transparency 
viewpoint, but also for the effective and efficient provision of decision support.
3.2 Conventional environmental DSS
According to the conventional rationale for environmental DSS, due to cognitive 
limitations, humans have difficulty in coping with the complexity of modem 
environmental decision-making. As decision-making tasks become more difficult 
and unwieldy, “selective perception, selective information retrieval, incomplete or 
biased problem definitions, and unreliable or inconsistent evaluation of alternatives” 
arise, leading to “suboptimal decisions” (Lein 1997:95-96). It is argued that, due to 
its information processing capabilities, computer-based DSS may enhance the 
cognitive abilities of environmental decisionmakers to allow consideration of a more 
comprehensive range of variables more objectively (Stuth and Stafford-Smith 1993). 
Environmental DSS may thus render practical a range of vital but manually 
inefficient management techniques. By consolidating optimal knowledge, DSS may 
also enable decision-makers to undertake specialist analysis which they would 
otherwise be unable to perform due to a lack of the appropriate skills, knowledge or
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experience. As Sagheb-Tehrani (1993:15) comments in reference to the utility of 
expert systems: “As good human experts are expensive, these systems provide an 
economical and efficient way of using the expertise in a variety of tasks”.
In light of their perceived objectivity, expertise and efficiency, environmental DSS 
are increasingly being heralded within research and management spheres as critical 
for effective decision-making for sustainability (Mikolajuk 1996:3). On the surface, 
and according to the conventional rhetoric, DSS appears a vital tool to enable 
decision-makers to cope efficiently with the demands of sustainability. As Walker 
and Johnson (1996:175) comment, addressing the utility of DSS to assist Total 
Catchment Management in Australia, “it is hard to see how increasingly demanding 
objectives in environmental management could be achieved without effective and 
efficient use of information technology tools”. Implicit within the conventional 
rationale are fundamental assumptions about knowledge claims, including the 
reification of science and technology as objective and expert. The rest of this chapter 
will characterise and critically examine these assumptions, and explore the 
implications of this critique for the effective provision of environmental decision 
support.
3.3 DSS, objectivity and bias
3.3.1 Reexamining the objectivity o f DSS
DSS proponents’ claims of objectivity are derived from a positivist notion of the 
scientific basis of DSS. As Ozawa (1996:221) comments, “Science is conceived as a 
process that yields an objective, rational, politically neutral body of knowledge”. A 
key philosophical thread underlying this positivist conception is the dominant early 
Enlightenment perspective which promoted scientific knowledge revealed through a 
process of disciplined, deductive reasoning as certain and unbiased by prejudicial, 
precipitant or distorted information acquired via the subjective senses (cf Descartes 
1968:41, Discourse 2). Rational inquiry was presumed to enable a disengaging of 
the mind from the body from the world (Appfel-Marglin 1996:3). This rationalist 
perspective was subsequently challenged by the Enlightenment empiricists, who 
argued that human cognition is necessarily grounded in sensory experience, and that 
the mind builds conceptual understanding by reflection on sensory impressions 
(Locke 1894:33, Il.i). According to the empiricist perspective, the human mind 
cannot possess certain knowledge of the world, but can only speculate or infer 
probable truths on the basis of hypotheses concerning sensory impressions of reality 
(Tamas 1991:334).
A resolution to the dichotomy between empiricism and rationalism was proposed by 
Kant, who argued that a person’s perceptions of the natural world are channelled 
through a priori filters into a structure which reflects that person’s prior knowledge 
and conceptual judgements about the natural world. On the one hand, this 
conception is consistent with the empiricist notion that humans cannot know an 
external objective reality without reference to sensory experience. However, it also 
appeals to rationality, by implying that reason exists as a part of the transcendental 
structures of cognition through which the human mind bestows order on the 
phenomenal world (Morrow 1994:147). Thus, “knowledge is made - constructed -
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through synthesis, which is performed by applying the categories of pure 
understanding to what is perceived” (Spivey 1997:6).
The Kantian notions of mental filters and the constructedness of realities are echoed 
in the many variants of contemporary constructivist theory. For example, following 
Kelly (1955:8-9), personal construct theorists argue that a person can only know the 
world through patterns or templates, called ‘constructs’, which that person creates 
and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed. Social 
constructionists emphasise knowledge, including the common-sense knowledge that 
guides conduct in everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Gergen 1985, Geertz 
1993:76), as generated from within social frameworks and as both constrained and 
enabled by "interlocking social commitments and conventions" (Wynne 1992:116).
Although individual-oriented and socially-oriented constructivism have traditionally 
been portrayed as distinct and even conflicting bodies of theory (Shwandt 1994:131), 
their compatibility is now widely recognised, and differences between the 
perspectives are regarded as predominantly a matter of analytic focus (Spivey 
1997:25). Whether the analytic emphasis is placed on the individual or the social 
group, personal and social variants of constructivism are predicated on the Kantian 
notion that knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. From this starting point, 
contemporary constructivists have developed a comprehensive critique of the innate 
objectivity of scientific knowledge. Constructivists note that an important corollary 
of Kantian post-empiricism is that human observations are never free of priorly 
imposed conceptual judgements. Consequently, all knowledge “bears the marks of 
its constructors” (Code 1991:55). Wright (1992:27) explains the basic thesis:
“we can observe and conceptualise the world only by imposing some general 
explanatory structure on our experience o f the world, thus enabling the experience 
to be organised into observations and concepts. We can see only what in some 
sense we already expect to see, and so observations can never be truly pristine, 
never fully independent o f our prior theoretical commitments and expectations. For 
this reason,... we can never have direct and innocent knowledge o f an independent 
and objective world”.
In the face of the constructivist challenge to the objectivity of scientific knowledge, 
Popper, although recognising that “We do not know: we can only guess” (Popper 
1968:278), has maintained that ‘good’ science proceeds from an interest in "objective 
scientific theories - in the theories themselves, and in the problem of their truth, or 
their nearness to the truth" (Popper 1994:56). According to this orthodox 
perspective, the method of science, the method of rational critical discussion of 
competing theories, provides the one superordinate discourse to transcend different 
social frameworks towards the goal of realising certain truths. Thus, even if 
scientific fashion, ideological dogmatism, institutional convention or other 
sociocultural commitments serve to bias a theory, that bias will be exposed by 
competing theories. The theory which has the least bias or uncertainty, which is 
more objectively nearer to the truth, will succeed as the interim ‘truth’. Note that 
within the positivist conception, ‘bias’ is construed as a negative term denoting 
divergence from ‘the truth’.
However, numerous authors have challenged the presupposition that good scientists 
conform to Popper’s ideal. In his seminal analysis of the structure of scientific
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revolutions, Kuhn (1962:24) argues that scientists typically work to reinforce the 
prevailing orthodoxy, disregarding facts which do not fit pre-existing theory as 
anomalies. Kuhn’s analysis of ‘paradigms’, his description of ‘interim truths’, 
shifted attention away from the prevailing framing of scientific research as a rational, 
logical process towards a notion of research as part of a cultural practice based on 
common meta-theoretical assumptions about the nature of science and methodology, 
key research problems, and exemplary science (Morrow 1994:74). Rather than 
viewing subjective construction as bad science, Wynne (1992a: 115) argues that 
social commitments are a necessary feature of structured scientific investigation in 
that they define the boundaries of, and give coherence to, scientific knowledge. 
Similarly, Maturana (1991:31) holds that the criterion of validation of scientific 
explanations constitutes science as a particular explanatory domain.
Over the past two decades, numerous analyses, particularly from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, have supported the argument that the technical construction of 
scientific logics is shaped by implicit and explicit social mechanisms of closure 
endemic to the culture of the observer (Collins 1986, Latour and Woolgar 1979, 
Wynne 1992a, Knorr-Cetina 1981, Yearley 1988). As Harding (1998:134) notes, 
from the outset of research, “it is in the context of discovery that culture-wide 
assumptions shape the very statement and design of the research project, and 
therefore select the methods”. Latour and Woolgar (1979) detail the integral role that 
social microprocesses play in the social construction of scientific ‘facts’ during 
routine research in a scientific laboratory. Munda et al. (1994) point to the model 
designer’s value judgement in selecting and weighting criteria in qualitative 
multicriteria model. Smithson (1989:8) emphasises the role of taboo as a form of 
socially enforced irrelevance: "taboo matters are literally what people must not know 
or even inquire about". These and other analyses support Ozawa’s (1996:225) 
conclusion that “Irrespective of the rigidities of the scientific method, a multitude of 
discretionary judgements are made during the course of a scientific investigation by 
the researcher”.
The interpretative flexibility of scientific logics is highlighted by ‘expert 
disagreement’ during episodes of scientific controversy (Pinch and Bijker 1987:27, 
Collingridge and Reeve 1986:16-17). In relation to divergent scientific explanations 
for radiocaesium contamination, Wynne (1992a: 122,125) suggests that the research 
speciality of different scientists influences their construction of scientific logics: 
“Their epistemic, theoretical and methodological commitments build up different 
bodies o f ‘natural’ data or facts, impregnated with incompatible ‘natural’ logics”. 
Even within a research discipline or subdiscipline, multiple epistemologies tend to 
result in a multiplicity of concurrent competing theories, none of which has achieved 
the hegemonic status of a definitive, universal paradigm (Long 1992:17). As Geertz 
(1993:14) argues, “The various disciplines and sub-disciplines that make up the arts 
and sciences are, for those caught up in them, far more than a set of technical tasks 
and vocational obligations; they are cultural frames in terms of which attitudes are 
formed and lives conducted”.
Additionally, when science encounters the public policy arena, whether during 
development or application of a theoretical concept or a scientific artefact 
(technology), then political factors such as expediency, interests and budgetary 
concerns emerge as a significant influence over the nature of the science or
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technology (Lafollette and Stine 1991). For example, in reference to guided research 
funding, Shackley et al. (1995:221) argue that "the dominant agendas, commitments 
and goals of particular policy communities may themselves act as closure 
mechanisms around particular scientific styles, practices and predispositions". The 
potential for both policy relevant science and technological development to be 
shaped by explicit and conscious influence to further a group or individual's interests 
is illustrated in King and Kraemer’s (1993:34) exposition of how opposing political 
parties in the United States have been routinely constructing their own economic 
models since the early 1980s to provide proof of the validity of their economic 
policies. In this instance, science and technology emerge “as weapons in ideological, 
partisan and bureaucratic warfare over fundamental issues of public policy” (King 
and Kraemer 1993:34).
Note that the preceding discussion illustrates the inadequacy of the conventional 
model which separates science from political ideology by positing the science and 
policy domains as independent systems which interact through the flow of 
information (Shackley et al. 1995:219). One modification to the conventional 
perspective suggests a distinction between core science (politically neutral and 
objective) and policy relevant science. Weinberg’s (1972) trans-science model 
postulates the existence of a trans-scientific domain distinct from pure science 
encompassing policy-relevant scientific questions which requires non-scientific 
methods for resolution. Subsequent authors have elaborated on Weinberg, 
identifying domains of regulatory science and mandated science (Shackley et al. 
1995:219). This thesis will not delve into these models other than to note that studies 
from the sociology of science would seem to undermine the trans-science models 
also, by revealing as artificial the reification of a politically neutral and objective 
core science. Regardless, even if the trans-science model is subscribed to, the 
science which underlies environmental decision-making clearly falls within the 
policy relevant domain.
In a similar manner to Shackley et al. (1995), Fries (1988:258) discusses how 
development of NASA’s space stations “has not been a coherent design evolution by 
an intrinsic technological rationality but rather a series of ingenious contrivances to 
solve problems that were political in origin”. Fries (1988:237) draws an analogy 
between technological development and Lindblom’s (1959) model of public policy 
which argues that political decision-making tends to follow a process of “muddling 
through” rather than systematic, rational actions to achieve predetermined goals.
This points to the historic specificity of technological development decisions, and 
supports Woolgar’s (1987:312) comment that “there is no unique way of designing 
(or interpreting) technology. Designs and interpretations vary across time and among 
different social groups. When competing views and ideas come into conflict, the 
upshot of the ensuing controversy is determined by various social contingencies”.
In summary, the conventional treatment of DSS as able to provide objective 
apolitical solutions stems from a unitary conception of knowledge which forces 
divergent knowledge claims into a homogeneous formalisation, overlooking “the 
way observations, insights, and ideas are influenced by interest and position” 
(Torgerson and Paehlke 1990:9). As Segal (1994:7) notes, "Because of its inherent 
contradictions and elusiveness, the public interest can never be defined 
technologically". Assertions of the objectivity of DSS thus neglect sociopolitical
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heterogeneity, and are undermined by the theory of the social construction of 
knowledge.
3.3.2 Environmental DSS and embedded bias
The preceding analysis suggests that the knowledge embodied within a DSS (for 
instance, the underlying conceptual theory, the way the problem is defined, the 
parameters and data selected as relevant, the theoretical models favoured, or the 
options or what-if scenarios permitted by the system to be modelled) will reflect, 
perhaps inadvertently, networks of social commitments and conventions which arise 
from the values, priorities, experience and organisational culture of those who have 
input into or influence over the design or development of the technology (Bardwell 
1991:605, Wynne 1992a).
Environmental decision-making is seldom unpoliticised (Di Chiro 1987). Instead, 
normative and political pluralism tend to result in multiple and competing definitions 
of environmental problems and their attributes (Miller 1993, Bardwell 1991:605). 
Consequently, an environmental DSS, designed to address a particular environmental 
problem, during a particular time period, at a particular scale, or within a particular 
boundary, will tend to be tailored to and therefore favour the worldview of those 
stakeholders who participate in or have influence over its design or who are the 
implicit users5. As Feenberg’s (1995:12) analysis of the subversive rationalisation of 
technologies suggests, the DSS “offers a material validation of the cultural horizon to 
which it has been preformed”. Where the construction of the DSS systematically 
influences the output, we can conceptualise bias as having been embedded into the 
structure of the DSS. Thus, in contrast to the positivist definition, ‘bias’ is now 
reframed as a relative term, indicating the promotion of (elements of) one constructed 
worldview over another, rather than divergence from ‘the truth’. As Postman 
(1992:13) argues, “embedded in every tool is an ideological bias, a predisposition to 
construct the world as one thing rather than another, to value one thing over another, 
to amplify one sense or skill or attitude more loudly than another”. A DSS may thus 
be considered as confining and enclosing dimensions of the decision-making 
environment through commitments to a system, or system components, and to the 
underlying logics.
A key source of embedded bias in environmental DSS arises from the limitations of 
the models incorporated within the system in representing complex, dynamic 
ecosystems. In describing environmental phenomena, a modeller attempts to abstract 
salient trends and patterns from a complex tangle of information (Malayang 1996). 
Any abstraction necessitates discretionary judgements on the part of the researcher. 
The model thus represents one perspective of elements and relationships within the 
ecosystem; the full spatial and temporal complexity of the environment is not able 
(nor intended) to be represented. As Torgerson (1994:307,308) notes,
“Even if one takes for granted many conventional assumptions concerning the
conceptualisation and categorisation of phenomena, there are always more variables
5 An important caveat to this point is that given the potential for bias to arise implicitly and 
unconsciously it is possible for a stakeholder participating in the design process to unwittingly 
discriminate against their conscious interests where these interests conflict with more tacit social 
commitments.
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than can be identified, much less measured with any precision, or even counted.
This inexhaustibility and ambiguity, while possibly obscured through precise 
operationalisations and measurements in narrowly defined contexts, nonetheless 
becomes obvious when one tries to the imagine the sum of all innovations and their 
relationships”.
Clearly, which knowledge representations are included, as well as which are 
excluded, will influence the output of the technology, and may therefore be 
conceptualised as a form of embedded bias.
The task of translating scientific knowledge to a computer-based DSS may 
necessitate further abstraction processes. Firstly, attempting to incorporate all known 
parameters would not only be time-consuming for programmers and require vast 
processing power, but may also compound uncertainty as the interactive effects of 
multiple variables are often turbulent and unpredictable (Carley and Christie 
1992:71). Secondly, given that a computer-based model comprises a set of 
computable mathematical relations, the descriptions of environmental phenomena 
embodied within that model are influenced by the ease of representation of those 
phenomena as calculable, quantifiable variables. Variables less amenable to 
computational treatment, such as intrinsic significance, cultural traditions or political 
motivations tend not to be taken into consideration. The systematic non­
incorporation of certain variables represents a crucial case of embedded bias through 
absence of knowledge. Responding to pressures for more integrative, holistic DSS, 
developers are attempting to cope with this limitation by refining methods of 
quantifying qualitative variables or formalising human constructs. However, this 
may introduce a further source of bias where the symbolic representation of these 
variables is inadequate, cursory, simplistic or misleading. Following Smithson 
(1991:10), we may conceptualise this as embedded bias due to the distortion of 
knowledge.
A further example of distortion of knowledge may emerge when either novelty or 
surprise lead to a new or altered decision environment. In focussing on the solution 
of ill-structured problems, rather than simple, bounded problems, DSS aims to 
support a dynamic, evolving decision environment. Thus, Abel et al. (1996:1) 
comment that “problem solving... typically requires some creativity and is essentially 
open-ended in terms of the data needed and the processing to be performed”. In this 
context, Laacke (1995:126) warns that “the more integrated [DSS] becomes, the 
more difficult and expensive it becomes to adapt to different environmental 
conditions and changing user needs”. In response to the tension between 
comprehensiveness (minimal absences in knowledge) and flexibility, DSS are 
increasingly based on a toolkit philosophy whereby users can select and link up 
relevant databases, models and visualisation systems as required. Despite this 
approach, limitations remain in terms of coping with novelty. Once resources have 
been invested into the construction of a particular technological system, it may be 
costly, both in terms of cash outflow and the opportunity cost of lost productivity, to 
make substantial structural modifications. As a result, it is often not possible to 
subject a technological system to the same rate of modification as the refinement of a 
theoretical construct.
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The potential for embedded bias through absences or distortions in knowledge is 
amplified when an environmental DSS includes predictive modelling of future states. 
As Laacke (1995:115) asserts, “natural, dynamic, open systems present a serious 
philosophical and conceptual hurdle to the development of the very predictive 
models upon which the process of ecosystem management depends, because these 
models are probably impossible to validate or verify”. The extent to which 
environmental predictive modelling engages ignorance and indeterminacy is 
illustrated by vigorous debate within catchment modelling literature over model 
verification and sources of error. Jakeman (1997) emphasises that “Catchment 
modelling has not progressed to the point where the effects of changes in land cover 
and management on erosion, water supply and quality can be accurately predicted 
unless the period of observation of quantities needed to calibrate a relevant model 
encompasses the range of changes to be addressed”. In an environmental policy 
context, in which process complexity, data paucity and error are more often the rule 
than the exception, accurate prediction tends to be precluded. While conventions of 
practice produce assessments of uncertainty, this does not diminish the potential for 
embedded bias. Pervasive ignorance and indeterminacy ensure that only a restricted 
range of uncertainties are identified (Wynne 1992b: 115). Furthermore, like the 
primary knowledge to which they refer, those uncertainties which are specified are 
also socially constructed and conditional.
The preceding analysis argues that a DSS will embody a particular sociopolitical 
perspective of environmental decision-making. The embodied perspective will be 
influenced by the networks of commitments of the developers and intended users, as 
well as the structure of the DSS which shapes permissible representations. When a 
DSS embodies a particular perspective from amongst a multitude of possible 
configurations, then presenting that DSS as objective and politically neutral acts to 
privilege the embodied sociocultural reality. The incorporated models, variables, 
data, scales, and so on, are sanctioned as truths, or legitimated as mechanisms which 
may acquire or determine truths. Excluded knowledge claims and methodologies are 
disempowered by their absence. In this manner, the reification of an objective DSS 
emerges as a cultural resource in the production of truths and construction of power. 
As Foucault (1980:113) argues, “ ‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered 
procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it”. 
The presentation of DSS as objective provides currency in claims for authority, 
reinforcing the credence of true, rational solutions. Unreflective reliance on DSS to 
provide objective solutions to environmental problems is not only politically naive, 
but may serve to obfuscate the political, cultural and moral dimensions of 
environmental decision-making.
Given the dialectic relationship between DSS and the social world, not only is a DSS 
shaped by social construction, but the introduction of a DSS into a decision-making 
environment may also effect a reconstitution of that decision-making environment. It 
may alter what we focus on as relevant, it may alter the symbols or means of 
decision-making, or it may alter the relationships between actors in the decision­
making environment (Postman 1992:20). I argue that the obfuscation of the 
existence of embedded bias in DSS, and of the potential for embedded bias to interact
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in a transformative way with the decision-making environment, is problematic within 
an I EM paradigm, creating tensions with equity and transparency dimensions. As 
Ewing et al. (1997:12) note, tools such as DSS which assist in analysing the larger 
quantity of information associated with an IEM approach do not by themselves 
constitute IEM. If DSS is to be an effective tool to assist IEM, it is imperative that 
tensions between the use of DSS and substantive dimensions of IEM, such as equity, 
transparency and a recognition of multiple perspectives, are attended to and 
reconciled.
3.3.3 Access as a source o f bias
Analyses of the role of science and technology in politics reinforce the potential for 
science and technology to be appropriated “for constructing political authority and 
legitimating the exercise of political power’’ (Ezrahi 1990:preface). In a case study 
of adaptive management of the Columbia River basin, McLain and Lee (1996:443) 
observe that “scientific information has become a key weapon in the political 
struggles... Stakeholders who have the capacity to produce and analyse scientific 
data are in a much more powerful position than those who do not”. Thus, if DSS 
constitutes a discursive method for validating one perspective over another, then 
inequalities in access to the technology, or to the processes in which it is embedded, 
may introduce, reinforce or augment power inequities between stakeholders.
The notion of geographical and financial attributes as potential sources of biases in 
access was the product of vigorous debate during the 1970s and early 1980s over the 
likely implications of computerisation for centralisation or decentralisation of 
decision-making. Initially, opinions were polarised. Echoing Orwell's Big Brother 
thesis, Whisler (1970), Mowshowitz (1976), Burnham (1980) and others argued that 
the application of computer-based technology tended to encourage, stabilise and 
entrench centralised social and political power structures and would thereby 
contribute to the erosion of the power of the citizenry. Providing support for this 
perspective, Wiezenbaum (1976:31) discussed how the computer had played a 
significant role in conserving, perpetuating and strengthening a centralised social 
welfare system in the United States because the information processing capabilities 
of the computer had made the mass handling of information required for centralised 
administration a practical and efficient technique. However, the claims that 
computerisation encouraged centralisation were rejected by others who contended 
that computer networking has the potential to support local autonomy and counteract 
flows of power to the central agency, by facilitating greater input from those lower in 
the organisational hierarchy (Hiltz and Turoff 1978:198).
By the mid-1980s, a dominant perspective had emerged, pioneered by Nora and 
Mine (1980), among others, that computer technology could be instrumental in 
shifting the balance of decision-making power in favour of centralisation or 
decentralisation dependent on the contextual structure of the technology. It was 
argued that large-scale, expensive, centrally located information systems would tend 
to promote centralisation, while a network of inexpensive computer terminals would 
tend to act as a decentralising force. The rationale for this argument derives from the 
information-as-power axiom that informed decision-making requires access to 
information and thus those who have greater access to information will have greater 
power over decision-making. In summary, the crux of the centralisation-
decentralisation argument was perceived to hinge on whether the computer 
technology was constructed to channel information to a central body or to local 
stakeholders.
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In terms of environmental DSS, the preceding argument raises the potential for 
geographic and financial biases of access to be introduced through the construction 
of the DSS. In the case of an expensive, centrally located system, access would be 
limited for potential users who live in remote areas and have limited financial 
resources at their disposal to fund travel or compensate time away from productive 
work. However, these constraints may be alleviated if a terminal, from which the 
central system may be accessed, is provided to the remote user.
Even if a DSS is set up such that remote access to the system is available, access to 
the information might still be constrained if the conventional or computer literacy 
required to use the system is greater than that of the user. In response to this 
problem, DSS developers are increasingly placing an emphasis in user interface 
design on intuitive natural language dialogue facilities and visual presentation of 
system responses which are comprehensible to all users (Mikolajuk 1996:10). 
However, even if the user-friendliness of a system is sufficiently high for a user with 
a low degree of computer literacy to use the technology, inequities in terms of access 
to information may still be introduced, if awareness and comprehension of embedded 
assumptions is not consistent across users. If a user lacks sufficient traditional, 
scientific or computer literacy to understand how variables within the system 
translate to the contextual environmental problem under investigation, and to 
appreciate how embedded assumptions may influence the system output, then their 
capacity for informed participation is clearly limited relative to a more computer- 
literate user. Note that the former user is also vulnerable to manipulation by the 
latter user. As Lowi (1975:457) warns, "Many will know how, yet few will know. 
Those who know will be setting the agenda for - i.e., programming - those who only 
know how".
Mason (1986:53) argues that poorer groups are most likely to be disadvantaged in 
terms of computer literacy, as computer literacy tends to be a function of economic 
status as well as knowledge. In the West, the proliferation of low cost personal 
computers over the past decade has made computer-based technology more 
accessible and economically attainable even to lower income earners. This may 
explain the dearth of literature discussing computer literacy and access to computer 
based technology since the late 1980s. Nonetheless, the early analyses suggest that 
the lowest income earners would still tend to be excluded from these opportunities, 
particularly in poorer developing countries.
Although limiting stakeholders' access to information may inhibit the extent to which 
they are able to participate in decision-making, access to information is not 
necessarily an inroad to a gain in decision-making power. To illustrate the 
limitations of the information-as-power axiom, and to foreshadow ensuing 
arguments, consider a land use planning system which is located on a workstation in 
the central office of a government agency6. We will assume that the land use
6 This scenario is modified and extended from a discussion o f a medical diagnostic system in Johnson 
( 1985).
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planning system contains geographically referenced databases and models which 
predict ecological health on the basis of ecological indicators. These databases and 
models have been selected and developed according to specifications set by the 
central agency. Via a remote terminal, a user representing the local community 
enters information on the ecological indicators of their catchment. Based on this 
input, the computer outputs various land use patterns and their likely ecological 
impacts, from which the local community may debate and select their preferred land 
management option. The DSS thus provides the community with information which 
would otherwise only be available to the central agency. According to the 
information-as-power axiom, the system would appear to facilitate an increase in 
local decision-making power. However, if the system was programmed to prescribe 
a single land use plan which the community was required to follow, then the system 
would clearly be supporting central control of decision-making. If the system output 
consisted of a ranked list of land use plans, and the community felt obliged to select 
the first-ranked option for fear that selection of the others might result in political 
repercussions, then centralised decision-making power would again be supported. 
Alternatively, if the local community was reluctant to base decisions on the system 
output because of a lack of trust in the technology, then the provision of information 
to the community via that technology would not lead to an increase in decision­
making power. Finally, if the output of the technology overloaded the community 
with diverse and detailed information, and the community was overwhelmed and 
sidetracked into focussing on peripheral and less important details, rather than the 
central issues, then local empowerment would again be defeated. Clearly, 
“deconcentrated computerization does not itself guarantee a broader deconcentration 
of reponsibilities” (Nora and Mine 1980:54). As Weizenbaum (1984:38) argues:
“There is a myth that computers are today making important decisions o f the kind 
that were earlier made by people... But the widely believed picture of managers 
typing questions of the form “What shall we do know?” into their computers and 
then waiting for their computers to “decide” is largely wrong. What is happening 
instead is that people have turned the processing of information on which decisions 
must be based over to enormously complex computer systems. They have... 
reserved for themselves the right to make decisions based on the outcome of such 
computing processes. People are thus able to maintain the illusion, and it is often 
just that, that they are after all the decisionmakers. But... a computer system that 
permits the asking o f only certain sorts o f questions, that accepts only certain kinds 
of “data”, and that cannot even in principle be understood by those who rely on it, 
such a computer system has effectively closed many doors that were open before it 
was installed”.
In reference to the power impacts of automated information systems, Kling (1974:6) 
argues that “gains in power are modulated by the scope of power and authority of the 
information receivers relative to the actions they would prefer to take”. This 
sentiment has been echoed more recently by McLain and Lee (1996:438), who 
comment that “The ability of institutions to respond to new knowledge depends on 
whether they have access to information and whether they have the will and capacity 
to act on that information”. Meanwhile, Carr (1994:358) notes that "Just because 
community groups have the opportunity to become involved in environmental 
management does not mean that there is automatic problem ownership and
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development of local solutions". These analyses emphasise that differences in 
political power, motivation and capacity create differences in the extent to which 
different actors participate in environmental policymaking. Where these differences 
exist independent of the introduction of DSS, then they may be considered irrelevant 
to a taxonomy of bias for DSS. However, pertinent bias emerges if a DSS introduces 
or exacerbates differences in political power or will, or if the DSS subsumes or 
supersedes alternate avenues of participation. To illustrate the latter case, consider a 
stakeholder who wishes to participate in environmental policymaking but who is 
either unable to use the DSS, for the reasons outlined previously, or who is 
uninterested or unwilling to use DSS, for example, because the system is perceived 
to be irrelevant. If the DSS has subsumed or superseded alternate avenues of 
participation previously open to that stakeholder, then the introduction of the 
technology has effectively limited their opportunities to participate in policymaking.
3.4 Taxonomy of bias
To summarise the preceding discussion of DSS and bias, a DSS system may be 
described as biased if the use of that technology systematically promotes one 
perspective over another, either because the output of the technology favours or 
promotes elements of one perspective over another, or because the use of the 
technology limits certain stakeholders’ opportunities to participate in policymaking. 
Bias is thus defined as a relational term, not inherently held, but emerging from 
interactions between alternate practices, discourses and world views.
Friedman et al. (1996) propose a framework which categorises ways in which bias 
can arise in the design of computer systems. Three categories of bias are identified: 
preexisting bias; technical bias; and emergent bias. Preexisting biases are derived 
from social institutions, practices, and attitudes, and “exist independently and prior to 
the creation of the system... [they may] enter a system through the explicit and 
conscious efforts of individuals or institutions, or implicitly and unconsciously, even 
in spite of the best of intentions” (p. 333). Technical bias “arises from the resolution 
of issues in the technical design”, and includes: limitations of computer tools such as 
hardware, software, and peripherals; decontextualised algorithms; imperfections in 
pseudo random number generation; and attempts to quantify the qualitative, 
discretize the continuous, or formalise the nonformal (p. 335). Emergent bias refers 
to bias that arises in the context of use. It includes: the emergence of new knowledge 
in society that is not incorporated within the system; the knowledge base of users 
being different from that assumed in the design; and the values of users being 
different from that assumed in design (p. 335).
The emphasis in Friedman et al.’s (1996) framework is on technical improvement of 
a computer system. The framework offers no guidelines on coping with bias where 
that bias is not suitable to technical remedy. Furthermore, the categories of bias 
which it proposes are not adequate to deal with many of the sources of bias relevant 
to DSS which have been discussed in the preceding pages. For example, Friedman et 
al. (1996) note the use by non-experts of the system as a source of bias, since non­
experts would be more inclined to accept decisively the program’s output. They 
classify this as emergent bias, since they assume that the system’s designers had 
created the system with expert users in mind. However, the user-friendliness 
dilemma (that the process of designing a system for a non-expert serves to shield the
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user from the underlying assumptions) is not addressed, nor does it appear to align 
with any of the framework categories. Secondly, while attempts to make human 
constructs amenable to computers is recognised within the framework as a bias, the 
non-incorporation of those constructs is not explicitly recognised as a bias. Thus, 
while the framework proposed by Friedman et al. (1996) represents a significant 
contribution, it emerges as inadequate to capture key sources of bias in relation to 
environmental DSS.
Distilling and synthesising factors which emerged from the earlier review as 
significant, Table 3.1 proposes a taxonomy of bias relevant to the design and use of 
environmental DSS. Part I of the taxonomy identifies three sources of bias in terms 
of the output of the technology. The first type of bias arises from conscious or 
unconscious commitments which influence the construction of the DSS, including 
commitments to: a particular DSS, for example, in the case of purchase of an off-the- 
shelf system; system components incorporated within the modelbase or database; or 
logics underpinning the system, including framing of either the problem or the 
options available to resolve the problem. Drawing on Smithson’s (1991) taxonomy 
of ignorance, illustrated in Table 3.2, two further sources of biases in output are 
identified: incomplete knowledge; and distorted knowledge. Incomplete knowledge 
may arise through absence of knowledge, such as the nonincorporation of qualitative 
factors, or through the noncommunication of the uncertainties in knowledge. 
Distortions in knowledge encompass both inaccuracy (distortion in degree) or 
confusion (wrongful substitution in kind) (Smithson 1991:10). Examples of biases 
due to distortion include the inadequate quantification of qualitative factors, 
perceived misrepresentation of ecosystem processes, or the underestimation of 
uncertainties. It should be emphasised that the proposed taxonomy of biases in 
output diverges from Smithson’s taxonomy of ignorance in terms of the inclusion of 
commitments and the exclusion of Smithson’s concept of irrelevance. The former 
distinction arises because consideration of bias differs from ignorance in that it is not 
only the exclusion or distortion of knowledge that is significant, but also the 
inclusion and validation of certain perspectives. The latter distinction arises because 
I argue that irrelevance, the act of ignoring certain knowledge, is a judgement which 
may manifest within the DSS as incomplete knowledge.
In addition to biases in output, four sources of biases in access are identified in Part II 
of the taxonomy. The first three sources of bias relate to the ability of a stakeholder 
to access the DSS. The first source of bias identified is the geographical structure of 
the DSS, in particular, whether the DSS is only accessible at certain locations. The 
second source of bias identified is the financial cost of use of the DSS, including 
costs associated with purchasing, establishing and maintaining the system. The third 
source of bias pertains to the conventional, scientific and computer literacy of a 
stakeholder in relation to that required to use and understand potential biases in the 
output of the technology. The final source of bias identified raises the potential for 
the DSS to limit a stakeholder’s opportunities to participate in decision-making by 
introducing or exacerbating differences in political power or motivation, or by 
subsuming or superseding alternate avenues of participation.
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I) Sources of biased output:
Commitments (conscious or unconscious)
Commitment to a particular system 
Commitment to particular system components 
Commitment to the logics underpinning the system 
Incomplete knowledge 
Absence 
Uncertainties 
Distortion o f knowledge 
Confusion 
Inaccuracy
II) Sources of biased access:
Geographical considerations 
Central location vs network 
Financial considerations
Cost of purchasing or establishing the system 
Cost of ongoing use of the system 
Literacy
Literacy required to use the technology 
Literacy required to appreciate potential biases 
Political considerations
DSS introduces/exacerbates differences in political power/motivation 
DSS subsumes/supersedes alternate avenues of participation
Table 3-1 Taxonomy of bias associated with environmental DSS
Ignorance
Error Irrelevance
Incompleteness Untopicality
Absence Taboo
Uncertainty Undecidability
Distortion
Confusion
Inaccuracy
Table 3-2 Taxonomy of ignorance: Smithson (1991) (Abbreviated)
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3.5 DSS as conditional expertise
A key thread to the conventional rationale for DSS is the purported capacity of DSS 
to embody and impart expertise. Yet intended users seem less convinced than 
developers of the expertise of DSS since anecdotal instances of targeted users 
disregarding DSS use abound. Technology transfer and extension literature suggests 
that the DSS experience is one manifestation of a broader tension between alternate 
conceptions of valid claims to knowing. In the following sections, I explore these 
alternate conceptions and their implications for DSS use and development.
3.5.1 DSS and the expert culture
The epistemological legacy of the Enlightenment conceptions of science, technology 
and nature is reflected in contemporary ‘expert culture’ or ‘technocratic’ approaches 
to environmental management. An intertwining of science and public accountability 
was consolidated during the Enlightenment. According to the medieval Christian 
view, the universe was both created and continuously and personally governed by an 
omnipotent God (Tamas 1991:285). Within this paradigm, theology and natural 
magic furnished a model of accountability of government based on transcendental 
referents to divine grace (Ezrahi 1990:61-66). Inspired by the Scientific Revolution, 
Bacon and other Enlightenment scholars mounted a comprehensive challenge against 
theologically shrouded and driven science. They argued and popularised modem 
secular scientism, the independence of secular scientific knowledge from sacred 
religious beliefs (Olson 1982:Ch 9). As trust in magic as a mechanism of 
accountability declined, attention deflected to the rigour and logic of science as the 
basis of a framework against which to validate and legitimise rational political 
action. Science was perceived to yield universal truths, and thereby privileged as the 
standard against which other forms of knowledge were assessed (Murdoch and Clark 
1994:119). This universality underpins modem scientific expertise, which is 
presumed to be fundamentally non-local (Giddens 1994:84).
In parallel with the establishment of science as universal arbiter, Enlightenment 
scholars also posited scientific inquiry and technological application as the means by 
which humans could achieve mastery over an external nature (Carley and Christie 
1992:69). Over the ensuing centuries, scientific expertise became increasingly linked 
to a preoccupation with rational management, control and prediction of the 
environment (Norgaard 1994:64). During the 1970s and 1980s, confidence in the 
capacity of scientific expertise and technologies to dominate and transform nature led 
many to dispute emerging analyses by Ehrlich and others that signalled ecological 
limits to growth (Dryzek 1997). As the environmental problematique gained 
currency, the expert culture reconstituted in the form of technocratic 
environmentalism, which seeks second-order control: “a higher level of observation 
and intervention has to be installed, in order to control the consequences of the 
control over nature” (Sachs 1993:20). From this standpoint, responding to the 
ecological predicament entails “regulating the transformation of nature globally in an 
optimal fashion” (Sachs 1993:20). Through references to predictive modelling of the 
impacts of management activities, evaluating trade-offs between different 
management strategies, and optimising management actions (e.g Bettinger et al. 
1996), the conventional framing of DSS resonates firmly with the technocratic, 
expert culture paradigm.
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Within the expert paradigm, an important corollary to the reification of scientific 
knowledge is a marginalisation of alternate bodies of knowledge. If science, as the 
“intellectual construction of general regularities” (Ezrahi 1990:49), yields universal 
truths and provides grounds for universal actions, then science may confidently 
override alternate claims to knowing (Apffel-Marglin 1996:2, D’Souza 1994:92).
This premise underpins modernisation theory, which visualises development in terms 
of a progressive movement towards more complex, sophisticated and integrated 
forms of ‘modem’ society through transfers of technology, knowledge and resources 
from the ‘developed’ to the ‘developing’ (Long 1992:18-19). Particularly post- 
WWII, modernisation theory was embraced as a model of development by the 
bureaucracies of many non-Westem countries (Norgaard 1994:52). Within the 
extension field, modernisation theory provided the basis for the linear, ‘science-push’ 
model which emphasised the transfer of western scientific expertise, often embodied 
within agricultural technology, to farmers in order to transform their primitive and 
inadequate traditional practices (Ewing et al. 1997:1). Under this paradigm, local 
communities were treated as passive recipients of expert scientific advice and 
technology (Kloppenburg 1991:523). During the 1970s, low rates of technology 
adoption under the science-push model led to a broad anxiety amongst policymakers 
and scientists about the community’s inability or irrational unwillingness to accept 
‘correct’ scientific information. Instances of public distrust of scientific knowledge 
were often regarded as stemming from stoic ignorance.
3.5.2 Expertise as conditional: The local knowledge critique
Over the past two decades, a shift in rural sociology, development studies and 
agricultural extension theory has provided an alternate perspective on the technology 
transfer approach. Firstly, since the mid-1970s, the universality of scientific 
expertise has been challenged by grounded analyses of the efficacy and impacts of 
transferred technologies. These analyses argue that not only have transferred 
technologies often failed to deliver their promised rewards, but that the uncritical 
transposition of western scientific conceptions of and approaches to environmental 
management has itself contributed to environmental degradation and social 
disintegration (Marglin 1996, Redclift and Woodgate 1994:64). Chambers 
(1997:31,33) attributes these failures or ‘development errors’ to the physical, 
organisational, social and cognitive distance of professional scientific experts from 
the local, complex, diverse, dynamic and unpredictable realities of the people and 
conditions that they were analysing, planning and prescribing for, and making 
predictions about.
Postcolonial analyses of development further argue that conventional technology 
transfer represents a cultural process of domination whereby local people are 
expected to conform to an imported and imposed blueprint conceived by enlightened 
authorities. From this perspective, technology transfer presents as a disempowering 
and anti-democratic process which denies individual autonomy and increases local 
dependency (Gorz 1993:57, Yearley 1988:150). The logic of the scientific method is 
not perceived to lend universality. Instead, the scientific framework is cast as a 
colonising tool which invades local realities, reconstructing them via the imposition 
of abstract categories. This process is seen to render formulations based on 
quantification and economic evaluation valid, and to marginalise those stemming
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from intuition and practical experience, which are aligned with local, non-scientific 
ways of knowing. One local-centred response to the critique of inherent scientific 
expertise is to emphasise and value local or ‘indigenous’ ways of knowing which are 
argued to be embedded within the contextual decision-making environment.
Another, championed by Schumacher (1974) and McRobie (1982), is to develop 
‘appropriate’ technology which is better suited to the needs and specificities of local 
decision-making environments.
Literature examining public attitudes towards science observes that scientific 
knowledge (as well as the technology which embodies that knowledge, institutions 
which promote that knowledge and decisions made on the basis of that knowledge) 
may suffer a public loss of credibility and support if the community perceives that 
the ‘expert’ knowledge is irrelevant to or incompatible with their local realities. For 
example, in a case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers’ scepticism of scientific advice 
about restrictions introduced after the Chernobyl radioactive fallout, Wynne (1992a) 
suggests that distrust was partially shaped by the perception that scientists had made 
incorrect or overly simplistic assumptions about complex, diverse local 
environments. In particular, scientific explanations on which initial policy 
commitments were made were later retracted after they were found to be based on a 
false model of the behaviour of caesium in upland environments; the standardisation 
by scientists of local physical environmental variations, farming conditions and 
practices was perceived by farmers to yield management advice ignorant of local 
heterogeneity; and scientists’ denial of farmer’s knowledge of hill-farming 
management realities led to unrealistic experimental conditions which later 
necessitated the abandonment of the experiments (Wynne 1992a:286-297).
Beyond reinforcing the fallibility of scientific pretensions to universal expertise, the 
Cumbrian example illustrates that, like knowledge, interpretations of ‘ expertise’ are 
multiple and socially constructed. Validation of expertise, or who is qualified to 
know, is seen to engage different validation codes dependent on the validator. 
Expertise is revealed as conditional, and contingent upon the realities of the observer. 
Validation of knowledge and expertise emerges as a dynamic negotiation between 
social actors and networks, rather than a linear and deterministic ‘transfer’ of 
knowledge commodities. Note that from this standpoint, refusal to ‘adopt’ external 
interventions may be interpreted as a viable discursive strategy by which ‘intended 
users’ may actively engage in the (in)validation of knowledge.
Recent contributions to development literature have critiqued the local-centred 
analyses for overplaying the distinctions between ‘local’ and ‘scientific’ knowledges 
by reinforcing a dichotomy between embedded, practical local knowledge and 
abstract, disembedded scientific knowledge (Murdoch and Clark 1994). Firstly, as 
discussed in the preceding critique of objectivity, accounts from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge have emphasised that all knowledge generation, including that 
effected by ‘scientists’, may be regarded as a contextual process embedded within 
specific sociocultural networks (Kloppenburg 1991:529, Watson-Verran and 
Turnbull 1995). The categorisation of scientific knowledge as disembedded from 
social relations is thus inconsistent with evidence of the constructedness of scientific 
theories and logics. None-the-less, it remains that abstraction, generalisation and the 
discovery of invariant laws are explicit methodological and epistemological goals of 
western science (Latour 1986). Furthermore, a particular scientific explanation will
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be contingent on the networks of the constructing scientists, rather than necessarily 
those of the community in which the scientific explanation is being applied.
Secondly, rigid distinctions between local and scientific knowledges become less 
tenable when one recognises the centuries of interactions between local and scientific 
ways of knowing through which these knowledges have reflexively exchanged, 
transformed, learnt and evolved (Agrawal 1995:422). Furthermore, application of 
scientific models is often physically contextualised through the imputation of locally- 
derived values for model parameters. These criticisms of the local-centred analysis, 
however, do not negate the argument that the ‘expert solutions’ proffered by 
particular scientists for a particular community may not be construed as ‘expert’ by 
that community.
I
3.5.3 Reconstructing expertise
If interpretations of expertise are accepted as multiple and socially constructed, then, 
drawing on Chambers (1997), a key question is ‘whose definition of expertise 
counts?’. Challenging the notion of self-proclaimed and un(der)validated expertise, 
cultural theorists argue that public knowledge should be evaluated and validated as 
part of the broader social system that creates and sustains it (Rayner 1992:98). As 
O’Hara (1996:101) argues, “As long as discourse remains limited to experts who 
represent the mainstream of disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) thinking, the discourse 
process may simply reinforce biases of the status quo as familiar definitions of 
critical rationality remain unchallenged”. A similar theme is discernible within 
contemporary public policy, risk analysis, adaptive management and rural 
development discourses (McLain and Lee 1996:439, Wynne 1992a: 126, Torgerson 
and Paehlke 1990:9).
For example, in Funtowicz and Ravetz’s (1991) post-normal paradigm, ‘extended 
peer communities’ are promoted for “quality assurance” of scientific methods and 
interpretations. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991,1995) argue that this democratisation of 
science is “necessary for the effectiveness of science in meeting the challenges of 
global environmental problems” (1995:160), and represents “the creation of a system 
which in spite of its inefficiencies is the most effective means for avoiding the 
disasters that in our environmental affairs... result from the prolonged stifling of 
criticism” (1991:151). They thus argue that empathetic or local knowledge may 
assist in managing scientific distortion or ignorance and thereby may enrich a 
scientific description: “Knowledge of local conditions may not merely shape the 
policy problems, it can also determine which data is strong and relevant. Such 
knowledge cannot be the exclusive property of experts whose training and 
employment inclines them to abstract, generalised conceptions. Those whose lives 
and livelihood depend on the solution of the problems will have a keen awareness of 
how general principles are realised in their ‘back yards’ ” (1991:149).
In light of recent attacks on the sociology of science as aiming to denigrate science 
(Gross and Levitt 1994), it should also be noted that arguments in favour of the 
democratisation of expertise do not tend to equate with negation of scientific 
methodology and practice (Kloppenburg 1991:525). Nor does a democratised 
position necessarily argue that scientific knowledge has an inherently lesser claim to 
knowledge. Instead, most advocates of democratised expertise merely propose that 
the institutionalisation of an exaggerated faith in the scope, power and certainty of
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scientific knowledge be replaced by a more reflexive and critical approach which 
recognises the partiality of a scientific perspective (Carley and Christie 1992:66, 
Busch 1984). In this vein, Wynne (1992a: 115) argues that “the built-in ignorance of 
science towards its own limiting commitments and assumptions is a problem only 
when external commitments are built on it as if such intrinsic limitations did not 
exist”. The intent behind a democratised approach is to manage bias by avoiding “an 
overdependence on particular ways of understanding and blindspots through the 
exclusion of other ways of knowing” (Norgaard 1994:10).
Furthermore, democratisation of expertise does not necessarily imply that any claim 
to knowing, however ludicrous, should be uncritically accorded status as expertise 
for public policymaking. As Harding (1998:19) warns, “Not all proposed standards 
of knowledge are equally good - indeed, some are not only inadequate, but 
dangerous”. Many advocates of democratisation support positioned rationalities, 
described by Haraway (1995:181) as “an argument for situated and embodied 
knowledges and an argument against various forms of unbeatable, and so 
irresponsible, knowledge claims”. Others emphasise the precepts of Habermas’ 
communicative rationality as procedural criteria to guide the resolution of contested 
claims to knowing (Habermas 1984, Dryzek 1990:87). From either standpoint, rather 
than submitting to ethical or normative relativism, the community of interest 
legitimises claims to expertise according to their negotiated code for assessing claims 
to knowing.
What insights does the preceding reconstruction of expertise offer in terms of 
improving the capacity of DSS to promote more transparent, accountable, and 
equitable policymaking? It suggests that if DSS is developed only by an elite 
technical or epistemic group according to the conventional paradigm then 
assumptions and uncertainties should be open to scrutiny by the communities of 
interest. One approach to meeting this directive prescribes that developers provide 
documentation to the community of interest specifying the assumptions and 
uncertainties associated with their system. Some DSS, such as RAISON and LUPIS, 
are now promoted as featuring the capability for users to gain access to underlying 
assumptions such as technical details about models, the rule base and how inferences 
were made (Lam et al. 1994:512). A limitation of this approach is that some 
assumptions, such as those due to ignorance or tacit normative codes, will be beyond 
the developers’ awareness, rendering communication nonsensical. Further 
limitations derive from difficulties in the extent to which uncertainties may be 
characterised.
A second approach encourages critical scrutiny by interested parties of the 
documentation and the hard code of the system. As King and Kraemer (1993:356) 
argue, “The critics can then question why certain variables are included versus 
excluded, or why this variable is treated exogenously versus endogenously, or why 
variables are weighed as they are. The model provides a systematic argument for and 
against various biases by its very nature. The model becomes the Rosetta Stone by 
which policy analysts with different biases can speak a common language to debate 
critical assumptions”. In this way, a role is framed for DSS which emphasises use of 
the technology to clarify issues, channel discussion, identify common ground and 
both encourage and enforce a discipline of analysis and discourse (King and Kraemer 
1993:356). A drawback of this approach lies in the difficulty external interested
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parties face when attempting to illuminate the logic underlying the actions of 
computer systems. As Cleland and MacKenzie (1996:370) note, “designers typically 
rely as much (or more) on intuition, experience and simulation as they do on 
mathematics”. Meanwhile, Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996:331) argue that “biases 
in computer systems can be difficult to identify let alone remedy because of the way 
the technology engages and extenuates them... If the system is complex, and most 
are, biases can remain hidden in code, difficult to pinpoint or explicate”.
3.5.4 Participatory design
An alternative approach is a more participatory mode of design, construction, and 
development of DSS, in which only knowledge already validated by the community 
of interest as relevant and credible be incorporated within the DSS. Participatory 
development of scientific models has been a recurrent theme since the late 1960s. In 
Britain, Mumford and Ward (1968) and others at the Manchester Business School 
explored a socio-technical approach to participative design of data processing 
systems. During the early 1970s, an influential Scandinavian approach to 
participatory, democratised systems design evolved based on strong union 
involvement (Ehn and Kyng 1987:25). Within an American policy context, Straus 
(1979:663) advocated a discursive process for model design, involving data 
mediation and participatory model building, as a means to expose normative 
assumptions embedded within the model and thereby better manage complexity:
“The very act of trying to seek agreement on the data, and to build the model... will 
force us to better understand the viewpoints of our opponents and, conversely, help 
our opponents understand our viewpoint and, if performed with integrity and 
intelligence, it should improve predicability and accuracy”. According to this 
perspective, a participatory approach may provide a forum for stakeholder learning, 
as well as assist in managing for bias and thereby enhance the quality and credibility 
of the DSS.
Straus’ emphasis on communicative learning within participatory design has been 
echoed within recent DSS literature. Angehm and Jelassi (1994:270) propose 
reconstructing DSS development to produce “a different type of DSS whose main 
objective is to provide flexible environments through which learning about a decision 
situation can take place”. Drawing on the experience of developing a DSS for 
sustainable management of grazing lands, Bellamy and Lowes (1995:111) argue that 
a focus in DSS development on support for learning processes “can create 
opportunities to foster communication and integrated action across a range of diverse 
stakeholder groups”. In this context, there has been increasing emphasis in user 
interface design on intuitive, natural language dialogue facilities and visual 
presentation of system responses which are comprehensible to novice as well as 
experienced users (Mikolajuk 1996:10). Fedra (1995:5, 15) advocates a heuristic 
role for environmental DSS, whereby the DSS provides “a common, shared 
information basis, framework, and language for dialogue and negotiation. The 
dialogue between the actors in the decision-making process is extended to a dialogue 
with the DSS, which plays the role of a technical expert and bookkeeper rather than 
an arbiter”. Note that the knowledge embodied within the DSS continues to be 
framed as inherent expertise within the latter perspective
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Fedra (1995:9) maintains that participatory development of DSS is valuable in that it 
increases users’ ownership of the DSS and provides a measure of insurance against 
irrelevance. Marsden’s (1994:53) comment in relation to indigenous participation in 
rural development appears pertinent here: “The assumption is that people will be 
more responsive if they are central to the design and implementation of programmes 
that affect their lives and livelihoods, and if they make some personal investment or 
commitment to them”. However, increased ownership of decision-making processes, 
arising from participatory DSS development, does not necessarily translate to 
increased commitment to a software-based DSS. Instead, as Argent and Grayson 
(1997:200) illustrate, participation in the preliminary stages of DSS development 
may confirm to participants the valid outcome that a software-based DSS is 
technically or politically unnecessary or inappropriate.
While a participatory approach may appear upon initial appraisal to be an 
improvement on the conventional paradigm in terms of managing bias, and thereby 
enhancing the credibility, quality and relevance of decision support, it introduces new 
concerns. Central to these are questions such as who should participate, and when? 
On the one hand, unless the DSS is intended to address a defined problem at the 
micro scale with few stakeholders, logistical and financial constraints obviously 
preclude the participation of all stakeholders from the genesis of design. On the 
other, many stakeholders may elect not to participate, perhaps because of opposition 
to the DSS, apathy, distrust of the proponents of the DSS, or the personal costs of 
participation (cf Syme 1992:90,93). Also, it is not possible to identify and therefore 
to seek the participation of any future stakeholders who may later develop an interest 
in the problem. These questions are important since, as Norgaard (1994:151) notes, 
“Who participates and how they are allowed to participate determines the type of 
questions raised, information brought to the discourse, and judgements made and 
encouraged upon others to make”. Who participates, and who does not, thus shapes 
and may bias the DSS development process and thereby the DSS.
Once participants have been engaged, a second issue arises concerning the form and 
process of participation, especially the politics of negotiating consensual knowledge 
and democratised expertise. As Scoones and Thompson (1994:21) note, “knowledge, 
which is diffuse and fragmentary, emerges as a product of the discontinuous and 
inequitable interactions between... competing actors. Through their respective 
‘discursive’ networks, different kinds of information and processes are 
communicated and legitimated. Misunderstanding and apprehension over hidden 
agendas and manoeuvres for power are the rule, not the exception”. Long and 
Villareal (1994:49) argue that “Knowledge processes are embedded in social 
processes that imply aspects of power, authority, and legitimation; and they are just 
as likely to reflect and contribute to the conflict between social groups as they are to 
lead to the establishment of common perceptions and interests”. These perspectives 
provide a warning that participatory development of DSS, albeit underpinned by 
democratisation theory, is no methodological panacea to rid knowledge production 
and transformation of political subjugation, obfuscation, or coercion. Indeed, 
unreflexive recourse to participatory approaches may merely provide a smokescreen 
for battles over knowledge claims and systemic biases.
Rather than being treated as a homogeneous, standard approach, participatory 
development of DSS should be recognised as encompassing a multiplicity of forms
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reflecting different conceptions of participation, and different power/knowledge 
relationships. For example, consultation by DSS developers with a small group of 
client users regarding technical specifications will involve different systems of power 
and knowledge legitimation to a process in which all stakeholders potentially 
affected by the DSS are engaged in dialogue about conceptual construction of the 
DSS. As discussed in the earlier discussion of decentralisation, there are also 
important power/knowledge implications if people are expected to participate in 
ways that are beyond their capacity or resources, if the scope for choices in 
development is constrained, or if they are not aware of alternatives (cf Williams 
1987:89). Drawing on the Scandinavian democratised systems design experience, 
Ehn and Kyng (1987:40,43) raise power/knowledge implications if inadequate time 
is afforded for union representatives to fully explore their perspectives before a 
systems design decision is required, and if the union representatives acquire the 
language, attitudes and values of the technical design experts, distancing themselves 
from their constituents. Recognition of both the heterogeneity of participatory 
approaches and the potential for bias urges critical appraisal of each instant of 
participatory DSS development in terms of the systems of power engaged and their 
roles in shaping the representations of knowledge embedded within the DSS.
As a further illustration of how bias may manifest within a participatory approach, 
consider a DSS development project that endeavours to recognise multiple 
perspectives by incorporating both ‘local’ and ‘scientific’ forms of knowledge within 
a DSS (cf Bosch et al. 1996). In this approach, bias may arise i f ‘local knowledge’ is 
treated as a coherent, unitary and fixed product that may be unproblematically 
detached from the dynamic social networks which create and sustain that knowledge, 
and easily assimilated into a western scientific framework (Scoones and Thompson 
1994:21, Murdoch and Clark 1994:118). Beyond neglecting the multiple and 
evolutionary nature of local knowledges, this approach may require the locally- 
derived knowledge to be manipulated into a form amenable to incorporation within a 
DSS framework, thereby paving the way for absences and distortions in knowledge. 
In this vein, Turnbull (1998) discusses how Australian Aboriginal knowledge about 
sacred sites was straightjacketed to fit a cartesian GIS. Attempts to incorporate 
multiple forms of knowledge within a DSS may also serve to reinforce traditional 
dichotomies between universal scientific knowledge and local knowledge. For 
example, ‘local knowledge’ may be confined to the provision of ecological baseline 
data while the models and theories underpinning the interpretation and manipulation 
of that data remain the domain of western science. Thus, based on a subjective 
categorisation of knowledges, ‘local knowledge’ is validated to provide information 
on local resources, but science is legitimated for global understanding and control.
In summary, through incorporating a wider range of worldviews, histories, 
knowledge horizons, a participatory approach to developing DSS may assist in 
managing bias associated with development by an elite and relatively homogeneous 
technical or epistemic group. However, given the limits to participation, some 
degree of bias in DSS development is inevitable. Furthermore, participatory 
approaches should not be viewed as a means to escape bias, since they too are 
inherently political processes in which validation of the structure, form and content 
of the DSS is enmeshed in systems of power.
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3.6 From (in)efflciency to effective decision support
According to classic DSS theory, DSS should promote effective rather than just 
efficient decision-making (Sprague 1982). In practice, rhetorical justification of DSS 
frequently highlights efficiency as a key rationale for investment in and application 
of DSS. Claims of the efficiency of DSS conventionally stem from the capability of 
computers to speed up the processing and transformation of information. However, 
as Cleaves (1995:87) notes, “Computerized aids are most helpful in easing the costs 
and in speeding up the decision process, but don’t necessarily help improve decision 
quality unless their designs consider the needs and eccentricities of human judgement 
and decision processes”. In their exploration of the long-term effectiveness of DSS 
on decision outcomes, Barr and Sharda (1997:144) concluded that while the use of 
DSS tended to decrease the time decision-makers spent processing information, its 
effectiveness was more limited in terms of promoting an increased understanding of 
relationships between decision-making parameters. Barr and Sharda (1997:134,143) 
also observed that the efficiency gains often encouraged a reliance on DSS such that 
decision-makers would habitually defer the decision-making process to the computer, 
decreasing those decision-makers’ effectiveness in future decisions. Hence, 
calculative efficiency does not necessarily promote long-term efficacy.
Furthermore, while few DSS developers admit it publicly, privately a number have 
acknowledged that a mismatch often arises between the DSS that the technical 
experts provide, and the DSS that intended users are willing to use. Fedra (1995:5) 
notes that although environmental DSS “have been discussed and advocated for a 
considerable time... Success stories of actual use in the public debate and 
policymaking processes are somewhat more rare”. Clearly, if significant resources 
are expended on development of a DSS that is disregarded by intended users, then 
both efficiency and efficacy claims are seriously undermined.
A key question that arises is: what makes an environmental DSS an effective tool for 
users? The earlier discussion regarding the inadequacies of the technology transfer 
model suggest that the relevance of the DSS to the decision-making environment of 
the intended user is critical. This is supported by recent DSS literature. For 
example, Moreno-Sanchez et al. (1997:164) suggest that “System development 
efforts that are technology-driven rather than end-user-demand driven are less likely 
to succeed”. Ewing et al. (1997:3) argue that “In the past, many DSS-style models 
have been unattractive because they are either ‘black box’ models that hide critical 
assumptions about the way the system functions or are so abstract as to ignore many 
of the political realities of decision making”. The latter comment highlights a 
common critique that conventional DSS, premised upon a model of decision-making 
as an objective, technical exercise, is irrelevant to contemporary environmental 
decision-making which often entails apparently “eclectic, fuzzy and shifty 
compromise between competing interests” (Ezrahi 1994:32). As Norgaard 
(1994:144) notes, “Political choices must be made using criteria other than a 
weighing of expected benefits and costs of mechanically predicted, patently unlikely, 
futures”.
Undermining relevance, and echoing a trend evident in a broad spectrum of computer 
application and innovation research, conventional DSS development has often 
favoured construction of a generic product in response to developers’ perceptions of
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users’ needs rather than supporting the specific characteristics and needs of the 
decision-making or management environment (Argent and Grayson 1997:199). As 
participatory DSS development gains currency, the increased participation of users in 
defining the scope and focus of a DSS emerges as a strategy to confront the 
inefficiency dilemma, by enabling management questions to take primacy over 
software system provision (Argent and Grayson 1997:204).
As discussed earlier, giving primacy to the needs and interests of the users and 
decision-making environment may lead to the conclusion that a computer-based DSS 
is redundant for the issue at hand. For example, it may emerge that the existing 
decision-making processes are adequate in light of the type of decisions, information 
requirements and the stakeholders involved, and would not be improved through 
introduction of a DSS. Alternately, the decision requirements may preclude efficient 
use of a computer-based DSS. For example, occasional or one-off decision tasks 
tend to be less amenable to efficient use of DSS than routine, frequent and 
standardised tasks (cf Walker and Johnson 1996). The extent of knowledge about 
ecosystem processes and the availability and accessibility of data may also influence 
whether a computer-based DSS is judged a useful tool. For instance, Gough and 
Ward (1996:14) concluded that a DSS would not be an appropriate tool to assist 
management of Lake Ellesmere, in New Zealand, because “Until such time as 
comprehensive databases containing information about the biological and ecological 
processes in the lake and the impacts of changes can be established, there are too 
many sources of uncertainty associated with the types of decisions that are required 
to be made to make DSS either a useful or viable option”. In other situations, a 
highly user-friendly DSS incorporating simple relationships may be deemed 
sufficient for the decision at hand and suited to the literacy characteristics of users, 
and therefore development of a more complex and sophisticated DSS would be 
unwarranted and inefficient. Thus, as Argent and Grayson (1997:199) contend, 
“while software tools can be important components of a decision-making process, 
their role must be carefully considered in the light of the overall management 
objectives and the audience for the exercise”. In other words, effective decision 
support requires cognisance of the pertinent decision-making environment7. In this 
context, a conversational approach to DSS design, as advocated by Schon 
(Interviewed in Binder 1996:56), which engages developers in dialogue with 
potential users about how they construe decision support, may be useful.
However, engaging professional developers and users in dialogue about the potential 
relevance of a DSS is not a simple task. On the one hand, if DSS developers are 
motivated by an interest in refining a particular system, then they may be less 
inclined to spend substantial amounts of time considering the possibility that an 
alternate system or process would be more effective. Commitment to a dialogue on 
relevance would imply a reframing of the role of the DSS developer as supporting a 
situated decision-making environment by assisting decision-makers in exploring 
appropriate tools or mechanisms to support their practice. On the other hand, 
developers frequently note that users “may not fully understand or be able to 
articulate requirements early in the development cycle” (Moreno-Sanchez et al.
7 Consonant with this point, the case study for this thesis will open by exploring the decision-making 
environment of the highlands o f Northern Thailand.
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1997:165). Participatory DSS development thus tends to be more akin to Lindblom’s 
(1959) “muddling-through” than Simon’s (1957) model of rationality. Opportunities 
for on-going dialogue between users and developers are necessary if both groups are 
to establish a mutual understanding of users’ needs and of the capability of the DSS 
to satisfy those needs.
It should be emphasised that the efficacy of a DSS is a dynamic quality, as the 
relevance of a DSS may be compromised due to distortions or absences in knowledge 
which arise through inflexibility of a DSS to respond to changes in the decision­
making environment. As Torgerson and Paehlke (1990:9) note: "Knowledge is not 
something which can somewhere be insulated or enshrined, for - to be relevant - it 
depends always upon the context and dynamics of organizational activity” . Since 
the decision-making environment, including management objectives, decision 
options, sociopolitical networks, interested actors, and ecological processes, is not 
static, the decision support must co-evolve with the environment. As Moreno- 
Sanchez et al. (1997:164) observe, in the context of multi-media environmental GIS, 
systems “can easily become ‘snapshots’ of existing conditions and run the risk of 
becoming outdated shortly after completion”. Against this background, sustained 
negotiation processes between users and professional developers emerge as useful to 
enable on-going dialogue about the dynamic efficacy of a DSS, including emerging 
biases.
As well as relevance, the credibility of a proposed DSS is also an important efficacy 
consideration. As alluded to during the discussion about expertise, intended users’ 
cynicism about the purported neutrality and legitimacy of the knowledge or reality 
embodied within technology often fosters non-use. In reference to the introduction 
of systems models developed by the Bonneville Power Authority and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to inform management of the Columbia River Basin of systems 
models, McLain and Lee (1996:442) discuss how fish agencies and tribal authorities 
raised objections to use of the models because they perceived the models to be 
flawed in favour of hydropower interests. As above, the key is the extent to which 
users perceive that the functional relationships and other information incorporated 
within the DSS are pertinent and valid. In this context, the transparency and 
comprehensibility of the DSS, and thus literacy or communication biases, emerge as 
significant. As Laacke (1995:126) argues: “The function and output of each step 
must be understandable, and it must be credible both to those who will exercise it and 
to those who are concerned about the information it produces”8. Thus, the 
interrogation of potential biases during DSS development emerges as a dimension of 
satisfying equity and transparency dimensions of credibility, and is thereby important 
for effective - and efficient - delivery of decision support. While every DSS will be 
associated with some form of partiality and bias, the key question is whether the 
biases associated with a particular DSS are significant in light of stakeholders’ 
concerns.
8 Laacke (1995:126) further argues that “A computer-based DSS that becomes so integrated and self- 
defining that it is not possible to track analyses from step to step, and understand the results, ceases to 
be credible”. In this context, the original motivation for DSS to assist in the resolution of ill-structured 
problems may ironically undermine the credibility and thus efficacy of DSS as analysis o f complex, ill- 
structured problems is inherently less intuitive and more difficult to comprehend than simple, well- 
structured problems.
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3.7 Conclusions
Claims that DSS provides objective, expert solutions for environmental problems are 
undermined by social construction theory, and recognition of the interpretive 
flexibility of expertise. So long as DSS development remains in the hands of an elite 
technical or epistemic group, the knowledge embodied within the system, the system 
structure and the transformed knowledge (output) of the system will tend to conform 
to and reinforce the biases of this group. While opening the development process to a 
wider cross-section of stakeholders may assist in managing for bias and ignorance, 
the limits to and costs of participation, as well as the political nature of participatory 
approaches, dictate the necessity of approaches which recognise that bias is arguably 
impossible to avoid. Rather than viewing bias as a threatening and negative concept, 
I propose that critical reflection on bias during DSS development may enhance the 
efficacy of environmental decision support. A theoretical basis and analytic 
framework for interrogating the biases associated with a particular DSS will be 
proposed in Chapter 5.
From critique to progress: 
Reorienting DSS development
A number o f ethnic minority 'hill tribes' live in the northern highlands o f 
Thailand. Many lowland Thais blame the destructive agricultural practices o f 
the hill tribes for highland environmental problems, and have placed pressures 
on the Thai government to forcibly relocate the hill tribes out o f the highlands.
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4. From critique to progress: Reorienting DSS development
4.1 Introduction
In response to the critique of conventional DSS presented in Chapter 3, this chapter 
explores a more reflexive process of DSS development which recognises the 
potential for bias. The initial part of this chapter draws on broader theoretical 
traditions to explore how the processes of DSS development may be recast to better 
recognise the role of values, interests and other discursive influences in the 
construction and use of DSS. Synthesising useful theoretical concepts from this 
discussion, Section 4.8 presents an analytical framework to facilitate interrogation of 
bias in DSS.
4.2 Reflexivity: Probing the frame
A starting point for a reorientation of DSS development is the notion of reflexivity, 
which has gained increasing attention over the past two decades as a response to the 
constructedness of knowledge (Morrow 1994:76). Within different theoretical 
traditions, reflexivity engages different sets of problems associated with the status of 
knowledge in relation to the knower or the observer (Steier 1991:2). Within 
ethnomethodology, the term reflexivity is used to refer to the “constitutive circularity 
of accounts” (Ashmore 1989:32), in that for a reader to make sense of an account, the 
reader must have some understanding of what the account refers to, which in turn 
requires the reader to have made sense of the account. Within sociology of science, 
the problematic of reflexivity applies to the reflexive relation between the subject of 
inquiry (science) and the methods of inquiry (scientifically-derived methodology), 
which is seen to undermine critical analysis (Gruenberg 1978). Reflexivity has also 
been used to refer to the self-confrontation of modernising societies with risks which 
are inadequately dealt with in industrial society (Beck 1994:5). My treatment of 
reflexivity differs from the preceding interpretations, although it shares their self- 
referential nature. Drawing on Hopper (1995) and Goffman (1974), reflexivity is 
constructed as self-analysis and critique o f the frames which guide the organisation 
or interpretation o f knowledge.
I argue that in order to confront the constructedness of DSS, the process of DSS 
development should be reconstituted as reflexive practice. Review of the DSS 
literature suggests that reflexivity has not yet emerged as a topic of concern, which is 
unsurprising as constructed knowledge has also received scant attention. Since DSS 
developers parallel, and are often drawn from, the academic community in terms of 
engaging in the construction of knowledge through research, development and 
application, I suggest that academic approaches to reflexivity may inform more 
reflexive DSS development.
Although reflexivity is receiving increasing theoretical treatment from academics, 
pragmatic approaches to reflexivity within academic culture have remained limited, 
with the bulk of academic culture appearing unaware, dismissive or in neglect of 
academic social construction (Hopper 1995:59). Within the academic domain,
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serious recognition of reflexivity within analytical practice has been predominantly 
dealt with through experimental textual devices which seek to challenge and 
deconstruct the representational or interpretive nature of the constructed text 
(Ashmore 1989, Woolgar and Ashmore 1988, Mulkay 1984). These textual 
approaches to reflexivity have been critiqued by Hopper (1995:63, 65) as neglecting 
the role of cultural practices in the (re)production of academic knowledge through 
their exclusive focus on individual, authored representations. He further argues that 
such approaches are limited by the individual’s inevitable blindness to fundamental 
dimensions of their personal framing, resulting in only a partial capacity to point to 
and analyse the frame (Hopper 1995:64). As an alternative to textualism, Hopper 
(1995:65) suggests that reflexivity should manifest as a collective process engaging 
the academic community in critical dialogue about the conditions and bases, beyond 
conventional epistemological concerns, that shape the construction of academic 
knowledge. Accepting Hopper’s (1995) critique, reflexive DSS development may 
similarly be constituted through discursive rather than textual devices. Ensuing 
sections will explore and articulate a conceptual framework to guide a discursive 
approach to reflexive DSS development.
4.3 Precautionary practice: Managing bias
A compelling rationale for engaging in reflexive DSS development must provide the 
foundations of a conceptual framework. I argue that consideration of the 
precautionary principle provides such a rationale. The precautionary principle 
emerged in response to recognition that, given the complexity and dynamism of 
ecosystems, environmental decision-making often takes place in situations of 
pervasive and even irreducible uncertainty'. As Dovers (1995a: 15) comments, "we 
are unsure of rates and causes of environmental change, the implications of these 
changes for natural and human systems, and both the efficacy and socioeconomic 
impacts of policy measures". Environmental decision-making thus necessarily 
engages an element of risk and uncertainty. Traditional risk management has sought 
to reduce or preferably eliminate risk and uncertainty in the natural environment. 
However, increasing recognition of the unlikeliness of the total comprehension of 
natural systems, or human interactions with them, has led to increasing acceptance 
that where there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage, measures 
to anticipate, avoid or minimise this damage should be attempted even in situations 
of incomplete knowledge (IGAE 1992:13). This is known as the precautionary 
principle.
Within policy spheres, the precautionary principle has been invoked to inform 
environmental management at local, national and intergovernmental levels, including 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, the United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change 1992, and the World Conservation Strategy 1991. 
While the precautionary principle does not provide pragmatic guidance, consensus 
has emerged in the literature that a precautionary approach should entail (Deville and 
Harding 1997, Dovers 1995b, Wynne 1992b):
• acknowledgment that uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy pervade our 
knowledge about the environment and environmental risks
• a shift in the onus of proof from those advocating environmental protection to 
those proposing actions that may impact the environment
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• a proactive, preventative and anticipatory rather then reactive or defensive 
approach.
Shifting from consideration of externalised environmental threats to the risk that 
developers’ practice may bias the DSS, with potentially serious and irreversible 
adverse implications for actors in the decision-making environment, I argue for a 
reflexive treatment of the precautionary principle by developers of environmental 
DSS, see Box 4.1. This shift from environmental impacts to the effects of practice is 
similar to a move from project-based Environmental Impact Assessments to Strategic 
Impact Assessments of policies, and thus may be termed a ‘strategic’ precautionary 
approach. Analogous to environmental risk management, precautionary practice 
would entail the anticipation, avoidance and minimisation of potential biases through 
critical reflection both prior to and during DSS design and development. Thus, 
rather than leaving users to manage the impacts of biases reactively as they manifest, 
DSS developers would assume a degree of responsibility for identifying, managing 
and communicating potential biases which may interact and transform the decision­
making environment in ways judged adverse. In this manner, a precautionary 
approach shares similarities with the perspectives of Woodharper et al. (1996), 
Rogerson (1995) and others who have advocated the development or establishment 
of a code of ethics for information systems analysts. However, a precautionary 
approach differs significantly from much of the development ethics literature in 
emphasising communication of the critical history of DSS development including the 
discursive interrogation of biases. Thus, developers’ consideration of bias is not 
confined to spheres of personal practice, and extends beyond the development 
community9 to engage with the broader decision-making community.
Precautionary Princwle Precautionary DSS development
• concerned with threat o f serious or •  concerned with risk that biases may have
irreversible environmental damage serious or irreversible implications for 
decision-making environment
• anticipate, avoid and minimise damage • anticipate, avoid and minimise biases
• proactive, preventative and anticipatory • proactive, preventative and anticipatory
environmental management DSS development
• onus o f  proof on those proposing actions • greater responsibility on those developing
that may impact environment DSS to identify, manage and 
communicate potential biases
Box 4-1 From the precautionary principle to precautionary DSS development
Beyond recognising that uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy may lead to 
embedded biases within the DSS, precautionary practice also recognises that 
technological commitments, made on the basis of presumed knowledge and 
manifested as components of the DSS, and policy commitments, made on the basis 
of users’ presumptions about the validity/uncertainty of the DSS output, will both
9 The term ‘development community’ refers to all of those who participate in DSS development, 
including conventional ‘developers’ as well as any participating ‘users’.
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serve to compound ignorance (cf Wynne 1992b: 114). Acknowledgment that 
technological commitments may compound ignorance reinforces the imperative for 
developers to interrogate and manage biases during the design (conceptual 
commitment) and development (technical commitment) processes. Acknowledgment 
that policy commitments may compound ignorance reinforces the value in 
documenting and communicating developers’ discursive interrogation of biases to 
users in order to alert them to potential biases due to technical commitments. Note 
that participatory development is also encouraged since involving users in 
development is likely to enhance their awareness of commitments and other sources 
of bias.
A precautionary approach to DSS development presupposes a dialectic co- 
constructive relationship between technology and society. On the one hand, the 
introduction of a DSS reconstitutes the decision-making environment, shifting and 
transforming relationships, networks and processes. On the other, the DSS is 
constructed and transformed by developers and other actors within the decision­
making environment. Hence, while bias may be introduced through the social 
commitments of developers, and while this bias may interact transformatively with 
the decision-making environment with potentially adverse implications for 
stakeholder relationships, there is also an opportunity for DSS developers and users 
to anticipate and manage potential biases through value-sensitive development. If a 
DSS not only shapes, constrains and enables our decision-making actions, but 
developers and users may also shape, constrain and enable the DSS, then a space 
emerges for creative engagement with the DSS to guide it toward trajectories which 
reflect their negotiated vision. The interplay of technologies with society are always 
unpredictable, and precautionary practice is no panacea for unwelcome 
consequences. However, I suggest that iterative interrogation of biases is a key step 
in guiding the construction and use of DSS in a manner more consonant with a 
sustainability paradigm.
The proposed approach shares similarities with branches of Technology Assessment 
(TA) in terms of an interest in the sociocultural and political consequences of 
technologies, and in the constructive management to guide the development of 
technology which better meets social goals, namely sustainability (Porter 1995, 
Huddle 1972). However, by focussing on processes of social construction, the 
proposed approach differs significantly from conventional TA, which emphasises 
probabilistic assessment and deterministic forecasting of the impacts of a defined 
technology. Within the TA literature, social constructionist approaches are 
beginning to emerge, notably, Van Langenhove and Berloznik (1996). My proposed 
approach to reorient DSS development may be positioned within this nascent 
discourse.
4.4 Learning through reflection on practice
How should precautionary DSS development proceed? Literature which explores the 
relationship between practice, research and learning, particularly action learning 
literature, offers useful insights for more reflexive DSS development. Action 
learning is concerned with the dialectic between thought and action (Robottom 
1987:109). It involves self-critical and socially-critical reflection on practice, and on 
the theory of practice, with an aim to improve practice (Di Chiro 1987:44). In
64
contrast with passive learning in which the learner receives knowledge imparted by 
an authority, action learning entails active reflection by the learner on their own 
practice.
While some (for example, Revans 1991) argue that an action learning mode is 
founded on taking action rather than discussing or recommending possible actions, 
most advocates recognise that action does not automatically lead to learning 
(Margerison 1991:213, Pedler 1991:63). Pedler (1991:63) suggests that the defining 
characteristic of action learning is not the requirement for action, but instead 
“acquiring the ability to ask good questions of oneself, of others and of situations 
which lead to an increased ability to tackle problems in the future”. Within this 
conceptualisation of action learning, critical interrogation is emphasised in order to 
challenge the individual or group’s presumed knowledge (ignorance).
A conceptual framework developed by Argyris and Schon (1974) to assist people in 
learning-directed reflection on their actions provides several key concepts 
underpinning action learning. Argyris and Schon (1974:7) distinguished ‘theories of 
action’, the theories of practice which a practitioner purports to subscribe to, from 
‘theories-in-use’, the theories which frame the practitioners actions. They posited 
that theories-in-use captured the governing variables which a practitioner was 
interested in, and that these set boundaries for action (p 15). Based on this 
conceptualisation, behavioural learning was described as either the adoption of new 
strategies to achieve the existing governing variables (single-loop learning), or 
modification of the governing variables (double-loop learning) (pi 9). Argyris and 
Schon (1974:30, 31) suggested that double-loop learning tends to be initiated through 
the surfacing of dilemmas, such as observation of incongruities between the espoused 
theory of action and the theory-in-use. They further argued that any situation of 
practice provides opportunities for learning through examination of the assumptions 
underlying practice, and exploration of dilemmas of theories in practice (p 159).
Over the past two decades, practitioners from a wide range of fields, particularly 
education and sociology, have drawn on these concepts of active reflection on one’s 
own theory of situational practice, but often without Argyris and Schon’s strict 
experimental methods of testability (Fook 1996, Sadique 1996, Ryan 1996).
In the context of DSS development, action learning offers a conceptual framework 
for self-examination of developer’s practice and development biases through 
reflection on the assumptions and commitments which constitute practice, their 
potential manifestation within the DSS, and potential role in reproducing or 
transforming the decision-making environment. However, while action learning may 
be fostered, it cannot be guaranteed. As Pedler (1991:64) notes, “one of the critical 
prerequisites is whether the individual wants it to happen for her/him” (1991:64).
4.5 Collaborative learning
Although the principles of action research have been extrapolated to improvement of 
individual practice (Whitehead 1991), action research originally gained popularity, 
particularly through Lewin’s (1946:34) work, as a tool to assist intergroup relations. 
Retaining this group focus, many advocates argue that action research is only 
constituted through collective and collaborative inquiry (Zuber-Skerritt 1992).
Within this conception, action research requires an emphasis on forming shared
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discourses and agreed practices, (self-)critical analysis of group relationships, and 
group learning (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988).
Kemmis and McTaggart (1988:31-43) invoke theories of contestation and 
institutionalisation to describe the dynamic of group learning. Contestation theory 
refers to the political processes of negotiation and renegotiation that effect change in 
a group’s continual reconstruction of its social reality, and its relationship to broader 
society (p. 31). Thus, as DSS developers reflect on potential individual and shared 
biases, conflict may emerge, for example, as to the validity or likelihood of biases, or 
the practicality, necessity or means of managing biases. As contests between 
members of a group are resolved, certain discourses, practices and organisations 
become accepted, shared and institutionalised (p. 41). Kemmis and McTaggart argue 
that revelation of the critical history of contests, changes and institutionalisation is a 
key dimension of constructive group improvement, as the critical history may shape 
“categories of individual and cultural action to define themes, issues and strategies 
which could form the basis of a plan for a program of reform” (p 43). Learning is 
thus represented as directed improvement through individuals becoming more 
conscious and critical of the coherency and consistency of individual and shared 
discourses, practices and forms of organisation (p.44). As individuals reflect in 
concert, group learning may emerge. As Heclo (1974:306) argues, “Social learning 
is created only by individuals, but alone and in interactions these individuals acquire 
and produce changed patterns of collective action”. Thus, the identities of DSS 
developers, and their constructions of bias, development practice, the DSS and the 
decision-making environment, are continually contested, reproduced and 
institutionalised. Reflection on the critical history of DSS development may catalyse 
individual learning, and may shape collective action, therein reinforcing collaborative 
learning.
Collaborative social learning also features in organisational change, policy learning 
and environmental negotiation literatures. From the organisational learning domain, 
Haas (1990) describes learning as “the establishment of shared meanings among 
parties that may be active antagonists but that find themselves condemned by their 
interdependence to negotiate better solutions than they had created in earlier 
attempts”. In construction of knowledge terms, the establishment of shared 
meanings implies the sharing of different constructed realities. As Erlanson et al. 
(1993:24) note, “This sharing is never a straight-forward, clear communication of the 
original constructions; it is shaped by the host of realities already constructed by each 
group, based on their collective experiences as well as the relationships between the 
groups”. The demand for procedures to negotiate a path through conflict for mutual 
social learning translates into a requirement for processes that interrogate and 
adjudicate the different construals of reality (Bruner 1990:95). As Long (1992:27) 
warns, such processes do not escape conflict, but instead are inherently political: 
“Knowledge encounters involve the struggle between actors who aim to enrol others 
in their ‘projects’, getting them to accept particular frames of meaning, winning them 
over to their point of view”. Consequently, apparent convergence of constructions 
may reflect one person’s successful impairment, perhaps via suppression, 
intimidation, distortion or obfuscation, of communication and other social 
interchanges intended to guide the negotiation of shared constructions (Lindblom 
1990:80, Habermas 1984). From this perspective, non-collaborative learning may be
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promoted as individuals or stakeholder groups engage in single-loop learning about 
how they may better achieve the ends defined by their core ontological and 
normative beliefs (Sabatier 1988, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994).
Lee (1993) draws on Haas (1990) and Argyris and Schon (1978), among others, in 
his model of social learning, based on adaptive management and bounded conflict, to 
achieve sustainable ecosystem management. Within Lee’s conception, adaptive 
management involves the use of policy experimentation to discipline learning from 
experience (p. 114). Bounded conflict is represented as “a combination of politics, 
negotiation, and other means of promoting uncomfortable change, which provides 
tools for establishing shared goals and probing the bounds of cooperative effort” (p. 
16). Lee argues that while social learning may emerge through conflict, severe 
conflict may prevent or undermine experiential learning, or lead to only sporadic 
learning (p. 101,114). To foster learning, Lee suggests restructuring conflict through 
negotiation processes which recognise different visions of conflict, and thus of 
learning directions, which build consensus on agreed goals, and which oversee 
incremental settlement of conflict (p. 105,108). Echoing Lee’s approach, McLain 
and Lee (1996:439) propose that “In situations where a multiplicity of stakeholders 
are present, the key is not to try to reach consensus on all values and meanings but to 
create some common values and shared meanings through processes that promote the 
development of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the interests of others”. 
Focussing on individuals within communities of practice, O’Neill (1998:16) argues 
that differing understandings “only need to be addressed and resolved when they 
directly interfere with mutual engagement and achievement of the joint enterprise”. 
To negotiate a convergent vision from divergent positions, Lindblom (1990) 
advocates social inquiry or ‘probing’ of the differing positions. These theoretical 
perspectives suggest that to promote collaborative learning, divergent framings of 
decision support should be highlighted, probed and debated when they manifest as 
competing claims for commitments in constructing the DSS developers’ joint 
enterprise; the DSS.
Departing from conflict-oriented models, an alternative perspective on decision­
making and group learning argues that learning not only flows from political 
contests, but also from “collective puzzlement” (Heclo 1974:305). Following this 
line, Revans (1991:5) suggests that collective learning flows from the recognition of 
common ignorance, as participants discover that no one participant can tell the others 
the answer, but instead “all are obliged to find it”. Within this conception, learning 
entails taking steps to overcome ignorance, rather than merely trading knowledge 
between participants. This suggests that a condition for effective collective learning 
may be a willingness to acknowledge the limits of group knowledge and the 
existence of ignorance.
One challenge in collaborative learning is the potential for disjunctures when a 
newcomer joins the DSS development process. Situated learning theory offers 
insights into how new participants in the DSS development community may integrate 
with a culture of reflexive, precautionary practice. Following Lave and Wenger’s 
(1991) conception, ‘situated learning’ implies more than classical experiential 
models of ‘learning by doing’. Learning is framed as a process of becoming a full 
participant in a particular community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991:52).
Rather than merely acquiring skills and knowledge, the learner gradually absorbs and
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becomes absorbed into the culture of practice - the norms and practices of the 
community (p. 95). The newcomer also introduces their personal culture of practice 
to the community of practice, therein reconstituting and transforming the community. 
Based on a conceptual understanding of agent, activity and social world as mutually 
constitutive, learning thus involves the (re)production, transformation and change of 
the identities of practitioners, skills of practice, and communities of practice through 
social activity (p. 49, 51). Differences in power between the established community 
members and the newcomer mediate the extent to which a newcomer reluctant to 
engage in reflexive, precautionary practice will transform or be transformed by the 
culture of practice (p. 116). It should be noted that, by locating learning as social co­
participation, Lave and Wenger (1991) offer a contrasting viewpoint to Kemmis and 
McTaggart’s (1988) and Heclo’s (1974) analytical focus on the individual-as-leamer.
4.6 Critical dialogue to interrogate biases
It should be noted that approaches to reflexivity which focus on shared construing 
may echo the limitations of participatory DSS development. For example, Gergen 
and Gergen (1991:86) propose a ‘relational reflexivity’ which focuses on shared 
construing of meaning and theory by researchers and research ‘subjects’. Their 
account of relational reflexivity is intended to move beyond the limitations of the 
individual to realise and articulate the linguistic conventions in which he or she is 
embedded. However, while sharing realities may challenge the biases of the 
individual, like participatory development, this approach may fail to guard against 
reinforcement of the shared cultural biases of the group. To move beyond these 
limitations, the notion of reflexive practice adopted earlier suggests the necessity of a 
commitment beyond shared construing to critical, cyclical interrogation and 
communication of group biases as they are realised.
A number of authors from contemporary sociology and critical theory suggest that 
this task may be assisted by broader discursive interaction. These approaches 
resonate with Hopper’s (1995:67) interest in critical dialogue to confront the cultural 
bases of knowledge reception and (re)production. For example, drawing on 
Habermas (1984), Dryzek (1990) argues for a revival of open political discourse for 
collective deliberation and decision-making, underpinned by communicative 
rationality. Communicative action is “oriented toward intersubjective 
understanding” and “the generation of action-oriented consensus” (Dryzek 
1990:14,70). An action is communicatively rational depending upon the extent to 
which interaction is uncoerced, unconstrained, undistorted, and validated on the basis 
of argumentative speech (Habermas 1984:10). Dryzek (1990:87,221) recognises that 
purportedly discursively democratic exercises are as vulnerable to co-option and 
exploitation as conventional processes, reinforcing the imperative for continual 
critical scrutiny.
Drawing on Habermas (1983) and Dryzek (1990), O’Hara (1996) proposes an ethical 
discursive process for ecosystems valuation. O’Hara (1996:97,101) argues that 
discursive ethics offers: firstly, the potential for making visible or deconstructing 
valuation biases concealed by disciplinary assumptions and cultural norms; and 
secondly, a framework for a democratic reconstruction of deconstructed valuation 
and decision-making processes. The former process is engaged from the point of 
selection of discourse participants through consideration of the views of those who
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are conventionally unheard and un(der)-represented. An expanded democratic 
dialogue may then give expression to the latter process. Extending Dryzek’s 
warnings, O’Hara (1996:104) argues that critical sensitivity to hidden value 
distinctions and underlying biases is necessary in ecosystems’ valuations to avoid 
reinforcement of existing valuation and power structures.
In terms of DSS development, the preceding perspectives support the incorporation 
of discursive processes to catalyse the critical interrogation of tacit and shared biases. 
Although critical dialogue has received limited attention to date within the DSS 
literature, a few authors have supported, in very general terms, a role for DSS in 
promoting or facilitating critical dialogue. For example, Fedra (1995:6) argues that 
the graphical user interface of a DSS “can generate a widely accepted and familiar 
format for a shared information basis supporting an open debate”. O’Neill (1998) 
suggests that through modelling scenarios, DSS can help to situate shared visions, 
providing a focal point for negotiating common meanings. Addressing critical 
dialogue in greater detail, Angehm and Jelassi (1994:270) describe a DSS which 
facilitates a critical interrogation of a user’s biases by means o f ‘stimulus agents’ 
programmed into the DSS: “These agents can be thought of as a team of advisors, 
experts and devil’s advocates that challenge the frame selected by the decision 
maker. They provide different viewpoints and additional information and offer 
alternative problem solving strategies. As a result, the DSS user is prevented from 
structuring problems in too narrow a way, from becoming too overconfident in his or 
her judgement, and to eliminate (sic) or reduce the negative effects of other well- 
documented biases”. This approach provides a virtual dialogue between the user and 
DSS developers, and its utility as a critical tool appears inversely dependent on the 
degree of consonance of the users’ frame with the frames imputed by the developers. 
While an advance on conventional DSS usage, providing a restraint on hubris, this 
approach is less useful in terms of a critical reconstruction of the DSS development 
process, since introducing a second DSS to challenge development biases of the focal 
DSS could easily engage biases associated with the second DSS, perhaps 
exacerbating complexity and circularity. The fundamental problem is that, where it 
is even mentioned at all, the DSS literature treats bias as located in the user, and 
tends to neglect the role developers may play in biasing a DSS.
4.7 Weaving the threads: A new theoretical framework for DSS development
To confront the constructedness of DSS, and the concomitant potential for bias, the 
process of DSS development is reconstituted as reflexive, precautionary practice. 
Reflexive practice entails critical inquiry into, analysis of and reflection on practice 
to enable greater self-awareness of framing, accompanied by revelation of the 
influences of framing in shaping the process of knowledge (re)production. 
Precautionary practice involves the anticipation, avoidance and minimisation, both 
prior to and during DSS design and development, of potential biases likely to interact 
transformatively with the decision-making environment. A cyclical, discursive 
approach, based on principles of action learning, is proposed to guide self- 
examination of developer’s practice and development biases through reflection on 
the assumptions and commitments which constitute practice, their potential 
manifestation within the DSS, and potential role in reproducing or transforming the 
decision-making environment.
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As DSS developers reflect on potential individual and shared biases, individual 
learning may be catalysed as individuals become more conscious and critical of the 
coherency and consistency of individual and shared discourses, practices and forms 
of organisation. Inconsistent discourses, practices or forms of organisation may 
shape alternate framings of decision support, manifesting as competing claims for 
commitments in constructing the DSS. As individuals probe and debate divergent 
framings of decision support in concert, a mutual vision for the joint enterprise (the 
DSS) may be negotiated, and collaborative learning may emerge. As well as 
interrogation of divergence, critical scrutiny of convergent framings is advocated to 
challenge tacit and shared group biases. Communication of the critical history of 
DSS development is promoted to apprise future users of biases and commitments, 
and inform post-facto learning.
While critical sensitivity is increasingly informing natural resource management, 
witnessed by greater emphasis on equitable and participatory management strategies, 
it is not yet as visible reflexively within the personal and professional theory and 
practice of those who develop and enact approaches to natural resource management, 
including DSS developers. Within the DSS literature, reflexivity, critical practice, 
and the constructedness of DSS have received limited and inadequate attention. The 
theoretical framework articulated above thus provides a useful contribution to the 
DSS field.
4.8 Analytical framework: Anticipating and interrogating bias
The preceding review has established a theoretical basis to underpin the reorientation 
of DSS development as collective, collaborative learning via discursive interrogation 
of biases. However, with the exception of Anghen and Jelassi (1994), whose 
approach was inadequate for exploring developers’ biases, the literature has not 
yielded analytical advice. Procedures are required which assist developers or users 
committed to or potentially affected by a particular DSS application to explore 
potential and existing biases associated with the DSS. To this end, Table 4.1 
proposes a generic analytical framework, based on the taxonomy of bias presented in 
Chapter 3, which is intended to structure an interrogation of potential and existing 
biases associated with an environmental DSS.
The analytical framework is divided into three sections. Part A is a background 
section which situates the analysis within a specific decision-making environment. 
Question A1 queries the motivations for development of the DSS, in order to explore 
interests and commitments. By asking participants to detail the decision problem the 
DSS is being developed to support, A2 prompts broad problem-framing. A3 
emphasises the evolving, dynamic nature of the decision-making environment, and is 
designed to inform subsequent reflection on embedded biases introduced through 
time. A4 explores the stakeholders who have an interest in the decision problem for 
which the DSS is being developed. A5 examines the policymaking processes which 
are deemed relevant to the decision problem, with a view to exploring how the DSS 
may alter stakeholders access to the policy process. A6 and A7 identify who the 
developers consider potential users’ of the DSS, and the benefits they are expected to 
gain through use of the DSS, pointing to assumptions about the purpose of the DSS. 
A8 directs attention to the types of information which the developers consider 
necessary to be incorporated within the DSS, signalling problem-framing
70
assumptions. To delineate the perceived functional bounds of the DSS, if any, A9 
examines whether the DSS will be introduced in conjunction with other types of 
policy mechanisms, such as non-computer-based operational policy frameworks.
A10 inquires of the criteria for success of the DSS, prompting identification of 
further assumptions about the purpose of the DSS.
Part B is an interrogation of embedded bias. B1 deals with who the DSS 
developers are, and their varying roles in the development process. Beyond 
identifying the developers, B1 is intended to prompt reflection on the partiality of 
participation, and the different degrees of participation possible. Those stakeholders 
who have an interest in the decision problem, but who will not be involved in 
development of the DSS, are explicitly identified in B2. Thus, perspectives are 
located which will not be directly involved in development, pointing to potential 
embedded biases. B3 continues this line of reflection, exploring how these non­
participating stakeholders’ views, as well as those of participating stakeholders, are 
intended to be incorporated within the DSS. In particular, this may inform reflection 
on absences and distortions of representation. Question B4 examines problem 
framing in greater detail, and is intended to prompt developers to consider 
assumptions underpinning their problem framing and alternate perspectives. By 
exploring the capacity of the DSS to be updated or reconstructed, B5 focuses on the 
potential for management of biases such as absences or distortions in knowledge 
which may be introduced by the evolving decision-making environment. Pointing to 
developers’ commitments to a particular system, system components or the logics 
underpinning the system, B6 identifies the hardware, software, models and datasets 
which are to be incorporated within the DSS. To catalyse reflection on assumptions 
made about relationships and interactions within the decision-making environment, 
B6 also examines the integration of components. To signal potential assumptions 
regarding relevance, and potential absences or distortions in knowledge, B7 focuses 
on those systems or components which may have been rejected by developers for 
inclusion in the DSS. B8 inquires about the uncertainties and assumptions which the 
developers are aware of in relation to the either the system components or underlying 
processes, suggesting potential biases due to distortions in knowledge. To explore 
potential absences or distortions in knowledge introduced as a result of the interface, 
in particular those due to the user-friendliness dilemma, B9 and B10 query the mode 
of presentation of the DSS output and associated uncertainties and assumptions.
Part C is an interrogation of biased access. To inform potential geographic biases 
in access, Cl queries the geographical structure of the DSS, for example, whether the 
system is intended to be centrally located or networked. C2 then compares the 
geographical structure of the DSS with the locational constraints of potential users.
To inform potential financial biases in access, C3 queries the costs of 
developing/purchasing, establishing and maintaining the DSS, and who is likely to 
bear the costs. C4 then compares the financial costs of the DSS with the financial 
resources available to different potential users. To inform potential biases due to 
literacy, C5 and C6 explore the conventional, computer and scientific literacy which 
are anticipated to be necessary either to use the DSS, or to interrogate and analyse the 
potential for embedded biases. C7 then compares the literacy demands of the DSS 
with the literacy bounds of potential users. C8 aims to catalyse reflection on the 
interaction of the DSS with policymaking processes and institutions within the
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decision-making environment, including whether the DSS is likely to supplement or 
supplant policymaking processes, or whether the DSS may serve to mediate either 
the empowerment or the disempowerment of an institution or stakeholder group. 
Given the existing policymaking processes, and the potential geographic, financial, 
literacy and political biases in access, C9 and C 10 explore whether the use of the 
DSS is likely to improve or worsen the access of any of the stakeholders in 
environmental decision-making.
For any application, it is likely that certain questions proposed may be deemed 
irrelevant or inadequate. Thus, to ensure relevance and practical feasibility, the 
generic framework (including the wording of questions and the methods of 
application) should be modified to suit each specific case. The framework is not 
intended as a prescriptive methodology, but rather as a flexible yet detailed guide to 
stimulate critical reflection on and discussion of biases. If used early, the framework 
may facilitate the anticipation of biases, thus allowing the management of potential 
biases before they emerge as problems. It should be emphasised that the framework 
is intended as an iterative heuristic aid, with developers and users revisiting questions 
periodically throughout the development and use process. If reapplied throughout 
the design, development and implementation of the DSS, the reflective responses 
may provide a (partial) history of the rationale underlying design, development or 
implementation decisions, thus facilitating a more transparent process. This may 
prove useful where a participatory approach is limited, allowing scrutiny after the 
fact of the underlying logic and assumptions. It may also prove useful to guard 
against loss of critical history if key participants in development decisions leave the 
DSS development community.
4.9 Conclusions
This chapter has outlined the conceptual underpinnings of a new approach to DSS 
development, which emphasises a precautionary treatment of development biases. 
The anticipation and management of biases is cast as an iterative process of critical 
reflection on development practice, the DSS, and the decision-making environment. 
Through this process, individual and collaborative learning emerge, as the DSS, DSS 
development practice, and the identities of DSS development participants are 
reproduced and transformed. To catalyse and guide reflexive interrogation of biases, 
a heuristic analytical framework has been proposed. In order to ground and further 
develop both the conceptual and analytical frameworks, in subsequent chapters, the 
frameworks will be used to guide reflexive DSS development in the IWRAM project, 
which is developing a DSS to assist integrated environmental management in the 
highlands of Northern Thailand. In Chapter 5, the frameworks will be used in 
conjunction with reviews of the highland environmental history and the political 
culture of highland decision-making to foreshadow potential biases which may arise 
if DSS is introduced into the highland decision-making environment. Chapter 6 
presents a narrative of how I used the proposed frameworks to catalyse researchers 
participating in the IWRAM project to interrogate potential biases and negotiate 
convergent framings of decision support.
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Table 4-1 Framework for anticipating bias in DSS
A: Background to the application context
A 1. Why was this development of DSS initiated?
A2. What decision problem(s) is the DSS intended to support?
A3. How might this problem change over time?
A4. Who are the stakeholders to this problem?
A5. Characterise the existing policymaking processes relevant to this problem, including a power analysis of the 
stakeholders to the problem.
A6. Who are the intended users (direct and indirect) of the DSS?
A7. What benefits are these users expected to derive from use of the technology?
A8. In the light of (A2,A6 and A7), what are the information requirements of the technology?
A9. Will the DSS be applied in conjunction with any other policy mechanisms?
What are the criteria for success of the DSS?
B: Embedded bias
B1. Describe the people who are intended to be involved in development of the DSS. Why will they be 
involved? When will they be involved? How will they be involved?
B2. Describe those stakeholders who are not intended to be involved in the development of the DSS. Why 
won't they be involved?
B3. Will different stakeholders views be considered during the construction of the DSS or incorporated in any 
form? If so, how?
B4. How will the decision problem be framed? Who will frame the problem? What alternate ways are there of 
construing this problem?
B5. How rapidly and easily will the DSS respond to changes in the decision problem or application context over 
time?
B6. Describe the hardware, software, models and data sets which are anticipated to be incorporated in the DSS. 
Why will they be incorporated? How will they be integrated?
B7. Have any hardware, software, models or data set options previously under consideration been rejected? If 
so, why?
B8. What uncertainties and assumptions (including constraints and boundary conditions) are associated with the 
underlying processes or system components?
B9. How is it intended that the output of the DSS presented to the user?
BIO.How is it intended that uncertainties and assumptions related to the output, underlying processes or system 
components be communicated to users?
C: Biased access
C l. What is the intended geographical structure of the DSS?
C2. Compare the location of potential users relative to the DSS.
C3. What are the likely up-front and running costs of the DSS? Who will bear these costs?
C4. Compare the costs of the DSS to the financial resources available to potential users of the system.
C5. What degree of conventional or computer literacy is likely to be required to use the system?
C6. What degree of conventional or computer literacy is likely to be required to analyse potential biases in the 
system output?
C7. Compare the likely literacy requirements of the technology to the literacy levels of potential users of the 
system.
C8. How will the DSS articulate with existing or intended policymaking processes and institutions?
C9. In the light of (A5) and (C2,4,7,8), is it likely that use of the DSS will improve the access of any individual 
or group to policymaking relative to the existing situation?
CIO. In the light of (A5) and (C2,4,7,8), is there a risk that use of the DSS will worsen the access of any 
individual or group to policymaking relative to the existing situation?
Locating the decision-making 
environment:
The highlands o f northern
Thailand
Some o f the highland villagers argue that government policies aimed at 
reserving and protecting the highland forests have denied them of wood 
traditionally used for housing, cooking and heating.
5. Locating the decision-making environment: 
The highlands of northern Thailand
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This chapter is intended to embed analysis of the IWRAM case study, presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7, within the geographic, cultural and political decision-making 
environment of the highlands of northern Thailand. In particular, it aims to foreshadow 
and offer insights into tensions between alternate framings of decision support which 
emerge during the IWRAM case study.
The first three sections explore the highland decision-making environment. The chapter 
opens with a brief geographic profile of the northern highlands. To illuminate the 
politics of highland development theory and practice, Section 5.2 traces an interpretive 
narrative of the highland environmental history. Viewing historical narratives as 
reconstructions, Section 5.2 does not pretend to be a singular, definitive explanation of 
the environmental history. Instead, it reflects my selection, organisation and weaving of 
historical fragments which I have deemed influential in shaping the ecological, political 
and sociocultural environment of the highlands. Key themes explored include 
interactions between lowland and highland stakeholders, and the influence and role of 
Western science, politics and development philosophy on the highland decision-making 
environment. To inform key relationships and events represented in the historical 
narrative, Section 5.3 discusses characteristics of the political culture of highland 
environmental decision-making.
The final three sections are intended to locate DSS and the IWRAM project within the 
highland decision-making environment. Section 5.5 discusses the state of highland 
environmental decision support. Drawing on the IWRAM project proposal, Section 5.6 
describes the research approach of the IWRAM project, and explores how this project is 
confronting challenges of integration, co-ordination and participation. Drawing on the 
highland environmental history and politics as well as the taxonomy of bias, the chapter 
concludes by exploring potential biases in relation to the IWRAM DSS.
5.1 Geographic profile
Comprised of the seventeen administrative provinces (changwat) which lie to the north 
of the Central Plain, Northern Thailand covers an area of 169 644 km2 (RFD 1994). In 
contrast to the plains of the Lower North, the landscape of the Upper North is one of 
hills and mountains, interspersed with narrow valleys. Within the rugged mountain 
ranges are many peaks in excess of 1500 m, including Doi Inthanon, which at 2576 m is 
the highest mountain in Thailand (Tern et al. 1978:24). The headwaters of several major 
rivers are located in these ranges, including the Ping, Yom, Wang and Nan rivers, the 
four main tributaries of the Chao Phraya river which irrigates Thailand’s Central Plain.
The Northern highlands experience a monsoonal, tropical savanna climate, with distinct 
wet and dry seasons. The southwest monsoon is active from May to October, bringing 
moisture from the Indian Ocean, and blanketing the highlands in dense rain cloud (Anat 
et al. 1987:15). The dry season runs from October to May. From October to February, 
the northeast monsoon carries dry, cold air from China, causing highland temperatures 
to cool to less than 10°C . From March to May, a hot, dry climate prevails, raising 
temperatures to around 3 0°C.
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Figure 5-1 Northern Thailand (Source: Kanok and Benjavan 1994:4)
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The Upper North is classified into three agroecological zones: the highlands; the 
intermediate uplands; and the lowland valleys. The lowlands are densely populated by 
Tai speakers, mainly the Northern Thai or Tai Yuan (Anan 1996:204). The upland and 
highland zones, which are often collectively referred to as ‘the highlands’10, have 
traditionally been sparsely populated by a number of non-Tai ‘hill tribe’ communities. 
While hill tribes represent only about 6% of the Northern region’s population of 11 
million, many of the mountainous provinces in the Upper North have sizeable hill tribe 
populations. For example, about 19% of the total population of Chiang Mai, 60% of the 
population of Mae Hong Son, 25% of the population of Tak, and 16% of the population 
of Nan identify as hill tribes (Kanok and Benjavan 1994:6). It should be emphasised 
that hill tribe population figures are approximates. Accurate figures are difficult to 
obtain from census data as only around 61.2% of hill people have Thai citizenship 
(Kampe 1992:159).
Prior to World War II, the population density in the Northern highlands was contained 
by remoteness and diseases such as malaria and smallpox (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 
1992:21). Since the 1950s, more effective control of diseases and extension of 
infrastructure have enabled a dramatic increase in stakeholders, with increasing numbers 
of lowland Thais moving into the uplands. Due to the increase in population density, 
the Northern highlands, which were originally covered in dense forest, have been 
subjected to extensive clearing, primarily for agriculture, although resorts and other 
tourist ventures are becoming increasingly common. Now, only around half of the 
Northern highlands is covered in evergreen, mixed deciduous and dry dipterocarp forest. 
Smaller remnants of tropical coniferous forest, teak and other plantations are scattered 
across the landscape. However, at 44 %, the Northern region still has the most 
extensive forest cover in Thailand, compared with a national average of 26% (RFD 
1994).
5.2 Highland environmental history: Politics and pressures"
5.2.1 Early settlement history
Although the early settlement history of the highlands of Northern Thailand is sketchy, 
around the 8th century, people of the Karen and Lua hill tribes, considered indigenous to 
Northern Thailand and adjoining areas of Burma and Laos, are thought to have settled in 
the forest covered highlands (Bhruksari 1989). The Karen and Lua formed permanent 
settlements in the foothills and middle elevations, where they hunted and gathered wild 
forest products, and practiced rotational shifting cultivation (Kundstater 1978, Pasuk 
and Baker 1995:50). Under rotational shifting cultivation, a village would clear a plot 
of secondary forest on their communal land for the village households to cultivate 
swidden fields (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:23). After the annual crop had been 
harvested, the land would be left fallow for around ten years to enable secondary forest 
regrowth and ecological rejuvenation, before being recultivated. The traditional Karen
10 In this thesis, the term ‘Northern highlands’ is used to refer to the mountainous region of the Upper 
North comprising the upland and highland agroecological zones. Where the term ‘highland’ is used to 
refer to the agroecological zone, this is explicitly stated.
11 Readers interested in alternate accounts should see Reynolds (1992) exploration o f historians’ 
(re)constructions o f the ‘plot’ o f Thai history, and Thongchai’s (1988) treatise on the influence of 
cartography in recreations o f Thai territorial history.
77
and Lua land management regime has been credited as having a strong conservation 
ethic. For example, vegetation on steep slopes, along rivers, and at the headwaters of 
streams were preserved to prevent erosion (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:25).
Forests in which spirits were believed to dwell were also preserved, and provided seed 
stores and wildlife shelters (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:25).
During the thirteenth century, Tai warriors migrated from China and seized power in 
strategic places throughout South-East Asia12 (Wyatt 1984:38). Numerous small Tai 
states were established in the lowlands of Northern Thailand in which a prince (jao) 
would rule over a cluster of peasant villages which were primarily engaged in wet-rice 
cultivation (Keyes 1989:28). Within this pre-capitalist sakdina society, peasants were 
compelled to provide labour to the ruling aristocracy, who monopolised administrative, 
political and economic power (Hewison 1989:36). During this period, the ancient Tai 
Yuan kingdom of Lanna, which encompasses most of Northern Thailand as delineated 
today, was founded, and construction of its capital city, Chiang Mai, began in 1296 
(Wyatt 1984:48). Historical accounts suggest that Lanna was a highly contested region 
from the fourteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, with the kingdom constantly 
engaged in internal and external warfare and control oscillating between various Tai and 
Burmese regimes (Wyatt 1984:74). In 1776, Tai armies of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya 
recaptured Chiang Mai, and by the late eighteenth century, the Bangkok-centred Siam 
state (the antecedent of the modern Thai state) had consolidated a loyalty-protection 
relationship with the semi-autonomous Lanna principalities (Keyes 1989:27, Wyatt 
1984:142,155). It should be noted that at this time, territorial boundaries were 
perceived as irrelevant since a political sphere “could be mapped only by power 
relationships, not by territorial integrity” (Thongchai 1994:79).
During the Lanna period, the highland people lived a fairly autonomous existence. 
However, they were not isolated from interaction with the lowland Tai courts. For 
example, lowland Thai rulers negotiated feudal tribute and trade agreements with 
individual highland communities to acquire highland forest products, such as beeswax, 
which were a vital component of foreign trade (Marlowe 1969:54, Jonsson 1996:176-7). 
Other interaction arose through warfare, slave raids by the Tai on highland 
communities, and the employment of highland people by the Tai for menial labour. 
These latter forms of interaction appear to reflect a pattern of domination by the Tai 
over hill peoples which had been established prior to and during their migration from 
China to Thailand (Wyatt 1984:8,41). Despite their limited economic and political 
interaction, the highland and lowland communities maintained a distinct separation, 
largely because of the geographic remoteness of the highland settlements. Jonsson 
(1996:178-9) suggests that the separation was also partially maintained by opposing 
ritualistic constructions of space: “lowlanders lived in areas uplanders associated with 
witchcraft; uplanders inhabited what lowlanders viewed as the domain of wild animals 
and spirits”.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, small numbers of Akha, Lahu, Lisu, 
Hmong and Mien tribes also migrated into the highlands, where they settled in the 
unoccupied higher elevations above the Karen and Lua settlements (Bhruksari 1989 
cited in Waranoot 1995:279). Savina (1930:173-176) suggests that lowland hostility 
drove the newcomers into the mountains. However, Geddes (1976:30-31) argues that
12 For a detailed history o f the Thai migration from China into the Indo-China peninsula see Rong 1986.
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their settlement at higher elevations reflected a traditional attachment to mountain 
living. Kunstadter (1978) suggests that poor agricultural conditions at these higher 
elevations dictated a system of pioneer shifting agriculture for survival. Under pioneer 
shifting cultivation, a household would clear and bum forest and other vegetation on a 
small parcel of land to grow crops. When the productivity of the land declined, due to 
soil nutrient depletion or weed infestation, or i f ‘bad spirits’, sickness or conflict became 
associated with the land, the household would relocate to a new site. In contrast to the 
communal system of the permanent swiddeners, cultivation and relocation decisions 
were managed by individual households, and allegiances to the village were tenuous 
(Kunstadter 1992:29). As migratory groups, the pioneer swiddeners did not tend to 
emphasise conservation or sustainable management. None-the-less, given the low 
population densities, the abandoned land would gradually recover, and after around 15- 
20 years, would become covered in secondary, closed-canopy forest (Fox et al. 
1995:329). Thus, with low population pressures, an equilibrium was maintained 
between loss and recovery of closed-canopy forest cover, and sustainability of the 
ecological system was not compromised.
5.2.2 Colonisation of the Northern resources
During the late eighteenth century, Chinese migration increased markedly into the area 
now delineated as Thailand, and by the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants 
controlled much of the internal Siamese trade (Keyes 1989:48). By 1850, a small teak 
industry, dominated by Chinese foresters, had been established in Northern Thailand. 
The foresters were required to obtain leases from the relatively autonomous local jao 
who granted concessions to forest use in exchange for fees and gifts (Vandergeest 
1996:161). Fees were divided by the rulingy'ao into three portions: one for himself; one 
for his official ‘noble’ collector; and one for the owner of the forest (Phen 1981 
(1903):306). The foresters sold the teak locally as a material for house building, 
fencing, boat building and fortifications (Slade 1981(1896)).
During the 1850s, Northern Thailand began to receive attention from the British, who 
were keen to demarcate a clear boundary between Burma and Northern Thailand 
(Thongchai 1994:68). Without the knowledge of Bangkok, the British negotiated a 
boundary treaty with Chiang Mai (Thongchai 1994:68). As fixed boundaries were 
perceived as irrelevant to political claims, Chiang Mai was amenable to signing a treaty 
so long as the British accepted the task of surveying and marking boundaries 
(Thongchai 1994:69).
In the 1870s, the British, followed soon after by the French and Danish, shifted their 
teak exploitation activities from the South Burmese forests into Northern Thailand 
(Sharlardchai 1989:32). Not only were the Burmese forests near exhaustion, but the 
activities of the Western forestry firms had been increasingly disrupted by the Burmese 
civil war (Pasuk and Baker 1995:100). Of all the teak forests in Northern Thailand, 
those in Chiang Mai, Lampang, Lamphun, Nan, Phrae, Chiang Saen and Chiang Rai 
were most highly prized because of the superior quality and abundance of teak wood 
(Phen 1981(1903)). In 1875, a British Consul Officer concluded that “The teak worked 
out into the Bangkok river does not exceed 1,000 or 2,000 logs a year, though very 
much more might be obtained if the forests were worked” (Edwardes 1981(1875)). The 
foreign interests “tuned to the needs of the external commercial economy and equipped 
with a more efficient technology... set a course to exploit [the Northern forests’]
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virtually untapped timber and mineral resources more thoroughly than subsistence 
farmers could ever have imagined possible” (McKinnon 1983:333).
Records from this time refer to the Northern mountains as being inhabited by lawless 
Karens and Shans who were liable to rob passing traders, and who had claimed and 
worked the mountain forests for many years (Edwardes 1981(1875)). These ‘bandits’ 
were portrayed by Bangkok as a threat to the security of the Northern Thai cities, 
demanding an attack by well-disciplined Thai troops (Government of Thailand 
1981(1902)). Other records describe the Northern jao as having discredited the Siamese 
reputation by slaughtering Shan and Karen men and forcing their wives and children 
into slavery where “they suffered as greatly as beasts” (Rama V 1981(1885)). With 
foreign interests in the North expanding, Bangkok became concerned that the Northern 
jao would embarrass the central government, or worse, create conflict with the British, 
who had demonstrated their military might during the Chinese opium wars. Hence, 
during the 1870s, Bangkok moved to secure the integration of Lanna into the Siam state 
through centralising revenue collection and other administrative functions (Wyatt 
1984:194). However, despite the incorporation of the Northern periphery within the 
Thai administrative domain, wild animals, robbers and malaria continued to discourage 
settlement of ethnic Thai in the highlands, which remained sparsely populated by hill 
tribes (Pasuk and Baker 1995:50).
By the late 1880s, Chiang Mai had become a major exporter of teak, particularly to 
British ship builders (Vandergeest 1996:161). From an average of 5 000 m3 during the 
period 1873-76, the annual export of teak rose to around 62 000 m3 during 1895-99, and 
reached a peak of 122 000 m3 during 1905-1909 (Ingram 1971:96). Although a few 
small forests were worked by their Thai owner or local officials, the British 
overwhelmingly dominated the Thai teak industry (Slade 1981(1896)). By the early 
1890s, the British teak firms had become concerned about the viability of the Northern 
forests. Ingram (1971:110) comments that “wanton and indiscriminate cutting of 
timber... became so extreme in the late nineteenth century that the teak companies 
themselves urged government regulation to stop it because no single company could 
compete successfully if it alone took the proper measures of conservation”. The 
concerns of the teak industry should be considered in the context of increasing conflict 
between the British companies and the jao, who often attempted to improve revenue 
either by leasing the same area to several companies or by imposing extra charges (Van 
der Meer 1981:21).
Rather than submitting to the jao 's demands, the British chose to undermine the jao 's 
claims to power by encouraging the extension of Bangkok’s sovereignty to the northern 
frontier (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:396). To prompt swift action, the British 
threatened to assume control of the northern periphery if the Thai government did not 
act swiftly and decisively to exert greater administrative control over the Northern 
forests and curtail the influence of the local jao (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:396). In 
response to the British pressure, the Ministry of the Interior sent provincial governors 
and district officers to start assuming control from the Northern princes. The 
government officials organised the Northern villages into permanent, registered villages 
with recognised village heads (Thongchai 1994:120). At the time of the administrative 
reforms, the Thai state also rewrote the forest concession contracts, including requiring 
recipients of concessions “to plant 4 baby trees for every teak tree felled” (Phen 1981 
(1903)).
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By the early 1900s, western-style cartography had become accepted by the Thai state as 
indispensable technology in negotiations over contested spaces: “modem mapping was 
the only geographical language the West would hear and only a modem map could 
make an argument” (Thongchai 1994:121). Thus, the traditional conception of political 
claims as based on spheres of influence had been displaced by a concern for territorial 
proof. Along with surveying boundaries, the state had also developed an interest in 
mapping the internal geography of Thailand to enable clear identification of their 
legitimate space (Thongchai 1994:119, 131).
To ensure administrative control over unoccupied lands, the Thai state established the 
Royal Forestry Department (RFD) in 1896, under the directorship of a British forestry 
expert (Vandergeest 1996:161). British foresters continued to occupy the position of 
Director-General until 1924, when the first Thai was appointed (Sharlardchai 1989:43). 
Many of the early Thai directors of the RFD had been educated in the forestry schools in 
British colonies of India and Burma. Thus, as Sharlardchai (1989:43) remarks, the RFD 
“emerged from the philosophy and practice of British logging companies during the 
peak of exploitation of teak forests in Burma and Thailand”. Based on the Indian and 
Burmese forest management and policy models, in 1899, the RFD claimed jurisdiction 
over all land within the boundaries of Siam that was neither occupied nor claimed by 
any person or agency (Vandergeest 1996:161, Santasombat 1995:21). It is significant to 
note that since the hill tribes were not citizens of the Thai state, their occupation was not 
recognised. Hence, the centrally constructed responsibilities of the RFD served to 
delegitimise established hill tribe settlements. It is also significant to note that land 
officially classified as ‘forest’ was not required to be covered in forest. Thus, the RFD 
was able to claim jurisdiction over around 75% of Thailand, and emerged as one of the 
most powerful state agencies (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:408).
The RFD also assumed responsibility for the collection and distribution of royalties 
from forest leases (Phen 1981 (1903)). By the early 1900s, the granting of forest leases 
to foreigners had been recognised as having adversely impacted the local people. In the 
Mae Ping forest, Phen (1981(1903)) notes that “When common people wanted to 
construct teak houses, they could not buy any teak wood. If they bought the teak wood 
from foreigners (sic), the price they had to pay was very high... This was troublesome 
for poor people”. The freedoms of the highland people were further eroded by the 
passage in 1938 of the Protection and Reservation o f Forests Act. This Act empowered 
the RFD to demarcate ‘protected’ and ‘reserve’ forests, and was intended to stop 
peasants from clearing and cultivating forest land, and thereby taking it out of the 
jurisdiction of the RFD (Vandergeest 1996:163-4). Note that people who had been 
living, often for many years, in forests which were declared as reserved were 
transformed into illegal violators through the bureaucratic delineation. The Act also 
authorised state holdings of commercial forests which could be leased to foreign or Thai 
logging companies (Santasombat 1995:21).
Another significant environmental development during the early twentieth century was 
the expansion of opium cultivation in the Northern highlands. The expansion appears to 
have been initiated in part by the Chinese Imperial anti-opium decree (1906) which 
marked the beginning of a concerted effort by Chinese authorities to eliminate opium 
cultivation by Chinese farmers (Crooker 1986:69). These opium suppression measures 
encouraged more intensive opium production in the highland regions which overlap the 
borders of Burma, Laos and Northern Thailand, forming the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’
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(Allen 1986:70). During this period, Chinese migration into Thailand also intensified, 
leading to an expansion in domestic demand. To control the opium trade, the Thai 
government taxed opium sales and established a state monopoly to which highlanders 
could legitimately sell opium (Geddes 1976:208, Jonsson 1996:180). By the early 
1920s, around 20% of Thailand’s national revenue was due to opium (Scott 1969:136).
During the 1930s, lowland Northern Thai introduced irrigated agriculture to 
highlanders, and wet-rice cultivation began to spread throughout the upland ecological 
zone (Kunstadter 1992:31).
5.2.3 Post-war development, conflict and growth
Prior to WWI, the term burana, meaning ‘restoration’ or ‘(re)construction’, tended to 
frame state and monarchical reforms aimed at modernisation (Demaine 1986:95)13.
Post-WWI, discursive referents to notions of ‘development’ by the Thai state shifted to 
an interpretation of development as ‘progress’. As a result of the 1932 coup, which 
overthrew the absolute monarchy in favour of a constitutional system of government, 
the hierarchical sakdina principles of economic and political organisation were formally 
replaced by the logic of capitalism (Hewison 1989:59). As Thailand began to recover 
from the post-WWI depression, Prime Minister Phibun, who held office from 1938- 
1944 and 1947-1957, reinforced industrial development and capital investment as the 
means to transform and strengthen the Thai economy (Hewison 1989:67). Phibun also 
introduced the concept of wattana which promoted national advancement through 
cosmetic deference to the social customs and dress style of Western civilisation 
(Demaine 1986:95, Wyatt 1984:255).
During this period, the government initiated limited development efforts in the 
highlands. The Border Patrol Police (BPP), which was established in the early 1950s to 
ensure a security presence and gather intelligence in remote frontiers, was the first 
government agency to have formal development-oriented contact with the hill tribe 
people of the Northern highlands (Tapp 1989:32). In 1956, the Government also 
established a Committee for the Welfare of People in Remote Areas to provide food and 
clothing to hill people (Suwan 1969:12).
During Phibun’s era, in the face of mounting pressure from foreign governments to 
better contain Thailand’s contribution to global narcotics production, opium cultivation 
was restricted to the highlands of Northern Thailand (Anderson 1993:116). The Thai 
state was reluctant to ban opium cultivation outright because of its contribution to the 
national economy. In 1953, a Thai government official admitted to an international 
convention on narcotics control that the Thai state “could not afford to give up the 
revenue from the opium business’’ (Walker 1991:214).
A new era of interventionist developmentalism was ushered in during Sarit’s prime 
ministership (1958-63). Firmly couched in western modernisation theory, Sarit’s 
development model (pattana) equated national development with economic growth, and 
transformed state treatment of the highlands from relative neglect and indifference to 
active political and economic intervention through substantive development policies
13 For example, King Chulalongkom’s (1868-1910) initiatives to refashion a modem Bangkok, create a 
modem army and centralised bureaucracy, construct transport infrastructure, and introduce standardised 
Western-style education are located within this framework.
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(Brown 1994:167, Prudhisan 1992:51). Sarit argued that technocratic expertise was the 
key to develop Thailand into a modem, efficient and powerful state (Girling 1981:82). 
He installed Western-educated Thais to craft policies aimed at increasing economic and 
material prosperity through developing infrastructure, encouraging foreign investment 
and promoting integration into western markets (Tatsanee 1989:12, Muller 1996:33). 
Agricultural policies emphasised productivity gains through diversification and 
modernised practices, while forest management policies focussed on state allocation of 
land for economic development. The law limiting landholding to 50 rai was also 
revoked, creating opportunities for real estate investment and speculation in the 
highlands for those holding Thai identification papers (Turton 1978: 111). Several laws 
were also enacted ostensibly aimed at conservation: the Wild Animals Reservation and 
Protection Act 1960 established wildlife sanctuaries and hunting free areas, and the 
National Parks Act 1961 established a system of national parks (Vandergeest 
1996:166). These latter laws extended the territorialisation initiated in the 1800s, and 
resulted in more highland villages being demarcated as illegal settlements. The laws 
legally eliminated any requirement for consultation with local villagers, and reinforced a 
further shift in land management power from the villagers to the Royal Forestry 
Department (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:409).
Sarit’s development approach also emphasised social harmony and moral integrity. For 
example, in an effort to restore cleanliness and orderliness to Thai society, an Anti­
opium Act was passed which banned the cultivation, sale and consumption of opium 
(Wyatt 1984:280). Jonsson (1996:181) suggests that the prohibition of opium 
strengthened state power by undermining the bargaining power of the highland 
cultivators. Despite a rhetorical concern for social well-being, social dimensions of 
development were largely relegated to the downstream benefits which proponents 
assumed would ‘trickle-down’ from growth in the national GDP (Demaine 1986:94). 
The exception was the emphasis placed on construction of purportedly ‘social’ 
infrastructure, particularly the expansion of electrification and road construction into 
rural Thailand. This policy was based in part on commissioned advice from the World 
Bank, and reflected the prevailing western development philosophy (Demaine 1986:96). 
The extension of infrastructure also played into national security interests, as it provided 
a means of integrating the culturally insulated rural periphery into the control of the 
Bangkok-centred state (Prudhisan 1992:52). Beyond allowing more efficient provision 
of government services, rural feeder roads which linked villages to state highways, 
facilitated the distribution of economic benefits to poor highlanders, thereby confronting 
the perceived underlying cause of insurgency (Chairat 1988:207). The road network also 
enabled more rapid deployment of government troops in the event of an uprising 
(Chairat 1988:207). The explicit national security context of highland development 
policy reinforced a visible and influential role for the Thai army in highland 
development practice (Gohlert 1991:37).
The extension of infrastructure in the highlands was accompanied by targeted efforts to 
apply Sarit’s economic and social development policies to particular highland villages. 
In this context, a National Hill Tribes Welfare Committee was formed in 1959, and 
initiated a number of projects during the 1960s, administered by the Department of 
Public Welfare, which were aimed at improving the development and welfare of the 
highland people (Tapp 1989:31).
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It is significant to note that despite his heavy reliance on western expertise to craft his 
policies, Sarit explicitly cast his path to development within traditional Thai political 
culture. He argued that a benevolent authoritarian system controlled by a strong 
executive was better suited to traditional Thai paternalism than alien Western 
democratic norms (Likhit 1992:160). Consequently, development priorities were 
identified by the patrimonial leader and his expert bureaucracy, rather than defined by 
specific needs articulated by the targeted rural population (Jacobs 1971). Sarit’s model 
of development thus discouraged popular participation in decision-making, so that there 
were “no inherent expectations of participation by the people - either on the part of the 
authorities and even less on the part of the individual citizen” (Gohlert 1991:87).
Following Sarit’s death, his deputy Kittikachom continued to promote policies aimed at 
realising Sarif s vision of a modernised and wealthy Thai state. For example, the 
National Forest Reserves Act (1964) provided for “further expansion of state holdings 
of forest lands, which were then leased out to private firms for commercial exploitation” 
(Santasombat 1995:21). The Act also declared swidden shifting cultivation 
environmentally and economically harmful, and prohibited ‘unlawful’ uses of forest 
land and forest products without formal authorisation by the RFD (Rerkasem and 
Rerkasem 1994:10, Santasombat 1995:21). As a result of this policy, from the mid- 
1960s, highland villagers cutting wood for their traditional livelihoods, including 
household construction, were increasingly arrested on charges of illegal logging 
(Waranoot 1995).
During Kittikachom’s term, the state also continued Sarit’s policy of assimilating the 
highland villages into the sphere of the Thai polity. In 1964, the Border Patrol Police 
initiated a project to train highland people in first-aid, agriculture, sanitation, ‘correct’ 
politics, and as voluntary border security guards (Tapp 1989:32). In 1965, the 
Nationality Act was passed, which included a National Integration Policy granting hill 
people the opportunity to become a Thai citizen, a right that had previously been denied 
(Rerkasem and Rerkasem 1994:3). To facilitate integration of the hill tribe people into 
Thai culture and administrative order, and promote acceptance of the state development 
policies, the Thai government enlisted the assistance of Buddhist orders. Monks were 
trained in rural and community development, and sent to villages “to instill a sense of 
loyalty to the nation, government, religion and King... to convey the government’s 
policies... [and] to inform the government of the people’s needs and attitudes” 
(Somboon 1993:68). In particular, they were encouraged to convert hill tribe people 
from animism to Buddhism, and to educate them as to Thai language and customs, and 
their duties and responsibilities to the Thai state. The monks also distributed medicine 
and other items as gifts of the Thai state (Somboon 1993:71). By integrating the hill 
people into the fold of both the Thai state and Buddhism, security-conscious Bangkok 
hoped that a sense of loyalty would be fostered which would dissuade terrorist 
activities.
During the mid-1960s, a groundswell of antigovemment insurgency throughout 
Thailand lead to fears in both the Thai and U.S. governments that communism was 
making inroads in Thailand. In the North, the main combatants in the rebellion were 
Hmong villagers, whom the Thai state suspected were being supported by the Chinese 
communist party (Wyatt 1984:289). To combat the communist threat, the anti­
communist Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) were assisted by the Thai and the U.S. to 
protect the highland border areas. The CIF argued that participation in the opium trade
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was necessary to finance their arms purchases (Crooker 1986:88). Thus, in 
contravention of the official anti-opium decree, during the mid-1960s, the Thai and U.S. 
governments accepted opium trade as a lesser evil in return for national security, and 
covertly sanctioned the CIF to act as a border patrol and to collect duty on non-CIF 
opium caravans entering Thailand (Crooker 1986:90). The Thai state also supported 
military action against some of the highland villages suspected of involvement in the 
insurgency. Heavy artillery, napalm, air strikes and ground troops were used to destroy 
villages (Girling 1981:264). By 1968, around 40% of the highland people of Nan 
province had become homeless (Tapp 1989:36). Many of the displaced people were 
forced to abandon their migratory existence and resettle in new areas determined by the 
government (Tapp 1989:36, Girling 1981:264).
During the late 1960s, the US and British, facing mounting internal drug-related 
politics, began to exert increasing pressure on the Thai state to curb narcotics 
trafficking, and to shift away from state tolerance of opium cultivation. The Bangkok- 
based government also began to recognise that, rather than dissuading communist 
insurgency, the heavy-handed tactics of the CIF army had driven many dispossessed 
villagers to join with the communist forces (Crooker 1986:93). Consequently, the Thai 
state began to take measures to more actively enforce the 1959 anti-opium decree, 
including closing the opium refineries in the North, and to enact development and 
security policies less likely to alienate the highlanders (Crooker 1986:94). In 1967, the 
central government announced that its main policy objectives for the highlands were to: 
end opium cultivation through alternate cash crop substitution; and prevent 
deforestation and land degradation, attributed to pioneer shifting cultivation, by 
encouraging migratory tribes to adopt permanent agriculture (Suwan 1969:13). 
Permanent settlement areas were demarcated which also served as experimental research 
stations for extension of agricultural innovations (Suwan 1969:13). The provision of 
government services such as education and heath were offered as inducements for 
participation in the settlement programme (Suwan 1969:13). The Government also 
reintensified efforts to instill a sense of belonging and loyalty to the Thai nation in the 
highlanders, including maintaining political and economic support for a visible and 
active role for Buddhist monks in hill tribe villages, and organising visits by hill tribe 
leaders to witness progress and development in the lowlands (Suwan 1969:14).
Sarif s development approach led to an economic boom in Thailand in terms of high 
growth rates and a reduction in the poverty rate. However, the benefits of the 
accelerated economic growth were concentrated spatially and socioeconomically. The 
result was widening income disparity between industrial and rural sectors, major inter­
regional disparities, illustrated in Table 6.1, and persistent poverty among inhabitants of 
the rural periphery. State development policies during the 1970s began to recognise and 
respond to some of these inequities, espousing more widespread provision of health and 
education. However, in the North, as national security interests remained paramount, 
development attention was targeted at those villages which were suspected of or had 
demonstrated involvement in opium cultivation or insurgency (Demaine 1986:99). 
Villages which did not meet these criteria were less likely to receive the development 
assistance, and sometimes lost their land, without compensation, to the government for 
road construction or establishment of permanent settlements (Demaine 1986:98). As 
these latter villages tended to be poorer, subsistence rotating shifting cultivators, in
contrast to the richer, cash cropping opium growers, the development policies of the 
1970s often exacerbated economic disparities amongst the highland people.
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1960 1970 1980 1983
Whole country 2 106 3 849 14 743 18 770
Bangkok 5 630 11 234 41 300 51 441
Northern region 1 496 2 699 9 866 12 441
Adapted from Brown (1994:166)
Table 5-1 Spatial disparities in per capita income in Thailand (baht/yr)
By the 1970s, the opening of the Northern frontier combined with increasing capacity to 
control disease had enabled a marked increase in the number of stakeholders competing 
for highland resources. A key factor was Thailand’s rapid population growth from 18 
million in 1947 to 34 million in 1970 (Wyatt 1984:292). Urban and industrial 
expansion, stemming from this population growth and underpinned by the 
modernisation development ethos, had contributed to increasing rural indebtedness and 
land shortages in the lowlands. As the extension of infrastructure in the highlands 
improved accessibility, increasing numbers of lowland people began to migrate into the 
highlands, seeking potential high returns from highland swidden cash crops (Tapp 
1989:36). Through natural increases in birth rates as well as migration, the hill tribe 
population in the Northern highlands had also risen significantly; from approximately 
100 000 in 1948 to around 284 500 in 1973 (Kanok and Benjavan 1994). In 1975, the 
communist takeover of Laos stimulated the influx of many Hmong and Mien families 
who had fought against the communists into refugee camps in the Northern highlands. 
Around 125 000 Hmong entered these camps between 1975 and 1981 and by the late 
1970s, about 7300 Mien were living in Thai refugee camps (Allen 1986:30)u. The 
increasing population density in the highlands, combined with economic policies which 
supported the expansion of export-oriented agricultural areas, motivated mass 
deforestation in the highlands (Mingsam et al. 1995:29). The deforestation, and the 
population increase, contributed to landlessness and land shortages in the highlands. By 
1981, 13% of farmers in the Upper North were landless, 31% were near-landless with 
farms less than 5 rai, and a further 28% owned farms of less than 10 rai (Anat et al. 
1987:39).
By the early 1980s, it had become apparent that, contrary to Sarit’s modernisation 
assumptions, wealth had not trickled down to the two thirds of Thais who inhabited 
rural areas. Critical views of the conventional development ethos had increasingly been 
voiced within Thai academic discourse since the 1960s. The centralised process, 
authoritarian practice and concentrated outcomes of the conventional development ethos 
were critiqued not only on the basis of their practical failures, but also through appeals 
to western notions of democracy and freedom (Demaine 1986:99). During the early 
1980s, the decline of the communists in Thailand created room within the development 
arena for a raft of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) which drew on these
14 Notably this massive migration forced the Thai government to reassess its presumptive treatment of hill 
peoples as communists (Lewis and Lewis 1984).
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critiques to promote ‘alternative development’ philosophies and methodologies for the 
rural periphery (Hirsch 1996:6). Generally constituted of educated, middle-class urban 
Thais, the NGOs tended to portray themselves as facilitators of participatory 
development for local community empowerment. Although the NGO approaches varied 
considerably, they tended to differentiate themselves from the conventional state model 
by virtue of their greater emphasis on the self-reliance and the development of local 
capacities, particularly through education and the facilitation of local agricultural 
cooperatives. They also tended to emphasise local specificities and contexts including 
technology, knowledge, spiritual traditions, and traditional forms of organisation.
5.2.4 Highland development projects
During the 1980s, the alternative development philosophies increasingly penetrated 
state development rhetoric, with references to participatory, collaborative, and 
decentralised development practice commonplace. The Fifth Plan, prepared by 
Thailand’s central planning agency, the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), and implemented from 1981-1986, both reflected and reinforced a 
state shift away from a purely economic and efficiency oriented development. 
Decentralisation of economic activities, culturally appropriate technology and 
community-driven development were emphasised (Demaine 1986:103). A succession 
of highland development projects, often jointly sponsored by the Thai state and a 
foreign aid agency, were subsequently implemented which purported to effect the 
revisioned mode of development. These included the Thai/UNFDA15 Crop Replacement 
and Community Development Project, the Thai-German Highland Development 
Project, Doi Ya Pamon Highland Development Project, the USAID-supported Mae 
Chaem Watershed project, the Sam Mun Highland Development Project and the Thai- 
Australia Highland Agriculture Social Development Project. It should be noted that, in 
part due to a controversy surrounding anthropological activities in Thailand16, neither 
anthropologists nor sociologists tended to be involved in these development projects 
(McKinnon 1983:11). Instead, the development efforts tended to be the domain of 
Westerners or Western-trained Thais with technical expertise in agricultural, economic 
and forestry practice. Consequently, the approach promoted by the highland projects 
emphasised more effective integration of the target villages into a cash crop market 
economy through transfer of western technical innovations and expertise. The highland 
development projects also promoted the establishment of highland schools, ostensibly to 
improve literacy of the highland people, but also more covertly as a mechanism to 
promote the state’s integrative and assimilative policies. For example, Tapp (1989:37- 
38) discusses how the establishment of schools by development projects in Hmong 
villages have acted as conduits for government information dissemination, and have 
indoctrinated a sense of loyalty to the Thai state into Hmong children through rote 
repetition of nationalistic phrases presented as literacy aids.
15 United Nations Food and Drug Administration
16 This refers to the charges made by some American anthropologists that field anthropologists based at 
the Tribal Research Centre in Chiang Mai were assisting the Thai and US military in clandestine 
information gathering exercises, (see McKinnon 1983).
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Box 5-1 Highland development projects: Non-coordination and non-participation
revealed
The Mae Chaem Watershed project (1980 - 1989) was an integrated project aimed at encouraging self-reliance 
among the poor people living in Mae Chaem, in raising their income and improving their access to social 
services (MCWP 1989a,b). At the completion of the project, all personnel and officers involved were 
interviewed as to their ideas and opinions of the project, so that the experience of the MCW could be used to 
help development of other watersheds in the North. In terms of integration, interviewees felt that cooperation 
was not real, with each participating organisation continuing to work independently. In the eyes of the villagers, 
the different organisations were not interconnected and were each performing their own service. Other problems 
identified were the reticence of the farmers to use the irrigation systems that had been constructed and the low 
rates of success of the new agricultural practices introduced for conservation, which was attributed to a lack of 
understanding on the part of the villagers of how to utilise and maintain them. It was suggested that future 
projects should place a greater emphasis on community-based participatory methods and on greater cooperation 
between government and non-government agencies.
The Thai-Australia Highland Development Project (TAHDP) (1980-1987, 1988 - 1993) was initially focussed 
on developing agricultural technology to improve the production of cash crops in the uplands. Strategies 
included crop rotations, pest control, seed multiplication and extension. In 1985, the original project collapsed 
when various departments failed to take over project management as had earlier been negotiated. In 1989 the 
TAHDP joined with an International Board for Soils Research and Management project into upland sloping land 
agriculture for sustainability. Research emphasis during Phase 2 shifted to land management in small 
watersheds, focussing on strategies for soil conservation. Most work involved developing techniques on 
experimental demonstration plots. Adoption of these techniques outside the demonstration areas has remained 
minimal, largely because many farmers have not perceived any social or economic advantage in long term soil 
conservation strategies.
Most projects theoretically encouraged a participatory and co-ordinated approach. 
However, with the exception of the Sam Mun development project, post-project 
evaluation has failed to support the rhetoric. While efforts were made to co-ordinate 
project administration between the various central ministries or departments involved, 
activities in the field were seldom co-ordinated. Furthermore, in practice, programmes 
tended to be highly centralised, and driven by the external experts rather than the local 
‘target population’. These experts tended to have limited prior acquaintance with their 
target areas, and to spend only short periods in the highland villages during the 
development project (Hinton 1992:112, Tapp 1989:40). Through presenting the project 
to a village meeting, project rhetoric maintained that “full consultation with the people 
has been established” (Keen 1983:305). However, the projects were generally designed 
to address problems, defined by the external observers, that villagers were assumed to 
experience (Demaine 1986:109). The projects’ objectives tended to reflect a measure of 
quality of life, usually increased income and consumer goods, that the villagers were 
assumed to desire. As Hirsch (1990:14) notes, participation in these projects tended to 
translate into “the doing rather than the initiating or the deciding”. Since the targeted 
communities seldom acquired independent decision-making authority, critics suggest 
that few if any of the projects achieved their stated objective of self-reliance (Kampe 
1992:162). Others have suggested that self-reliance was undermined by the
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unsustainability of inputs, such as subsidised seeds, pesticides and fertilisers and 
marketing, which were supplied by projects17.
The projects were charged by critics with neglecting the values and interests of the 
target communities in lieu of technological and institutional considerations (Yos 1989). 
Tapp (1989:40) notes that villagers complained of the “cultural chauvinism” of project 
officials who they felt “did nothing to help them”. Others claimed that the solutions 
promoted by the external experts were based on an oversimplified analysis which 
neglected the complexity of the local ecology and political culture, “did not care for the 
people and was more concerned at the literal application of the planned schedule that 
they were in solving the problem” (Hinton 1992:112). In this vein, McKinnon 
(1983:327) decries the application of generic land use zone templates and zonal 
development, which presuppose transmigration of communities, as paternalistic and 
unrealistic. Drawing on the experience of the Thai-German project, Puginier (1997) 
notes that the labour demands of the permanent agriculture cash crops were often much 
higher than previous cultivation methods. The inappropriateness of development 
project assumptions manifested in villagers’ reluctance to participate in implementation 
of these strategies. As Keen (1983:305) argues, “the people who struggle by various 
means for a livelihood in the hills of north Thailand have had foisted upon them a series 
of narrowly defined (but administratively convenient) land use programmes with which 
they could not, and did not, identify”. Supporting this claim, Hirsch (1990:15) notes 
that villagers often expressed feelings of being pestered and forced into participating in 
development projects. It is thus unsurprising that when projects finished, and the 
external agents were no longer providing financial and other inducements to participate, 
cultivation practices often reverted to pre-project strategies.
Since, like previous state development initiatives, most of the highland development 
projects were motivated by narcotics control through opium crop substitution, they 
tended to perpetuate inequities between different tribal groups. The Hmong, the 
traditional opium growers, tended to profit from development attention. The Karen, the 
traditional conservationists who account for around one half of the total hill tribe 
population, tended to be neglected by development projects (Renard 1988 cited in 
Jonsson 1998:18). In 1987, there were only 0.09 projects per Karen village compared 
with 1.25 per Hmong village (Ministry of Education 1987). Exacerbating the 
disparities, with the market experience that opium cultivation afforded, the Hmong 
tended to adjust successfully to market-oriented commercial cash-crop production. In 
contrast, as traditional subsistence producers with limited market experience, and 
increasingly impoverished, the Karen tended to be susceptible to the vagaries of the 
market, such as sudden falls in commodity prices (Anan 1987). Furthermore, many 
Karen lost land through state development programmes which used the promise of 
secure title to fertile upland land to persuade the opium growers or insurgents to settle 
permanently. As Jonsson (1998:18) notes, “The world-views of international 
developers and the Thai Government, and their ranking of the groups whose livelihood 
they affect, set up who gets aid in an environment that is increasingly parcelled out by 
outsiders”.
With their emphasis on opium eradication, the highland development projects tended to 
focus on alternative cash crops which would yield sufficient income to be an attractive
17 Personal interview with Oliver Puginier, 17 November 1997.
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substitution, without consideration of their environmental impacts (Anan 1996:211).
The widespread cultivation of some of the promoted cash crops, particularly cabbages, 
and the intensive use of promoted pesticides and fertilisers, proved environmentally 
destructive, leading to a dramatic decline in both soil fertility and species diversity 
(Kampe 1992:162). Some of the grasses promoted as soil and water conservation 
measures infested the land and were difficult to eradicate (Puginier 1997). 
Marginalisation of the traditional conservationists further exacerbated the declining state 
of the environment (Anan 1996:209).
5.2.5 Unsustainability: pressures heighten
Through the 1980s, the numbers of highland stakeholders continued to increase, 
intensifying pressures on the highland resources. Due to high birth rates, the hill tribe 
population had risen to 749 353 by 199518. Meanwhile, by 1990, the Thai population 
had grown to 56 million, prompting increasing numbers of lowland Thai farmers to 
move into the Northern periphery (RFD 1994:108). The construction of roads 
combined with liberalisation of land ownership laws had enhanced the value of land 
sited near roads, leading to a boom in private sector interest and investment in 
plantations, highland resorts, golf courses, restaurants and other tourism ventures. 
Although the proportion of land which had been converted to private sector tourist 
ventures by the late 1980s was not expansive, Dhira and Panayotou (1990:2) note that it 
affected “some of the best agricultural land both in terms of its productivity and its 
proximity to markets”. In the wake of the increased investment in highland real estate, 
only around 32% of hill people now own their own land (Kampe 1992:159). While 
some highland villagers have portrayed the land speculators as a welcome means of 
escaping poverty, others claim that the land speculators, in collusion with corrupt 
village headmen, stole the villagers’ common forests upon which they depended for 
grazing land and as a source of firewood, farm materials and food (Sanitsuda 1990:131- 
142). Anan (1996:205) argues that the Karen, vulnerable in confrontations over control 
of the uplands, were particularly marginalised in the drive by lowland people to take 
control of and capitalise from the upland resources.
Competition for the highland resources led to a dramatic decline in dense forest cover, 
as stakeholders sought to expand into new territory. From 1960 to 1990, 14.4 million 
acres of forest were cleared (Mingsam 1993:14). By the early 1990s, only around 45% 
of the North remained under forest cover (RFD 1994:3). As the extent of deforestation 
became more widely recognised, increasing royal, religious, state, intellectual and 
public concern over environmental deterioration in the highlands placed pressure on the 
state for more effective highland environmental conservation and management. In 
response to public concern (especially from the large Bangkok political constituency 
and the lowland farmers downstream) that deforestation was exacerbating flooding and 
landslides in the lower reaches of the Chao Phraya river, the Thai government 
introduced strict policies which banned logging concessions, restricted forest access and 
increased protected areas. By 1990, 257 forest reserves had been declared in the 
Northern region, amounting to 113 904 km2 (RFD 1994:11).
The demographic pressures combined with the more restrictive conservation and 
reservation policies led to an increasing scarcity of arable land for the traditional
18 Directory o f Highland Communities and Population, National Security Council 1993.
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highland farmers. As the feasibility of agricultural expansion diminished, development 
agencies introduced Green revolution technologies to the highland communities as a 
means of increasing income and providing continued food security in the face of 
diminishing resources. Through extension, agricultural diversification and 
intensification became widespread throughout the highlands. In most areas, cropping 
frequency increased, resulting in shortened fallow periods. Traditional specialisation in 
products based on locally-available resources was largely replaced by market-driven 
crop diversification, with intercropping of maize with legumes and of temperate fruit 
trees with vegetables and flowers becoming common (Kanok et al. 1994). 
Accompanying the agricultural intensification was a greater reliance on fertilisers and 
pesticides, and increased water use as low-cost gravity-fed sprinkler irrigation systems 
became widespread (Kanok et al. 1994). Typical highland household activities 
diversified to include: subsistence crop production from swidden farming; cash crop 
production from permanent agriculture; livestock raising; gathering of wild vegetation, 
firewood and minor forest products as food supplements, fuel and income; and 
production of handicrafts for the burgeoning tourist industry. It should be noted that 
although opium cultivation had decreased, many highland villages continued to grow 
small plots of opium poppies either for personal consumption or cash sale (Anderson 
1993:121).
For those highland villagers which adopted the commercial approach promoted by the 
development agencies, increased integration into a market economy through lucrative 
cash cropping led to increased incomes and greater contact with lowland people. This 
in turn contributed to altered perceptions of living standards, and greater demand for and 
consumption of lowland merchandise. It also fostered a sense of relative deprivation 
amongst those villagers unable to acquire pick-up trucks, refrigerators, transistor radios 
and other ‘modem’ consumer goods (Chairat 1988:210). Thus, accelerated integration 
into the market economy provided both participating and non-participating villagers 
with additional impetus for income improvement and further intensification.
By raising land productivity, intensification of agriculture can reduce land requirement, 
thereby relieving land pressures and providing a greater window of opportunity for 
forest regeneration (Kanok et al. 1994:128). However, as the land to population ratio 
falls, intensification may bring a host of adverse environmental and social effects. In 
the Northern highlands, shorter fallow periods, in an effort to speed up the rotation 
cycle, and cultivation of fragile, steeply sloping marginal land as arable land has 
become scarce, have both exacerbated soil erosion. Road construction has also led to 
severe erosion (Kunstadter and Kunstadter 1992:36). In 1990, the Department of Land 
Development estimated that 39 million rai of upland agricultural land was affected by 
severe to very severe soil erosion (Dhira and Panayotou 1990:15). On many highland 
farms, soil erosion has reduced the chemical and physical fertility of the soil, leading to 
declining crop yields. To maintain productivity of the unsustainable system, highland 
farmers have responded by applying increasing amounts of pesticide and fertilizer, 
affecting the toxicity levels of both soils and produce. Adverse health impacts 
following the use or application of pesticides have been noted by many highland 
farmers (Kanok et al. 1994:xxv).
Due to the interconnectedness of watersheds, the impacts of highland degradation have 
not been contained within the highlands. Increased soil erosion has been blamed for 
accelerated reservoir sedimentation and increased surface runoff downstream, while
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pesticide and fertilisers which have washed off highland farms have been blamed for 
higher toxicity and nutrient loadings in lowland streams. The causal assumptions 
implicated in this assignation of blame have been queried (Enters 1992). None-the-less, 
the practices of highland communities have been widely blamed for environmental 
problems in the lowlands, and increased pressure has been placed on the state to relocate 
villages out of the highlands, and to educate them about more sustainable practices. As 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995:413) have observed, ecological threats have enabled 
continued framing of the highlands as a national security issue, with environmental 
desecration now replacing subversive terrorism. Those advocating relocation often 
emphasise that the hill people are illegal encroachers on state property. The relocation 
conflicts illustrate that historical tensions persist between the lowland Thai and the 
highland communities, who continue to be treated as primitive and destructive outsiders 
in need of integration into the civilised Thai state.
There are a number of pragmatic disincentives for state relocations of highland villages. 
Firstly, several government officials and academics have observed that where villages 
have been forcibly relocated, the villagers have experienced significant psychological 
ramifications. Secondly, given the chronic land scarcity, there are few viable areas to 
which villages may be relocated. During 1993-94, a state-commissioned study 
investigated the potential relocation of populations living in conservation forests in the 
Mae Taeng, the Chem and the Klong Yan watersheds (Ruangdej and Jerapan 1994). In 
most cases, the study concluded that no suitable areas outside the conservation forests 
could be identified that could accommodate relocated populations, so population 
management and environmental rehabilitation measures would have to be implemented 
within the conservation areas. Beyond the pragmatic disincentives, forced relocation 
introduces fundamental moral questions. Highland farmers, supported by several 
academic commentators, claim that continued deforestation is largely attributable to 
illegal logging, facilitated by bureaucratic ineptitude and corruption. They thus argue 
that prime responsibility for forest depletion should be assigned to forestry officials, 
logging companies and developers, rather than scapegoating the highlanders. Highland 
farmers also maintain that where they have been guilty of deforestation, through 
personal encroachment or participation as labour in illegal logging, this has often arisen 
because they have not had sufficient employment opportunities to feed their families or 
service their debts (Pratuang 1996:120). They further note that stricter environmental 
policies have served to deprive the highland farmers of resources traditionally used for 
income supplement and home consumption, such as wood for fuel and housing (Ammar 
et al. 1991). The highland farmers’ perspective has been accorded increasing 
articulation in the media due to the mobilisation of spontaneous and NGO-facilitated 
farmer protest groups in response to controversial environmental policies. Because of 
the practical and moral complexity, state agencies are often reluctant to effect forced 
removals, leading to inconsistency between policy and agency practice.
Since the mid-1980s, the Thai media has reported an escalating number of local 
conflicts between lowland and highland communities over the downstream impacts of 
highland resource use, and the continued movement of lowland Thais into the hills 
(Sanitsuda 1990). However, it should be noted that environmental conflict may provide 
only a superficial explanation for highland politics. As Waranoot (1995:283-285) 
revealed in a study of a highly publicised conflict between Hmong highlanders and 
ethnic Thai lowlanders over the forest and water resources of the Mae Soi watershed,
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allegedly ‘environmental’ conflicts may have complex social, economic and cultural 
dimensions. While the lowland farmers involved in the Mae Soi conflict attributed the 
genesis of the conflict to the Hmongs’ deforestation practices and subsequent 
contamination of the Mae Soi river, most highlanders felt that the conflict had started 
when a cattle thief (a lowlander) was killed in a Hmong village. Ethnic differences, 
lowland resentment over the economic success of the Hmongs’ cash crops, and the 
activities of an outspoken and celebrated conservationist who advocated relocation of 
the hill tribes, have also been cited as possible sources of the conflict.
5.2.6 Confronting sustainability?
By the early 1990s, foreign partners had begun to withdraw support for highland 
development projects owing to Thailand’s apparent economic success. Their departure 
coincided with increasing realisation within government agencies of the failures of the 
development projects, including their contribution to degradation of the social and 
ecological highland environment. State development policy responded to these 
problems by heeding appeals from NGOs for more sustainable highland environmental 
management, including more effective participation. The Sixth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1987 - 1991) introduced the concept of “ecodevelopment” 
which linked environmental development with economic and social development. The 
Seventh Plan (1992-1996) sought to establish a base for long-term sustainable growth 
by balancing economic growth, quality of life concerns and social justice. The current 
Eighth Plan (1997-2001) (“a long term vision of a desirable society”) is designed on the 
premise that development which ignores environmental and human development will 
“eventually affect the sustainability of long term development”, where sustainability is 
defined as tridimensional, relating to the economy, the environment and human 
resources. Echoing the Eighth Plan, a spokesperson from the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment frames the task of confronting sustainable 
development as “planning and implementing economic-cum-environmental developing 
projects, where the investment pays good dividends in both financial earnings and in 
environmental protection” (Kasem 1996:336). Thus, although social and environmental 
concerns have become more visible, national development continues to be firmly linked 
to economic profit and growth.
Allusions to participatory responses to ensure sustainable and consensual resolution to 
environmental conflicts increasingly feature in the policies of state agencies involved in 
highland decision-making. For example, in 1992, the RFD was restructured to place an 
emphasis on extension, rather than just forest protection and control, and to support 
greater decentralisation of activities to provincial and district levels (Pragtong 
1993:118). Following the restructuring, the RFD purports to have “started working 
more closely with local communities currently living in conservation forests” (Pragtong 
1993:118). One of the perceived advantages of participatory co-management of forests 
is that it enables more effective protection from encroachment since manpower and 
resource limitations place constraints on the RFD’s ability to patrol vast areas (Quinn 
1994:22). The move towards more participatory natural resource management was 
reinforced in October 1997, when King Bhumibol Adulyadej signed a new Thai 
constitution, the first to be formulated through widespread public participation, into law. 
The constitution requires the state to promote public participation in decision-making 
(Section 76), and “in the preservation, maintenance and balanced exploitation of natural
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resources and biological diversity and in the promotion, maintenance and protection of 
the quality of the environment in accordance with the persistent development principle 
as well as the control and elimination of pollution affecting public health, sanitary 
conditions, welfare and quality of life” (Section 79)19. The constitution also affirms the 
duty of citizens to conserve natural resources and the environment (Section 69), and the 
right of persons, including traditional communities, to participate in both the 
preservation and exploitation of natural resources and biological diversity, and the 
protection, promotion and preservation of the quality of the environment (Sections 
46,56).
Despite rhetorical claims to empower the poor through locally-specific, participatory 
development, both NGO and state-sponsored sustainable development projects have 
been charged with failing in practice to deliver sustained community empowerment. 
Critics have suggested that the sustainable development approaches are merely 
conventional strategies couched in politically fashionable terms. Like the conventional 
projects, sustainable development projects have tended to act as catalytic agents in 
transforming subsistence agrarian production to commercial market-driven agriculture 
through financial support of agricultural intensification. One NGO worker justified this 
approach through reference to the wider decision-making environment: “We... are 
struggling for the betterment in the state’s framework and mechanism” (Quinn 
1994:17). Like the conventional models, the sustainable development projects also tend 
to reflect an externally-driven agenda and leadership regime which neglects critical 
dimensions of the local decision-making culture. Consequently, as with the 
conventional models, community participation has often failed to materialise (Gohlert 
1991:57). Opart (1992) discusses farmers reluctance to participate in a grass-roots 
agroforestry project initiated by the RFD. The RFD attempted to engage highland 
farmers in establishing eucalyptus plantations in their agricultural areas, as a 
compromise between the RFD’s reforestation imperative and continued settlement by 
the farmers (Opart 1992:153). The RFD offered that the farmers could remain in the 
reforestation areas and plant their crops between the rows of trees (Opart 1992:153). 
However, the farmers were unwilling to co-operate, and further, tried to sabotage the 
plantations, because they perceived the eucalypt plantations as a mechanism to drive 
them off their land: “After two or three years, the fast-growing trees establish a canopy 
which shades out crops such as cassava, beans and maize,... and take up so much water 
that the crops cannot compete and cultivation is no longer worthwhile” (Opart 
1992:153). This example illustrates that participatory approaches may not necessarily 
be either beneficial to the participant or benign, but instead may be employed to obscure 
motivations for control.
In a detailed exposition of participatory development in rural Thai villages, Hirsch 
(1990:15) highlights the role of local power/control structures in shaping who benefits 
from participation: “...divisions internal to the village involve a divergence of interests 
among villagers and a partial convergence of interests between village elites and state 
developers”. In a similar vein, Gohlert (1991:57) argues that community participation 
in Thai rural development projects “generally translates into various degrees of co­
operation with local elites who facilitate the work of development agencies”. 
Alternately, Quinn (1994:7) describes how a Thai NGO development project acted to
19 Constitution o f Thailand, http://www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/el 1102540/text.htm
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raise to elite status a non-elite villager mediating between local interests and project 
personnel. In each of the preceding cases, development projects emerge as cultural 
devices in the reinforcement or reproduction of local power structures.
Despite policy references to collaborative and participatory ideology, scientistic beliefs 
in the mutual exclusivity of human settlement and effective environmental conservation 
remain visible within the practice of many state agencies. Anan (1996:213) argues that 
“state agencies still subscribe to the idea that for forest conservation, people and forest 
cannot co-exist, especially those ethnic groups who are considered ‘enemies of the 
forest”. This attitude is evidenced by Huai Hong Khray, a state showcase model of 
integrated watershed management, which was formed by flooding a Northern forest and 
relocating the resident villages out of the watershed. A variety of government 
departments conduct sustainable management experiments and demonstrations in the 
watershed, employing many of the former residents as wage labour. Environmental 
rationale, within a conventional scientific paradigm, continues to provide a rhetorical 
device to reinforce state authority in prescribing highland resource use and thereby 
validate state control of the highlands.
The environment has not only been employed by the state as a means to acquire 
legitimacy of control over contested highland resources. Increasingly, the highland 
communities are reinforcing their capacity to act as guardians of the forest through 
exemplar community forests and sustainable agriculture (Anan 1996:217). Thomas 
(1995:17) notes that the adoption of recommended conservation practices by upland 
communities has in some cases been part of a bargaining strategy for tenurial security: 
“Researchers found that the primary reason for the [contour vegetative] strips was 
because [untenured] farmers perceived they would improve their chances for gaining 
tenure, or at least decrease risk of being evicted by government officials”. Highlanders, 
supported by NGOs, are also increasingly employing G.I.S. mapping technology to 
enhance their negotiative authority over contested claims to resources. One NGO 
worker commented that: “Mapping has been a powerful tool in villages in Northern 
Thailand... Some villagers have actually been successful in getting the RFD to change 
their position - to modify areas and redraw boundaries. The villagers together with 
NGOs and people’s organisations had to fight back with information - for good or bad, 
they needed the hard data”20.
5.2.7 Elements of the decision-making environment
The contemporary decision-making environment of the Northern highlands of Thailand 
has been shaped by complex webs of interaction and intervention. Relationships 
between present-day stakeholders, their framings o f ‘the problem’ and their approaches 
to solutions are embedded within historical narratives which highlight recurrent politics 
of control. Prior to the eighteenth century, the Northern highlands were portrayed by 
Thai as a wild and dangerous place of marginal interest to lowlanders. Colonial interest 
in highland forests, formation of the Thai nation-state, the creation and reinforcement of 
the RFD, and state security imperatives have contributed to construction of the 
highlands as a valuable resource, in need of rational and paternalistic control and 
protection. Contemporary attempts to reinforce state control of the future of the 
Northern highlands from the highland communities echo eighteenth-century Bangkok’s
20 Person^ interview with Karan Aquino, 18 November 1997
95
consolidation of control over the North from the Northern jao  (Jonsson 1996:186). In 
place of the threat of upsetting foreign powers, ecological security is increasingly 
invoked to validate strategies of control. Environmental management has emerged as a 
discourse by which stakeholders may acquire legitimacy in claims over contested spaces 
and resources. Battles over space and material resources in turn implicate contested 
constructions of human-nature relationships. From eighteenth century cartography to 
modern-day G.I.S., western-derived sciences and technologies have repeatedly been 
appropriated, internalised and employed by highland stakeholders as discursive tools in 
these battles. The complex, multifaceted politics engaged in the history of highland 
environment reveal as naive the assumption that highland environmental problems are 
physical, politically benign problems amenable to rational optimisation, or that DSS 
may provide an objective, politically neutral tool.
Despite profligate development efforts, the conservation gains that successful realisation 
of policy rhetoric would have entailed, have simply not materialised (Hinton 1992:116). 
Beyond failing to live up to their promises, development efforts have often served to 
exacerbate the declining health of the ecological, political and sociocultural 
environment of the highlands. In part, this has been due to the uncritical transposition 
of Western-derived models of environmental management, from the demarcation of 
forests commencing in the 1800s through the foreign development projects of the 1980s 
to the sustainability initiatives of the 1990s (cf Redclift and Woodgate 1994). This 
history challenges the assumption that environmental problems may be resolved through 
recourse to generalised methodology, raising questions about potential absences or 
distortions in knowledge if a generic western-constructed DSS is introduced.
5.3 Political culture of environmental decision-making
To illuminate aspects of the preceding historical narrative, and to inform the exploration 
of potential biases associated with the IWRAM DSS, presented in Section 5.6, this 
section briefly outlines elements of traditional Thai political culture which continue to 
underpin networks and relationships between highland stakeholders and to influence 
stakeholder process.
5.3.1 Hierarchy and subordination
Authoritarianism, elitism and hierarchical ‘patron-clientage’ relationships have been 
widely observed as salient features of modem Thai society (Attwater 1996, Gohlert 
1991, Terwiel 1983). The parallel existence of these elements with the Thai conception 
and experience of democracy reflects the enduring influence of the traditional Thai 
value system. The latter has been shaped by the patriarchal rule of the ancient Sukothai 
kingdom (1238-1378) and the adoption of Theravada Buddhism during the Ayutthaya 
period (1350-1767). During the Sukothai period, the incumbent ruler assumed the role 
of father of the populace which obliged him “to render the people assistance but... not 
(to) allow them self-government or to exert control over those in the power pyramid” 
(Thinapan and Likhit 1989:167). The Sukothai period also introduced a formula for 
leadership which balanced phra dej, whereby “the patron can extract loyalty and 
obedience as a consequence of his clients’ fear”, and phra khun, whereby “the patron 
entices his clients, ingratiating himself with them by using bribes and favours to 
generate a sense of obligation” (Wright 1991:95). According to the modem patronage 
construct, as articulated by Keyes (1989:136), "individuals higher up in the hierarchy
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seek validation of their power from among those below them, and in return those lower 
down expect tangible benefits from their superiors".
Theravada Buddhism, which sanctions hierarchy through the law of kamma, was 
formally adopted during the absolute monarchy of the Ayutthaya period. Theravada 
Buddhism affirmed the political authority and legitimacy of the King to ensure social 
order (Somboon 1993:43). Buddhism also provided a rhetorical framework for civilised 
society which reinforced a distinction between uncivilised non-Buddhist highland 
people and the civilised Thai lowlanders (Jonsson 1996:172). Widespread public 
devotion to Theravada Buddhism is suggested to be responsible in part for continued 
adherence to traditional notions of differential rights to power relative to status.
Thinapan and Likhit (1989:179) assert that "Most Thais are prone to exercise absolute 
power if they are in a position to do so. They are also prone to defer, obey and submit 
to those in power". Thus, subordinates must demonstrate unconditional deference and 
obedience to their superiors. This requires them to refrain from questioning or 
challenging the opinions of superiors, and to desist from displays of personal initiative 
which might challenge the status quo and incur their superiors’ displeasure (Gohlert 
1991:87). This ’culture of subordination’ has been claimed to suppress criticism of the 
social order (Hirsch 1990:189); thereby inhibiting freedom of speech and formal 
consensual decision-making while encouraging the monopolisation of power by the 
ruling elite and top-down decision-making. When conflict arises between stakeholders, 
the matter is often resolved through informal negotiations (Thinapan and Likhit 
1989:190). A formal meeting may then be arranged to ceremoniously rationalise and 
legitimise the preordained outcome.
Superior-subordinate relationships are evident within Thai family structures, institutions 
and the educational system. Two manifestations of the superior-subordinate maxim 
which have a pervasive influence over sociopolitical interaction are the monarchy- 
masses and the bureaucrat-masses relationships. These relationships are remnants from 
the two-class structure of traditional Thai society, which separated the nobility from the 
peasantry. Constitutionally, the monarchy is above politics. Although previous 
monarchies have been regarded less favourably as symbols of political manipulation, the 
present monarchy of King Bhumibol is popularly revered. Slights against the monarchy 
are not tolerated either legally or socially. In the case of environmental management, 
this precludes critiques of royally-sponsored environmental programs or public debate 
of environmental objectives and strategies articulated by the King. The status of the 
monarchy is such that, in order to gain favour, government institutions involved in 
natural resource decision-making have been observed to reconsider their policies and 
programs in the light of suggestions made within a royal speech.
Government officials, literally 'royal servants' (Hirsch 1990:19), are similarly accorded 
prestige and status. When, in the late 1800s, King Chulalongkom created a modem 
Thai bureaucracy based on the European model of functional ministries, bureaucratic 
positions were given to the ruling nobility, thereby maintaining the traditional two-class 
feudal structure (Hirsch 1990:19). Contemporary class distinctions between the urban- 
based bureaucrats and the predominantly rural masses continue to reflect a belief that 
politics is "an affair of the ruling elite rather than a fundamental right of citizens" 
(Thinapan and Likhit 1989:176). Associated are stereotypes of bureaucrats as educated 
and modem, and villagers as passive, ignorant, unsophisticated and apathetic (Demaine 
1986:110). Concomitant with this perspective, participation is often treated by state
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officials as the increased co-optation of local communities in the implementation of 
stipulated state objectives (Thawithong 1984: 2-3 cited in Hirsch 1990:190). In this 
way, strategies aimed at increasing participation of the village polity may act as a 
vehicle to reinforce state power at the community level and thereby to undermine active 
local decision-making. Notably, a number of bureaucrats, many of whom occupy 
positions of seniority, denounce these generalisations, and express appreciation of 
indigenous knowledge and management21.
Perpetuation of the traditional patron-clientage system of social relationships has also 
been linked to widespread corruption in Thai administration and politics. As Pasuk and 
Sangsit (1994:4) note, “ The patron-client relationship connects the officials to the 
people and is the most organised system to allocate social gains and interests... Such a 
system institutionalises exchanges of money and power which may be classified as 
corruption”. Consequently, corruption has been tolerated according to the traditional 
norms of the patronage system, even though it is illegal according to Thai law. In terms 
of the highland environment, corruption has been charged with responsibility for 
continued deforestation. For example, Quinn (1994:22) notes allegations that corrupt 
forestry officials, politicians and entrepreneurs had colluded to claim title on 
conservation forest.
In recent years, a number of authors have indicated signs of the erosion of the traditional 
hierarchical class structure and the elitism and corruption with which it has been 
associated. Several authors have signalled the emergence of social stratification based 
on wealth (Hirsch 1990:20). Since the student uprising of 1973, there have been 
growing demands for curbs to bureaucratic power (Chai-Anan 1990). Since 1997, 
Thailand’s economic crisis has led to more widespread realisation that corruption may 
lead to repercussions on the global financial market with far-reaching economic 
implications for Thai society. This has accelerated appeals for political reform, 
culminating in the adoption of a new constitution aimed at dispelling corruption and 
decentralising decision-making. However, several political commentators have 
suggested that resistance to change is substantial. Thinapan and Likhit (1989:169) 
assert that the powerful "cling to the idea of elitism". Chai-Anan (1990:15) argues that 
"bureaucratic reforms in Thailand are more oriented toward incremental structural 
adjustments rather than decentralisation and citizen participation. Furthermore, when 
the issue of decentralisation becomes central to more effective implementation, there is 
a tendency to utilise this policy to strengthen and expand the power of the central 
government". These perspectives suggest that adoption of a new constitution may not 
necessarily translate into practical reform, unless institutions, policies, programmes, and 
the discursive conditions enabling stakeholder interaction are similarly reconstructed.
5.3.2 Fragmentation and non-coordination
The Thai state has been described as an ensemble of institutions with "scope for 
multiple directions of state action and thus also for differences of emphasis, divergence 
of goals; non-co-ordination and even incompatibilities among state development 
programmes" (Hirsch 1990:18). This perspective has validity in the context of 
environmental decision-making in the Northern Highlands, which features a multitude
21 Personal conversation with Mr Boonyarak Suebsiri, former Director-general of the Department of Land 
Development, June 1996.
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of overlapping and competing claims on the natural resources across geographic and 
institutional scales. Figure 5.2 illustrates the number and diversity of state agencies 
with an interest in the use, development or management of the highland natural 
resources.
The various state agencies involved in highland environmental decision-making tend to 
act independently and autonomously. Even in the case of an officially multiagency 
project, integrated, co-operative action is rare. Against this institutional background, 
many government officials remain confused about the concepts of integrated 
management and interdependent sub-projects, despite their incorporation within state 
policy rhetoric for many years (Demaine 1986:109). Centralised Bangkok-based 
departmental committees may co-ordinate in the planning of broad project objectives. 
However, each agency then develops separate field level work plans which meet these 
objectives, and assign personnel to accomplish specific tasks related to the work plans. 
The activities or progress of one agency are seldom communicated to other agencies 
working at the project site. This non-coordination was highlighted as a key problem in 
a post-project evaluation of the Mae Chaem Watershed Project, an “integrated rural 
highland development project” involving the Royal Forestry Department, Department of
MOD MOSET MOCMOAC
ONCB DOM EG ATDEDP
RTSD OEPP
OHD
Highland villageDLD-RO
MOI: Ministry of Interior DPW: Department of Public Welfare
MOAC: Ministry of Agriculture and 
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RID: Royal Irrigation Department 
RED: Royal Forestry Department 
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MOD: Ministry of Defence DEDP: Department of Energy Development and 
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RTSD: Royal Thai Survey Department
MOSET: Ministry of Science, 
Environment and Technology
OP: Office of Prime Minister ONCB: Office of Narcotics Control Board 
OEPP: Office of Environmental Policy and Planning
MOC: Ministry of Communications DOM: Department of Meteorology
SE: State Enterprises EG AT: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
Figure 5-2 Selected state agencies with an interest in highland natural resource
management
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Land Development, Department of Public Welfare among other government agencies 
(MCWP 1989a, 1989b). As a result, administration was duplicated, and villagers 
perceived that the different organisations were performing their own service, rather than 
an interconnected program. The tradition of overlapping and duplication of functions, 
unclear jurisdiction, and limited communication and co-ordination has been noted 
across institutional scales, down even to the level of individual divisions of a 
department (Chai-Anan 1990:17,29, Demaine 1986).
One reason for duplication of responsibilities and lack of co-ordination between 
agencies lies with the Thai parliamentary system, in which different ministries and even 
different components of a ministerial portfolio are presided over by the different 
coalition partners in government. Another reason is the bureaucratic position 
classification system, whereby "a divisional chief has to create more functions and ask 
for more personnel in their division in order to claim that the quantity and quality of 
work are large enough for the elevation of their [position classification]. This behaviour 
leads to overlapping and duplication of functions and also centralization” (Chai-Anan 
1990:27).
Departmental parochialism arises in part because projects are perceived as mechanisms 
to expand the role and resource base of the department. Since collaboration would 
amount to power-sharing and the dispersal of influence, co-operation is not encouraged 
(Van der Meer 1981:129). This parochialism acts as a significant constraint on the 
practice of integrated environmental management, as environmental data is fragmented 
amongst the agencies, and guarded fiercely. Departmental loyalty is reinforced by a 
system of promotion and rewards based on patronage (Chai-Anan 1990:26). Where 
coordination does occur between government agencies, the interaction between 
institutions is frequently governed by personal loyalties, notably through kinship and 
common school or university backgrounds.
Because of the lack of co-ordination between government agencies, local communities 
often receive conflicting directives from the different agencies. For example, the 
Department of Public Welfare and the RFD are often in conflict over the settlement and 
provision of services to highland villages. Since the ban on commercial logging 
concessions in 1988, the role of the RFD has focussed on environmental preservation 
(Thomas 1995:3), and the RFD has been an active advocate of relocating villages out of 
the highlands to enable forest regeneration. In contrast, the Department of Public 
welfare, which is concerned with the welfare and security of all people living within the 
Thai state, has promoted and invested in the establishment of permanent infrastructure, 
including schools, water pumps, electricity and medical facilities; legitimising 
settlement of villages earmarked by the RFD for relocation.
5.4 DSS for the Northern Highlands
In recent years, increasing use of information technology in Thai government 
institutions involved in environmental management has led to growing state agency 
interest in computer-based modelling systems and other information technology to assist 
environmental planning and policymaking. The value of these systems is seen to be 
derived from their capability to process and manipulate large amounts of information, 
and hence to contribute to “good and efficient services” and “effectiveness of 
governance” (NPITD 1996). According to Thailand’s National Policy on Information
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Technology Development, “information technology can play a pivotal role... to support 
many of the government’s policies for ... conservation of the nation’s natural resources 
and environment” (NPITD 1996). Thai NGOs are also increasingly promoting the 
development of integrated GIS-based environmental databases and computer systems 
capable of analysing ecological interactions. As with the state rationale, in their 
advocation of these systems, NGOs frequently cite the importance of more accurate, up- 
to-date and integrated information to achieve a transition to more sustainable 
development (Anat et al. 1987:304).
Despite political support for more widespread computerisation, DSS has not yet been 
widely applied in Thailand. In Northern Thailand, a limited number of applications of 
DSS have stemmed from research at the Multiple Cropping Centre (MCC) in Chiang 
Mai University. The MCC was established in 1969, under sponsorship by the American 
philanthropic Ford Foundation, to develop and extend multiple cropping systems which 
would be more profitable for northern farmers (Ireson 1976:3). Initial research focussed 
on agroeconomic problems such as optimum application of agricultural chemicals and 
the economic return from different crop varieties (Ireson 1976:3). By the late 1970s, 
sociological researchers had been engaged by the MCC to explore socio-economic 
components of agricultural decision making, such as the goals motivating farmers’ crop 
choices. As computer technology developed, research turned to development and 
application of DSS which integrated biophysical, agroeconomic and decision making 
mathematical programming models. For example, Pramote (1994) evaluated risk 
decision making models as a predictor of rice farmers’ behaviour, and concluded that 
risk models performed better than the conventional profit maximisation models, and 
should be employed to inform government formulation of agricultural programs.
Despite the research described above, interviews with a range of stakeholders suggested 
that there is general confusion and ignorance amongst academics, government officials, 
NGO workers and other stakeholders as to what DSS entails. The IWRAM project 
seems to represent the first attempt to develop a DSS which is intended for broad use by 
highland stakeholders. However, the interviews also revealed that officials from a 
variety of state agencies were enthusiastic about greater integration of GIS with models 
to assist their decision-making. Interviews with NGO workers highlighted a widespread 
belief that a commitment to the empowerment of villagers was increasingly requiring 
villagers to become literate in the use of the computer technology which the state 
employed. All of the highland NGOs I spoke with were involved in projects using GIS 
to map village territory. One NGO was involved in preliminary negotiations with 
researchers at Chiang Mai University to develop a GIS and modelling system, 
effectively a DSS, in collaboration with their regional organisations. Thus, while DSS 
in Northern Thailand is currently still in its infancy, there are grounds to expect 
instances of highland DSS development and application to proliferate in the future.
5.5 Locating the IWRAM project
In 1997, a three year research project was launched which aimed to develop an 
Integrated approach to Water Resources Assessment and Management (IWRAM) in the 
Ping Basin in the Northern highlands of Thailand. This section describes the original 
intent and collaborative structure of the IWRAM project according to the funding 
proposal which was accepted by the Australian Council for International Agricultural 
Research (IWRAM 1997). Over time, the objectives and methodology of the IWRAM
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project have altered, however the following description is relevant for the period of this 
thesis.
The central objective of the IWRAM project is to develop participatory and analytical 
approaches to assist stakeholders to identify and assess options for highland resource 
use which provide for more sustainable development, by better promoting the 
inhabitants’ socioeconomic and cultural welfare, while minimising impacts such as soil 
loss, flooding, drought and downstream water pollution. Key outputs of the project are 
intended to be a DSS and a participatory decision making framework.
The IWRAM project is a cross-cultural collaboration between an Australian research 
team and Thai academics and government personnel. The Australian researchers 
participating in the project are drawn from the School of Resource Management and 
Environmental Science in the Australian National University, and incorporated 
researchers whose fields of academic expertise include economic analysis, social impact 
assessment, catchment and groundwater hydrology, digital elevation modelling, and 
modelling of erosion processes, climate and agricultural systems. The Thai researchers 
in the project are drawn mainly from the Department of Land Development (and its 
Office of Highland Development), the Royal Forestry Department, Chiang Mai 
University, Maejo Agricultural University, and Kasetsart University.
The Thai collaborators are co-ordinated under the umbrella of the Royal Project 
Foundation (RPF). The RPF was established by King Bhumibhol in 1969 as a model of 
creative and compassionate development which would promote security through 
replacing opium and slash-and-bum cultivation with permanent cash cropping.
Although the RPF is cast as a non-government organisation, in practice, it is only semi- 
autonomous and semi-detached from the politics and development constructs of the 
state bureaucracy. One reason for this is that the RPF depends largely on government 
allocation of funds to maintain their activities (Gohlert 1991:39). Another reason is that 
RPF personnel tend to be drawn from government agencies which assign staff as 
‘volunteers’ to the RPF, and tend to mirror the prevailing development ethos of their 
base agencies. It should be noted that treatment of the King as beyond reproach tends to 
preclude public critical evaluation of the Royal Projects. Privately, several development 
workers have expressed reservations about the viability of the Royal Project approach, 
pointing out that the programmes are sustained through a continual injection of funds 
which subsidise marketing, sales, crop inputs among other services and material 
resources.
The IWRAM project comprises four interlinked research components: biophysical, 
sociocultural, economic and decision support. The four research components are 
integrated through common focal sites, and through information transfers. Management 
options generated through participatory processes undertaken by the socio-cultural 
component will be used as inputs to the biophysical land-use management simulations. 
This is intended to ensure that management options being modelled are ‘real’ and 
perceived as desirable by the different stakeholders. To provide feedback to the 
stakeholders on the benefits and costs of different visions and options for land use 
management, information from the biophysical component and the economic 
component on agricultural benefits will be fed into the stakeholder process. Also, 
information from the biophysical component on flood stage height, water quality, dam
102
siltation and crop yields will be used in the economic component to calculate benefits 
and costs, including losses in land productivity.
The DSS component serves a key role in the integration of the IWRAM research.
Firstly, the DSS to be developed will map different stakeholder’s visions and constraints 
for the Basin. Secondly, databases and biophysical and economic models will be 
integrated in the DSS. Finally, the DSS will perform simulations, visualisations, trade­
offs and optimisations of the biophysical, economic and social effects of different land 
and water use scenarios. The DSS is intended to incorporate spatiotemporal databases 
at two scales: a basin-wide scale based on a grid of about 100 m; and a focus-catchment 
scale with a grid of about 20m. The databases will include: digital, spatially referenced, 
gridded land cover data; a grid-based Digital Elevation Model; and digitised geological 
and soils data. Models or relationships of and between climate, landscape, land use, 
demography, agricultural productivity and environmental costs will be incorporated as 
modules in the DSS. A central feature of the DSS model-base is an integrated 
biophysical modelling system which will enable assessment of the hydrologic impacts 
under different land use, rainfall and temperature scenarios. Submodels intended to be 
incorporated in the DSS model-base include a precipitation-runoff model, an in-stream 
routing model, empirical agricultural and forest productivity models, a numerical 
groundwater flow model, and erosion models
It is envisioned that the DSS will be used by the various management agencies to make 
more informed decisions about land and water use options in the highlands of northern 
Thailand. Other academic and NGO stakeholders will be able to use the DSS as well as 
other research outcomes to assess the impacts of management decisions and inform the 
political process from their own perspective. For individual stakeholders and non­
technical users such as farmers and hill tribes’ people, it is intended that the output of 
the DSS in terms of appropriate land use and management activities would be 
communicated in extension activities by the Royal Project Foundation and the 
Department of Land Development.
To assist integration between the researchers and stakeholders, a participatory 
procedural framework has been developed, Figure 5.3, which encourages active 
involvement by the stakeholders in the research process. It is intended that stakeholders 
will have regular input into the research through interaction with researchers in the 
course of their eliciting visions and discussing possible options, through regular 
stakeholder workshops held throughout the project, and through additional meetings of 
government stakeholders convened by the Royal Project Foundation. It is also 
anticipated that where possible, stakeholders will participate in the collection, 
presentation and analysis of information.
Through the participatory process, it is intended that highland local communities will 
gain a greater direct say in policy development and land use planning. It is also hoped 
that the participatory strategies will enhance ownership by the end users of the processes 
and methods to be developed during the project, and support the implementation and 
further development of these processes and methods beyond the life of the project. The 
participatory process is intended to surmount conventional problems of bureaucratic 
fragmentation, with the participatory and collaborative approach facilitating 
communication and coordination among government departments, and encourage co­
ordinated development of policy and goals. It is also intended that the collaborative
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Figure 5-3 Procedural framework of the IWRAM project
structure of agency volunteers co-ordinated under the umbrella of the RPF will facilitate 
co-operation and dissuade interagency rivalry, and that integrated management will be 
promoted through delivery of a more holistic information base for policy development 
and regional planning.
The integrative research and procedural frameworks and the collaborative arrangements, 
particularly the RPF umbrella structure and the inclusion of sociocultural researchers 
from the outset, illustrate that the IWRAM project is making a concerted effort to 
confront the challenge of more effective co-ordination and participation. In this manner, 
the IWRAM project may prove an innovative departure from previous development 
efforts. However, the IWRAM project proposal also suggests several similarities with 
previous development projects, including reinforcement of a rationalist paradigm of 
management through an emphasis on biophysical and economic productivity, and some 
references to conventional extension and transfer of technology models.
5.6 Politics of highland decision support: Anticipating bias
The IWRAM DSS is intended to assist all stakeholders in highland environmental 
management to make better decisions for sustainability. A key issue is whether 
sociocultural networks of influence and commitments engaged during development or 
use of the IWRAM DSS may bias the DSS in favour of one set of stakeholders over
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another. Informed by the historical, environmental and political context detailed earlier, 
this section draws on the taxonomy of bias proposed in Chapter 3 to explore potential 
biases of the IWRAM DSS. The aim is to foreshadow case study issues and to 
demonstrate that biases are significant and worthy of consideration within this setting.
As evidenced by bureaucratic fragmentation, inter-agency and intra-village conflict, 
neither state nor village discourses on environmental decision-making are monolithic. 
None-the-less, literature suggests that themes may be synthesised from each set of 
discourses enabling a contrast of dominant state and village perspectives. From a 
critical standpoint, this characterisation is useful to indicate plausible, alternate ways of 
framing highland decision-making problems and solutions, and suggest potential biases 
in the IWRAM DSS in terms of which (and whose) logics may underpin the system. As 
illustrated through the narrative of the history of the highland decision-making 
environment, the dominant state discourse of highland development has tended to be 
embedded within security commitments and predicated on notions of territorial control. 
Over the past two decades, environmental conservation and sustainable environmental 
management have been employed to extend the metaphor of control and reinforce state 
claims to the highland resources. Environmental decision-making for the highlands has 
been framed as a national policy issue, necessitating a balance between the economic, 
environmental and social welfare of the nation as a whole versus that of individual 
highland communities. The highland environmental problematique has been linked to 
the destructive character of traditional highland swiddening systems, particularly opium 
cultivation. Solutions have been couched within western-derived theories of 
modernisation, economic integration, and optimal productivity through intensification, 
and attempts to enforce the separation of people and nature. In contrast, many highland 
communities locate environmental concerns within the context of increasing livelihood 
pressures, including the on-ground implications of solutions promoted by the state 
(Pratuang 1996:120). The mobilisation of environmentally-oriented community 
networks, partly in response to state threats of relocation, represent discursive claims for 
a stronger voice in highland decision-making. In contrast with state strategies of 
relocation and concomitant cultural dislocation to ensure environmental preservation, 
local analyses tend to place environmental management within the framework of 
cultural beliefs and customs (Pratuang 1996:123). Within locally-centred discourses, a 
key dimension of potential solutions often involves recognising and revitalising a role 
for traditional forest protection practices.
By framing more sustainable development as better promoting the inhabitants’ 
socioeconomic and cultural welfare, while minimising impacts such as soil loss, 
flooding, drought and downstream water pollution, the IWRAM project is attempting to 
bridge the perspectives presented above. However, the relative ease in incorporating 
commitments to logics underlying the state versus the local perspective suggest a 
potential bias. Scientific forest and land classification systems employed by state 
agencies may be contrasted with an indigenous Karen forest and land classification 
system. The former system is based on a set of universal criteria to evaluate biophysical 
properties of land and soil, including terrain, slope, soil type, soil texture, moisture, 
salinity, erosivity and organic matter content (Santita 1996:251). These criteria enable 
assessment and classification of forest and land parcels, including allocation of 
conservation forest, which is considered unsuitable for human settlement, and economic 
forest, which is deemed suitable for productive commercial exploitation (Pratuang
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1996). The quantitative character of the state criteria makes them amenable to computer 
manipulation, and the spatial allocative character of land evaluation is amenable to 
G.I.S. representation. Furthermore, the resonance of the state approach with dominant 
western approaches promotes incorporation due to familiarity.
While the indigenous evaluation incorporates some of the scientific state criteria, it 
differs in its emphasis on sensory perception and symbolic interpretation rather than 
quantitative measurement (Santita 1996:251). Whereas the scientific evaluations are 
predicated on standardisation of physical criteria, the indigenous system frames land and 
soil evaluation within the context of local livelihoods and culture. For example, Karen 
in the Mae Wang watershed classify forest into seven types, including upper watershed 
forest, which must be preserved to appease the resident spirits, but from which villagers 
may collect wildfoods and herbal medicines (Pratuang 1996:124). The symbolic, 
qualitative, spiritual and sociocultural basis of the indigenous evaluation process 
suggests that it may be more difficult to incorporate within a computer-based DSS. 
Kampe (1992) and others have argued that the predominance of westernised scientific 
knowledge and economic market ideology over indigenous knowledge and subsistence 
systems has resulted in a loss of tribal culture and self-esteem, and have undermined 
participation in decision-making. Similar disempowerment may result if the former 
knowledge is validated within the DSS, while the latter is absent. As Marglin (1990:10) 
warns, “The adoption of colonial values by Westernised indigenous elites stacks the 
cards against tradition. It hardly helps if Western values are expressed as universals 
which cut across cultural boundaries”. The likelihood of biases due to incomplete 
knowledge is reinforced by a comment from a foreign volunteer working with a 
development NGO in the communities in the Northern highlands, describing how their 
organisation had experienced difficulties with a recent computer-based evaluation of 
their programme: “They used the ‘Logframe’ process of evaluation. We were speaking 
different languages. They were focussed on quantifiable indicators, the NGO was 
talking about process and qualitative measures that didn’t lend itself (sic) to the 
logframe procedures”22. While many aspects of the indigenous system appear not to be 
amenable to incorporation in the DSS, the proliferation of 3D topographic models 
throughout highland villages suggests that, like the state system, the indigenous system 
may be referenced spatially, enabling G.I.S. representation.
The constructionist argument presented in Chapter 4 suggests that an interrogation of 
which perspective is likely to be incorporated rests largely on the question of who is 
likely to own the process of DSS development. Johnson (1985) argues that since the 
process of selecting and developing computer-based technology usually occurs at the 
instigation of those at the top of the organisational hierarchy, then the construction of 
that technology will largely depend on the motivations of these people. Kling 
(1974:279) notes that within organisations where there is dissension about goals and 
methods, designers tend to accept the professional ideology espoused by high level 
officials, partly because the latter’s support is usually necessary to implement the 
information system. He thus provocatively suggests that designers of computer-based 
information systems “act like hired guns who are merely servants of groups with 
established power”. Supporting these arguments, Winner (1989) draws on empirical 
studies of computers and social change to conclude that “those best situated to take
22 Personal interview with Karan Aquino, 18 November 1997
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advantage of the power of a new technology are often those previously well situated by 
dint of wealth, social standing and institutional position”. This conclusion echoes 
classical theories of organisational power, as articulated by sociologist Max Weber:
“The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material 
means of management in the hands of the master” (Weber 1946). Given the long 
tradition of political, socioeconomic and educational advantage of state officials over 
highland villagers, the preceding perspectives reinforce the likelihood that state agencies 
will own the process more than highland villagers, and raise the potential for the DSS to 
be used by the established elite to sustain and enhance prevailing power inequities.
Thus far, the discussion has been based on a broad comparison of state and village 
stakeholder groups. Further biases would emerge from further disaggregation of these 
groups. For example, analyses of intra-village conflict by Waranoot (1995) and others 
suggest that different village groups are likely to have alternate framings of the decision 
problem, partly dependent on their location in the catchment relative to other villages, 
and their history of land use. Amongst the state agencies, the historical conflict between 
the core interests of the Department of Public Welfare and those of the Royal Forestry 
Department indicate alternate state framings of the highland problem. The DPW has 
traditionally been concerned with enhancing the welfare of the highlanders, the RFD has 
been concerned with the preservation and productivity of forests. Given such 
conflicting framings, and in light of the tradition of interagency rivalry, the potential 
arises for DSS development to be hijacked by one department to reinforce its political 
sphere of responsibility and influence. If this occurs, then the exclusion of certain 
agencies in DSS development may lead to biases due to incomplete knowledge, 
distortions in knowledge, or commitments to certain logics. Fragmentation and non­
coordination of bureaucratic agencies with an interest in highland environmental 
management suggests that biases due to incomplete knowledge may also arise because 
of difficulties in gaining access to data. As Anat et al. (1987:304) suggest, “In a world 
where different agencies see themselves in competition for resources and influence, 
information is seen as power... it may be difficult to persuade them to share the 
information they have and to co-ordinate the data they collect in the future”. The 
quality of highland data, which is seldom rigorously documented methodologically and 
is frequently conflicting when triangulated, introduces further potential for biases due to 
incomplete knowledge or distortions in knowledge.
A tendency for computer power to be consolidated within central agencies in Bangkok 
raises potential for biases in access due to geographical constraints, potentially biasing 
against both regional state agencies and highland villagers. If the DSS was located in a 
regional office in Chiang Mai, access may still be constrained for those villagers living 
in remote communities. Installing the DSS on a portable laptop might surmount these 
geographical constraints if the agency maintaining the system was willing to travel to 
the remote villages. Although the expansion of the road network in the highlands has 
increased the accessibility of many highland villages, it is still necessary to access some 
villages by foot. Even for those villages connected to the road network, during the rainy 
season, roads are often hazardous and difficult to traverse except by four-wheel drives. 
An alternative favoured within many western countries would be to link computers 
located within highland villages to a central DSS. Limitations in terms of the 
availability of electricity in the highlands suggest a further impediment, necessitating a 
reliance on batteries. This latter point raises an issue which was not incorporated within
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the theoretically-derived taxonomy of bias, as the literature addressing computerisation 
and access issues is predominantly from developed countries where electricity supply 
tends to be assured.
If the user interface of the IWRAM DSS is in English, then access would be constrained 
for potential users who are not literate in English. Translating the DSS into Thai would 
enable agency personnel to use the system. However, access would still be constrained 
for many highland people since only about 59% can speak Thai, and around 74 % of hill 
people have no access to formal Thai education (Kampe 1992:159). The dearth of 
computer literacy within regional and local government agencies beyond simple word­
processing tasks suggests that even for these Thai-literate stakeholders, access is likely 
to be constrained unless computer training is provided. The limited conventional and 
computer literacy of highlanders raises the issue whether equitable access may be better 
promoted through ensuring alternate forms of interacting and interfacing with the output 
of the DSS rather than endeavouring for open computer-based access. However, it 
should be noted that some highland villagers have expressed an interest in receiving 
computer training, as they perceive that, as with conventional mapping technology, the 
DSS may be appropriated to enhance their authority and credibility in negotiations over 
contested resources23.
Yet not all highlanders are equally enthusiastic about computer technology. One NGO 
volunteer described a pilot project they had initiated in a highland village where GPS 
and a simple GIS were used to map the village resources: “It was time consuming - 
sometimes it would take an hour to get a signal through the canopy - we didn’t get one 
village let alone the three we had planned. At the end of the day, we would link a laptop 
up to a generator and draw maps. I’ll take a picture home in my mind of sitting in a 
Karen house lit by candlelight while the Karen villagers old and young sat around 
watching the computer create the map. But in the end, we stopped running it, because 
as we got more information, it took longer and longer to create the maps. And the 
novelty value wore off for everyone. We don’t know what use it will be - except that it 
is good for the villagers to know what is out there”. This comment suggests that the 
relevance and efficiency of the technology for the villagers was questionable, and 
emphasises local heterogeneity in responses to technologies.
If the IWRAM DSS achieves its objective of assisting in identifying more profitable 
resource management systems, and if users are required to pay for access, then the DSS 
will provide an economic advantage to those stakeholders who have the wealth to access 
the DSS. Hence, as with previous development efforts in the highlands, the IWRAM 
DSS may serve to introduce or exacerbate economic and political disparities. The 
historical disparities between the conventional opium cultivating and pioneer 
swiddening tribes versus the conservationist Karen would seem to implicate ethnicity as 
a significant factor to consider in terms of the likelihood of potential biases in access. 
However, Hinton (1983:159) has argued that as environmental pressures have gradually 
forced abandonment o f ‘traditional’ cultivation practices, ethnicity has become 
increasingly irrelevant. Instead, he argues that economic and political interests have 
emerged as more significant. Thomas (1995:15) similarly notes that although 
behavioural responses to introduced technologies “are increasingly similar among 
various communities and ethnic groups, research already indicates that there are
23 Interview with Prathuang Narintarangkul na Ayuthaya, November 1997
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differentials among households within communities”. This supports consideration of 
intra-community economic and political differences in an interrogation of biases in 
access. However, results from a study by Dearden et al. (1996) suggest caution in 
abandonment of consideration of ethnic difference. Drawing on interviews with 
villagers inhabiting the Doi Inthanon National Park, Dearden et al. (1996:127) note that 
while 29% of Hmong respondants indicated that they not only had sufficient income to 
meet their needs but also had some savings, “only 9% of the Karen were in this position, 
with 63% indicating that they had insufficient funds and 47% indicating that they were 
in debt”.
Even if villagers are provided with access to the DSS or the DSS output, the potential 
exists for the DSS to perpetuate the extension of state control and influence within a 
village, leading to the political disempowerment of villagers. Hirsch (1990:30) 
describes this fundamental tension of increased local participation and access: “On the 
one hand, integration of village institutions into supravillage structures gives villagers 
potential access to supralocal resources and influence over decisions affecting them that 
are made at a higher level. On the other hand, the penetration of State and capital into 
the village that is a concomitant part of this process transforms village institutions in 
such a way that they take on state functions or are reduced to monetised relationships 
within the larger economic system. This reduces village control over local resources 
and decisions in deference to state power, which itself falls into the hands of powerful 
individuals within the village”. If embedded biases are obscured, political disadvantage 
may be compounded. In this vein, it should be noted that the historical employment of 
education within highland communities as a means to promote assimilation and extend 
the state worldview suggests that development of DSS within a learning paradigm may 
not be benign. Instead, the use of a DSS as a tool for learning may explicitly or 
implicitly educate highlanders to think about highland problem-solving, including what 
the problem is, and what factors should be considered, in a way determined by external 
observers as correct.
The preceding discussion suggests that on several dimensions, there is the potential for 
the IWRAM DSS to be biased against highlanders, particularly poorer, more remote and 
already marginalised communities and individuals.
5.7 Conclusions
The implications of the use of environmental DSS for the decision-making environment 
of the Northern Highlands of Thailand are uncertain. On the one hand, DSS may 
provide a means of improving access of traditionally disempowered stakeholders to 
information, thereby minimising inequity and facilitating informed community 
participation in environmental decision-making. On the other hand, DSS may represent 
a means of perpetuating and reinforcing existing power inequities and conventional 
developmental biases through recourse to politically fashionable and convenient 
environmental rhetoric. For example, historical tendencies towards extreme 
centralisation and patriarchal rule, together with the remoteness of many highland 
villages, widespread illiteracy and persistent low incomes within highland villages point 
to potential biases in access. Meanwhile, a tradition of bureaucratic elites controlling 
the expertise and tools of power, and stark differences between the epistemological 
foundations and modes of classification associated with bureaucratic and local 
knowledges raises the potential for socially embedded biases. For the IWRAM project,
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a challenge is whether and how the processes of developing and implementing a DSS 
for the Northern highlands may be constructed to minimise potential biases. Chapter 6 
describes the process by which the IWRAM researchers engage with the frameworks 
proposed in Chapter 4 to reflect on potential biases associated with the development and 
use of the IWRAM DSS.
Framing environmental 
decision support and 
anticipating biases
Over the past decade, there has been increasing investment in and development 
o f highland resorts by lowland Thais. The highlands are an attractive resort 
location because of the cooler temperatures, and because, despite the 
deforestation, the highlands still have a higher proportion o f forest than any 
other region in Thailand. Highland villagers argue that the contribution of 
resort construction to the deforestation problem is often underemphasised in
public debates.
I l l
6. Framing environmental decision support and anticipating biases
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case study of the use of the analytical 
framework, proposed in Chapter 4, to guide reflexive and precautionary DSS 
development in the IWRAM research project. Figure 6.1 introduces the participants 
who feature in this and subsequent chapters24. The mode of presentation is a narrative of 
the evolution of the IWRAM project, concentrating on events which inform or comprise 
the framework application. The narrative approach has been selected for several 
reasons. Firstly, placing use of the analytical framework within a narrative of the 
IWRAM project evolution emphasises that the process did not take place within either a 
sociopolitical or perceptual vacuum. Instead, each participant engaging with the 
framework entered each phase of the process with preexisting ways of construing 
environmental decision support, the highland decision-making environment and DSS.
Secondly, a primary aim of this chapter is to communicate how different researchers’ 
perspectives on the nature and role of decision support, the IWRAM DSS, and the 
decision-making environment, shifted and evolved over time. The narrative provides a 
means of tracing this history, and a pointer to how different sociopolitical events may 
have crystallised, altered or otherwise influenced different researchers’ perspectives25.
In particular, a chronological treatment of the group dialogues that comprised part of the 
framework application illustrates the process of construing and reconstruing in practice, 
and informs the evaluation of the framework, presented in Chapter 7.
A narrative of the evolution of the IWRAM project also serves to illustrate the 
cascading impacts that happenstance and apparently incidental decisions may have over 
time on the conduct of a research project, and thereby on the character and form of the 
research outcomes, which in this instance included the DSS. In particular, the personnel 
who became involved in the project, the reasons why they became involved, their roles 
in relation to development of the DSS, and their familiarity with or commitment to 
particular software or methods, all emerged as factors which contributed to shaping, and 
thereby potentially biasing, the purpose, form and content of the DSS.
Section 6.2 recounts how the scope and design of the IWRAM project unfurled, and 
how the IWRAM DSS took shape within it. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 describe and analyse 
the use of the analytical framework with the Australian and Thai IWRAM research 
teams, respectively. These sections provide insight into the differing ways that 
participants construed decision support, and the potential biases that each participant 
identified. Section 6.5 describes and analyses a joint team meeting between the
24 During the time of my involvement with the IWRAM project (1995-1997), the roles of several 
participants changed. These changes are indicated in Figure 6.1. The underlined roles signify the name(s) 
by which each participant is referred to within the narrative. Further changes in participants’ roles which 
occurred subsequent to my involvement with the project are not indicated.
25 Note that this mode of presentation resonates with Kemmis and McTaggart’s (1988) advocation of 
revelation o f a group’s critical history, as referred to in Ch 4: Reorienting DSS development.
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Australians and Thais which provided an opportunity to share each team’s vision for the 
DSS. Finally, Section 6.6 notes several developments within the IWRAM project 
which unfolded after my interaction with the project had ceased, where these 
developments had significant implications either in terms of shaping the IWRAM DSS, 
or in terms of the effectiveness of the analytical framework.
Project manager
Thai teamAustralian team
Biophysical leader
(Hydrologist)
GIS researcher
(In biophysical 
team)
Economist
(Economics co­
leader)
Anthropologist
(In sociocultural 
team)
Became: 
DSS leader
Ecologist (GIS)
PHD Hydrologist
Became:
DSS leader
CRES Psychologist:
Became:
Sociocultural leader
PHD Director
Became:
Thai project co­
leader
CRES Hydrologist
Became:
Project leader
Biophysical leader
Project leader
(Retired agricultural 
scientist, volunteer 
in Royal Project 
Foundation)
Project manager
(Royal Forestry 
Department officer 
seconded to Royal 
Project Foundation)
Figure 6-1 Collaborators in the IWRAM research project referred to in narrative
6.2 The unfurling of the IWRAM project and DSS
The Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies (CRES) is a research institution 
within the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. In 1994, two academics 
at CRES, from the research backgrounds of environmental psychology and quantitative 
systems modelling floated the idea of collaborating together in an interdisciplinary 
project of mutual interest. Although CRES officially promoted itself as an 
interdisciplinary research body, it was widely perceived that in practice few projects of 
an interdisciplinary nature had been undertaken. Hence, a key motivation for 
developing such a project was helping to build up CRES’ strategic initiative in 
interdisciplinary research. For each of the academics, interdisciplinary collaboration 
also promised opportunities for professional development.
After some discussion, a project was identified which combined the research interests of 
several academics in CRES: developing methods for an integrated assessment of 
management options for sustainable development of the water resources of the Chao 
Phraya Basin, Thailand. The project was framed as a pilot project, with a view to later
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transferring the integrated framework developed to other Asian river basins. The CRES 
modeller and psychologist assumed the reins as project co-leaders, and began a search 
for opportunities to attract funding of the proposed project.
Independently of the plans to develop a project at CRES, a hydrologist at the Office of 
Highland Development (OHD) in Thailand had begun developing a project to integrate 
land use planning, hydrological modelling and GIS at the catchment scale. The OHD is 
an agency within the Department of Land Development (DLD) with responsibility for 
land use planning and allocation in the highland regions of Northern Thailand. In mid- 
1995, a Thai government delegation, including this hydrologist as well as the then 
Director of the OHD, visited CRES on the suggestion of the incumbent Director of the 
DLD, an old friend of the Director of CRES26. During the visit, details of each of the 
proposed projects were shared. The Thai hydrologist emphasised his interest in 
determining the type of land use cover which would improve the land and water quality 
of a catchment, particularly in terms of streamflow, channel erosion and base flow. The 
Director of the OHD spoke of the cultural and political context: how opium was a 
competitive crop and opium replacement crops needed to be similarly competitive to 
succeed; and how some generations back, strong, rich men had taken the best land, 
forcing the less powerful to roam the highlands exploiting the poorer land to survive.
Over the course of the Thai visit, the CRES modeller and OHD hydrologist further 
developed the OHD project with a view to collaboration. The OHD Director was 
strongly supportive of engaging in collaborative research with CRES, not least because 
his son had recently moved to Canberra for schooling. He suggested that a friend in the 
Royal Project Foundation (RPF) might be willing to sponsor a collaborative project.
The OHD Director later explained the perceived political benefits of locating the project 
under the auspices of the RPF. Firstly, he thought that the non-governmental status of 
the RPF, and the association of the RPF with H.M. Bhumibol Adulyadej, King of 
Thailand, would facilitate more broad participation within the project, including 
government officials, academics and other stakeholders. In particular, it would provide 
a means of overcoming traditional non-cooperation between stakeholders, particularly 
that due to intergovemment agency rivalry. Secondly, he thought that the extension arm 
of the RPF would provide a means for immediate delivery of the project outcomes.
After further interaction over the ensuing months, it was proposed that the original OHD 
and CRES projects be merged into a combined project which would develop an 
integrated framework to assess options for the sustainable management of land and 
water resources for the headwaters of the Chao Phraya, the Ping, Yom, Wang and Nan, 
which all originate in the highlands of Northern Thailand. This provided the genesis of 
the IWRAM project. A quest began to seek funding from the Australian Council for 
International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) for components of the project.
In October 1995, a CRES delegation, including myself, visited the OHD, DLD central 
office in Bangkok, and several other government departments and universities. During 
discussions at the OHD, the OHD hydrologist described two extreme strategies that the 
government could take in relation to the highlands, both of which were undesirable. 
Firstly, people could be allowed to exploit land as much as they wished, which would 
have severe environmental ramifications. Or, to protect the watershed, communities
26 My involvement with the IWRAM project commenced shortly before this visit, see Section 2.3.
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could be forcibly moved out of the highlands; an approach that in the past had proved 
controversial because of the adverse social impacts experienced by the dislocated 
communities. Against this background, the primary research question the OHD was 
interested in was: “How far can we exploit the forest in each catchment and turn it to 
cultivated land while still protecting downstream water and land resources?” Thus, 
from the Thai perspective, the project was firmly embedded within the political 
complexity of highland environmental decision-making, and framed in terms of 
reconciling different stakeholders’ interests.
The CRES visit coincided with devastating flooding throughout Thailand. One 
suggested response to the flooding which was widely publicised was that the Royal 
Irrigation Department (RID) be provided with money to build another large dam to trap 
the floodwaters. The Director of the OHD saw an opportunity for the joint project to 
take advantage of the political climate: “We want to support our office OHD - to get 
political support that if we fix the soil on the mountain, it is cheaper than giving RID 
money to clean up the stream”. The OHD Director felt that activities directed at 
restoring the highland environment would address the source of downstream water 
quantity and quality problems, and be more effective than expensive remediation 
efforts. Note that an institution building motive has emerged for the initiation of the 
IWRAM project.
The precise origins of the decision to develop a DSS as part of the IWRAM project are 
uncertain. Most reports trace the origin back to a suggestion by the CRES modeller, 
following a project workshop held in December 1995 in Chiang Mai. However, the 
development of the DSS appears in the preamble to that workshop as one of the project 
objectives, and thus must have been conceived of sometime in the months preceding the 
workshop. The CRES modeller recalls that he initiated incorporation of the DSS 
because he felt it would be a good vehicle for integrating the project, that it would give 
long-term memory of the project, and that it would provide an opportunity to initiate 
research within CRES into DSS. In the context of the latter rationale, he framed the 
DSS as a transferable computer-based technical tool. Meanwhile, the OHD hydrologist 
recalls that the DSS was initiated to promote greater efficiency. He explained that “The 
ideal situation is that development options are explored from every possible dimension 
or discipline. In real life, planners always have weak and strong points. The technology 
should help them get over their weak point with less time and effort. And get over their 
strong point in much faster time”. Thus, at this stage, the OHD hydrologist framed the 
DSS as a tool to allow planners to consider a wider spectrum of factors more rapidly.
The Phase 1 proposal, essentially a concept paper, for the IWRAM project was 
submitted to ACIAR in early 1996 (IWRAM 1996a). Box 6.1 reproduces excerpts from 
the proposal which illustrate how the IWRAM project and the DSS were framed at that 
time. It should be noted that the CRES modeller and psychologist were respectively 
identified in the Phase 1 proposal as leaders of the biophysical and sociocultural 
components of the project. From this point onward in the narrative, they will be 
referred to as the biophysical leader and the sociocultural leader.
Although the review of the proposal by ACIAR was supportive, they insisted on several 
revisions to address concerns about the scope and focus of the project. Among their 
concerns were that the project needed to address a policy issue and not be driven purely 
by academic interests, and that a smaller catchment be selected for the project case study
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than the whole of the Chao Phraya headwaters. In response to these concerns, the Phase 
1 proposal was revised to focus only on the Ping watershed, and to articulate the 
research more strongly in the context of the central policy issue, namely ‘Which patterns 
and intensity of cultivation and other water use in the highlands of Northern Thailand’s 
Ping Basin provide for sustainability in terms of promoting the soicoeconomic and 
cultural welfare of the inhabitants, while minimising soil loss, flooding and drought, and 
preserving downstream water quality?’ (IWRAM 1996b). The revised Phase 1 proposal 
was formally accepted in March 1996.
It should be noted that at this stage, the ACIAR proposal was not perceived as defining 
the boundaries of the IWRAM project. Instead, the research ambit of the project was 
broad, incorporating social forestry, groundwater, biodiversity and climate change 
issues, reflecting the diverse research foci of various CRES academics and others within 
the School of Resource Management and Environmental Science (SRMES) who had 
become interested in participating in the interdisciplinary project. Accordingly, the 
ACIAR proposal was merely viewed as providing funding for one portion of the project.
Box 6-1 Framing the IWRAM project and the DSS: February 1996
The project comprises three interlinked research components: sociocultural, biophysical and 
economic.
The sociocultural component aims to identify key stakeholders’ aspirations for highland 
development, assess social and cultural impacts of land and water use, and generate alternate land 
and water use options with stakeholders.
The biophysical component aims to simulate the effects o f water and land use options and climate 
on soil loss, agricultural productivity, stream quantity and quality, accepting as simulation inputs 
the management options arising from the sociocultural stakeholder process.
The economic component aims to calculate on-site benefits as well as on-site costs o f land and 
water use, using outputs from the biophysical component.
Integration o f the research components is intended to be facilitated by the concurrent 
development o f decision support software and spatio-temporal databases to perform basin-wide 
simulations o f the biophysical, economic and social effects o f land and water use options.
Excerpts from IWRAM 1996a
The Phase 2 proposal required a detailed project description, including methods, 
objectives, expected outputs, a full budget, and the specification of personnel and their 
responsibilities. At this stage, collaborative arrangements were still tentative. The 
OHD Director assumed responsibility for negotiating with prospective Thai 
collaborators. Some collaborators were brought on board because, as well as having 
reputations and experience in highland development, they were, or had connections to, 
friends or relatives of the OHD Director. Others were invited to collaborate because of 
their political positions, including the Office of Narcotics Control Board, which controls 
certain sensitive socioeconomic data. In many cases, association with the Royal Project 
Foundation was emphasised as a reason to become involved. In terms of the 
sociocultural collaborators, the OHD Director decided to approach a high profile social 
scientist who had in the past publicly supported political positions in favour of the 
highland people, and in direct opposition to the OHD Director. The OHD Director 
explained that he thought that joining people from the opposite sides of the old protests
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under the RPF umbrella would be critical if  the IWRAM project was to represent a new, 
participatory and collaborative approach. After a terse meeting in which the social 
scientist stressed that he would not be coerced into following a government line, he 
agreed that he and his team would participate.
An email exchange during the preparation o f the Phase 2 proposal between the 
sociocultural leader and one of the new Thai sociocultural researchers outlines their 
hopes for the project. Noting that the draft proposal methodology describes an intention 
to include all key stakeholders in natural resource management and social impact 
assessment, the Thai researcher remarked that:
The development of participatory planning system and methods, in which 
villagers and local officials have more communication and coordination, 
have been researched and experimented by some highland development 
projects in the last 5-7 years. Many good models and systems were 
developed but these stopped when the project terminated. Unchanged 
centralised legal and structural framework and system still obstruct the 
people’s participation in natural resource management on a sustainable 
bases. Do you think with this project we can achieve something beyond 
the development of participatory approaches and methods, say the 
improvement in institutional aspects which support the sustainable 
management of natural resources by all stakeholders?
The sociocultural leader responded that she had a dream that the process o f asking 
stakeholders their visions and discussing options could provide a way of “getting better 
communication within and then between government departments..., encouraging the 
government departments to open up better dialogue with the non-government 
stakeholders, particularly local people..., encouraging the government departments to 
use the processes we develop through the project as part of their ongoing management 
practice”. As will emerge through the course o f this narrative, this exchange may be 
viewed as an early signal of an alternate way o f construing the DSS, namely as a 
possible mechanism for political, institutional and social change in Thailand rather than 
as predominantly a transferable, technical tool.
In light o f the sociocultural leader’s absence on sabbatical overseas, as well as the 
conflicting professional commitments of other project personnel, the biophysical leader 
assumed primary responsibility for submission o f the Phase 2 proposal, including the 
development o f the budget27. At ACIAR’s behest, he also became installed as the sole 
project leader. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, this event was significant because of 
its implications for the direction the DSS would later take.
Active contributions to the preparation the Phase 2 proposal gradually diminished, as 
various SRMES academics initially interested in the collaborative project drifted away, 
many because o f more favourable professional opportunities, or time and resource 
constraints. Some social researchers who were originally involved have commented 
that their interest waned when they perceived that it would be difficult to maintain and 
defend a critical and participatory approach from marginalisation by technically- 
oriented researchers whose worldviews and ways o f practice would be challenged by 
such an approach. Other researchers have commented that their involvement
27 Offering an alternate construing, the biophysical leader suggests that he was always the main driver of 
the project. This version of events does not undermine, but instead reinforces, the analysis in Chapter 8 
regarding the shaping of the DSS.
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diminished because their research interests did not seem aligned with the strategic 
priorities of the proposal identified by the project leader. For example, climate change 
modelling, which was the research domain of one CRES researcher who had been 
closely involved with preparation of the project proposal until this time, was one of the 
research areas eliminated from the project proposal in order to keep within the budget 
limit specified by ACIAR. By this stage, the ACIAR proposal had come to be viewed 
as defining the bounds of the project.
In the Phase 1 proposal, responsibility for selection and customisation of a DSS, and 
integration of information into the DSS, had been left floating ambiguously amongst 
and outside the three project components. During preparation of the Phase 2 proposal, 
the development of the DSS was made an explicit fourth component of the project. 
Figure 6.2, drawn from faxed edits to the draft Phase 2 proposal sent from the 
Australian sociocultural leader to the Australian project leader shortly after the 
delineation of the DSS component, illustrates the sociocultural leader’s suggestion of 
how the new component should link with the existing components. The Thai 
hydrologist suggested submerging database development into the DSS component; a 
suggestion which was roundly supported. No leaders for the DSS component were 
formally identified, but the Thai hydrologist and Australian ecologist each reinforced 
their intentions to continue to direct database development in the Thai and Australian 
teams respectively. The CRES project leader continued to take overall charge of the 
DSS. At this stage, the aims of the DSS component were to: develop spatiotemporal 
databases at macro (basin) and micro (catchment) scales; to customise an existent 
computer-based DSS shell to integrate various environmental modelling tools; and to 
undertake extensive systems modelling for the Ping Basin of alternate management 
options. The favoured shell for the DSS was a Canadian tool called RAISON, in part 
because a recent review of DSS for environmental flows had identified RAISON as one 
of the most suitable for DSS development (Young et al. 1995). In addition, there was a 
burgeoning professional relationship between the Australian project leader and 
RAISON’s developer.
During August, further refinements to the proposal continued to shape the nature of the 
DSS. Firstly, delineating an explicit DSS research component required objectives and 
methodology for that component to be specified, Box 6.2. Secondly, the need to 
delineate the Australian versus Thai responsibilities for the DSS saw the Australians 
proposing to take the lead on building the digital elevation models and developing the 
land use, land cover, hydrologic and socioeconomic databases; the Thais were assigned 
to take charge of customising the DSS. Thirdly, the need to specify a leader for the DSS 
component in the proposal led to the Australian ecologist being installed in this 
capacity.
In September 1996, the Phase 2 project proposal was submitted to ACIAR for 
consideration. Over the following six months, there was continual to and fro between 
ACIAR and the IWRAM team over details of the proposal. During this time, the project 
leader, sociocultural leader and myself visited a contact of the sociocultural leader, who 
had designed a spatial DSS called ‘LUPIS’ to assist land use planning negotiations. 
Following a demonstration of LUPIS, both the project leader and sociocultural leader 
felt that this software could potentially be usefully incorporated within the IWRAM 
DSS to assist stakeholder negotiations and collaborative decision-making.
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Figure 6-2 Distinguishing a DSS research component, August 1996
Box 6-2 Framing the IWRAM DSS: September 1996
The aims of the decision support component are to:
• develop spatio-temporal databases at both meso and micro scales as part of an integrated 
framework to link land use, productivity and other physical, social and resource information for 
the region.
• construct a decision support system to aid research and policy developments for integrated land 
and water resource management by integrating the spatial database, environmental models and 
trade-off and optimisation algorithms.
• undertake extensive systems modelling for two representative catchments in the Ping Basin of 
alternate land and water use and management options in order to assess and visualise their net 
social benefit, including their externality implications and their impacts on social welfare.
• enhance the applicability of the DSS developed for land and water resource management in the 
Ping to other basins in Thailand and the region.
The DSS can be used to visualise spatial and temporal inputs and outputs, as well as perform
scenario studies with hypothesized inputs. The DSS can also be used to map stakeholder visions or
constraints for the different parts of the basin.
(Excerpts from IWRAM 1996c)
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6.3 Testing the analytical framework with the Australian team 
6.3.1 Testing Part A: Situating the analysis
Part A of the framework for anticipating and interrogating bias was tested with the three 
Australian leaders of the biophysical, sociocultural, and DSS components during May 
199728. Note that Part A is intended to situate the analysis within a particular decision­
making environment, see Section 4.7.
Participants’ perspectives as to the purpose of the DSS were closely convergent and 
therefore provide insight into the dominant framing of the DSS held at the time that the 
discursive interrogation of biases commenced. In describing the purpose of the DSS, 
the participants all spoke of: assisting decision-makers to clarify options; what-if 
simulation to allow users to view the impacts of different options; generating better 
understanding of the consequences of different options; and providing trade-off analysis 
between conflicting options. These perspectives closely matched the description within 
the research proposal which framed the DSS as a computer-based tool integrating 
different models with a GIS database to allow systems modelling of different 
management options.
Although originally intended merely to situate subsequent discussions, Part A illustrated 
how consideration of the framework questions may highlight individual or group 
ignorance and thereby facilitate learning. For example, although one participant was 
familiar with the broad policymaking environment (“fragmented decision-making by 
different departments; conflicting, top-down impositions of policy/practices on 
villagers; business... having relative freedom in laissez-faire political context”), the 
participants were generally unsure about the nature of the specific policymaking 
processes that the DSS was intended to support, including whether there were any 
existing processes by which local communities could give input into decisions. As the 
DSS leader remarked:
“This is an important question because we are talking about decision 
support: raises an important gap in our project planning. We want the DSS 
to be more than an end-point. We need to be able to integrate it into the 
decision-making processes... Its important if we want the technology to be 
more than just a computer”.
The topic of potential users of the DSS also revealed uncertainty. In their individual 
questionnaires, the DSS leader and sociocultural leader had each tentatively suggested 
that all stakeholders could be users, while the project leader had nominated technical 
personnel and some policy advisers from government agencies. During the group 
dialogue, the DSS leader, revisiting the earlier debate about policymaking processes, 
argued the need to “look at exactly how the stakeholders are actually going to use it” if 
the DSS was to be incorporated into policymaking processes. Taking up the challenge, 
the project leader proposed that different groups could use different packages in the 
DSS, in which case “any groups, except the local landholders because of their literacy 
level, could use the technology”. The DSS leader countered, “But the output of the 
technology can be presented in other forms like maps for the local people; we are not 
entirely dependent on a software interface - we will need people to be the human
28 Note that funding o f the Australian component of the IWRAM project by ACIAR had not been 
approved yet, but was expected.
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interface too”. Forestalling resolution of this issue, the sociocultural leader closed this 
discussion by suggesting that a decision could be made about this matter at some later 
date.
Group participants were also unsure about how the DSS was supposed to relate to the 
participatory framework, the other principal output of the project. In both their 
individual questionnaires and the group dialogue, neither the project leader or DSS 
leader felt able to comment. In her questionnaire, the sociocultural leader suggested that 
“I’d prefer it to be subsidiary, adjunct to the participatory stakeholder process, not to 
dominate it”. She reinforced this position during the group dialogue, and raised a 
possible tension between the DSS technology and a participatory methodology:
“I would prefer the DSS to be subsidiary to the participatory framework; 
that is one problem with LUPIS where people are brought to participate 
around technology rather than a true participatory approach. At most DSS 
should be a parallel process to the participatory framework - the DSS 
should illuminate but not substitute for these processes”.
When asked what they thought were the major advantages of developing a DSS for this 
application, the participants all focussed on the users. The sociocultural leader 
suggested the DSS would help the stakeholders clarify their options, the DSS leader felt 
that the DSS offered the “ability to present complex science and analysis in a format 
more readily understood in real-world terms”, and the project leader emphasised 
potential efficiency gains for users.
When asked about the major disadvantages, the participants again focussed on the users, 
highlighting issues relating to both biased access and embedded bias. In terms of the 
former, the DSS leader raised the “danger of the system being in the hands of 
technocrats” (political biases), and the project leader suggested that “the technicality 
may prejudice the use of it by certain stakeholders” (literacy biases). Revisiting the 
DSS-versus-participation tension, the sociocultural leader identified the risk that people 
would be “put off the whole participatory process because it’s seen as technocratic”. 
Lighting on a research-versus-use tension, the DSS leader also noted a danger that “we 
develop an academically interesting system but fail to deliver an operational system”.
In terms of embedded bias, the sociocultural leader identified a “risk of inequity in what 
it includes because it is so easy to lean to the measurable” (absences of knowledge), 
while the DSS and project leaders both highlighted the problem of identifying and 
communicating uncertainties (absences/distortions in knowledge). The project leader 
recognised that due to uncertainty, the output of the technology could be misleading, 
and the DSS leader argued that:
“we are talking about coupling together many types of models, data - all 
these errors propagate, when we try and integrate those the challenge is to 
quantify that uncertainty to stakeholders, who already have enough to deal 
with in terms of multiple options. But at least we can quantify the 
confidence of output of the DSS”.
However, the project leader feared that it would not be possible to quantify confidence 
bounds, in which case communication would be important. With the other participants 
agreeing that communication to stakeholders of uncertainties in terms of both 
quantitative and qualitative information would be vital, the group discussion closed.
With the benefit of hindsight, this initial discussion foreshadowed many important 
issues which were to reemerge continually over the course of my research process.
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Indeed, the story o f shifting constructions about the DSS may equally be reframed as a 
story o f conflict and shifting constructions about how the DSS ought to relate to the 
current and future policymaking environment, how the DSS ought to relate to the 
participatory framework, who would be likely or able to use the DSS, and the 
implications o f different users’ identities and characteristics for the form and content of 
the DSS. Intertwined with these issues are the tensions between developing a DSS for 
research and a DSS which will be used in practice, the dilemma of who should be 
responsible for considering communication of the DSS output to whom (and when), and 
the tension between the DSS-as-technology and participatory ethics and methodology.
Shortly after the Australian dialogue based on Part A of the analytical framework had 
taken place, a summary of the Australian responses was sent to the Thai hydrologist 
who had assumed practical responsibility for co-ordinating the Thai team. In an e-mail 
communication to me, he raised several issues regarding the summary, including 
apparent ambiguity about the scope of the project. Highlighting a potential bias o f the 
Australian perspective, he also noted the absence of population pressures from the 
Australian list o f potential changes in the decision problem over time:
“A colleague from RFD29 and I recently discussed this issue. Both of us 
agree that the key to problem changes is the population pressure. With 
limited land and water resource [sic], social and economic structures will 
change over time trying to accommodate more people. In that process 
people will develop different perceptions, values (or whatsoever [sic] 
appropriate terms) for their resources. The good news is that population 
growth is very quantitative and highly predictable. The bad news is that 
how people react to new constraint is unpredictable... Well, I guess that 
[Australian] group members grew up in countries where there are very few 
people and vast unoccupied land”.
6.3.2 Testing Part B: Embedded bias
Part B o f the framework was tested during July 1997. The group discussion (which 
included the participation of the recently appointed project manager) explored how the 
design and development of the DSS might be improved in the light of the collated 
responses. In particular, participants were asked to reflect on whether any of the 
identified problems or biases might put at risk any of the criteria for success or 
advantages o f the DSS, or conversely which might increase the likelihood of any 
potential disadvantages o f the DSS, which had been identified during Part A.
Framing the DSS for newcomers
To open the discussion, I asked the project leader to brief the new project manager about 
the DSS. In his briefing, the project leader concentrated on outlining potential software 
options that could be customised and integrated to form the DSS, therein indicating his 
own technical interest and focus:
“The type of technology we want is not really available - it will need quite 
a bit of customising and enhancing. Several options - WHAT-IF and 
RAISON from Canada - doubts about RAISON because of expense, 
ownership problems. We’ve been looking at LUPIS - all quite keen on 
that - allowing us to get stakeholders to input their preferences with respect
29 Royal Forestry Department
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to spatial land use options... But LUPIS is a bit separate. The main thing 
is what package we can come up with for displaying our spatial data and 
linking it up with the modelling. Nothing does that particularly well... So, 
its looking like we might develop our own system, cobbling together 
various tools”.
Note in the preceding quote how LUPIS, the software to assist conflict management in 
land use planning, is framed as distinct from the core DSS package which is framed as a 
technological system which integrates data and modelling.
Following the briefing, the project manager raised the issue of who would be likely to 
use the DSS. The sociocultural leader responded that she and the project leader 
“probably view it quite differently - the LUPIS type route - which I’m most attracted to 
because it’s more equitable among users - versus the high powered end of things in what 
you can represent in a system and I’d be worried about having two systems - one that’s 
more open to stakeholders and one that’s more high-powered and techy”. Hence, within 
the context of DSS construed as software, divergent framings were identified, 
contrasting an equitable, user-friendly approach with a more closed but, technically, 
more sophisticated system. This suggests recognition that literacy-based biases in 
access could be potentially problematic in the IWRAM project.
Who should be involved in developing ihe DSS?
Shifting to focus debate more explicitly on the framework questions, I asked the group 
to consider the extent and type of involvement of different stakeholders and researchers 
in the development of the DSS. In their questionnaires, the participants had each 
expressed a hope that all project researchers and stakeholders would be involved in 
development from early in the process, however the questions of when and how 
different people would be involved remained fairly open. In the group dialogue, the 
project leader suggested those questions could be answered at an impending project 
workshop. However, the sociocultural and DSS leaders cautioned that questions of 
when and how stakeholders or users should be involved in development required further 
discussion about the purpose and nature of the DSS. The sociocultural leader again 
raised concerns about a conflict between the participatory framework and the DSS, 
fearful that the DSS might discourage participation in and support for the project by not 
only highland villagers but also the Thai social science research team:
“DSS - either people haven’t heard of it at all, or it carries different 
connotations. So on the one hand we’re saying we want to get your 
aspirations, get to know you, help you, and on the other hand we’re trying 
to build this thing that you construe as a very technical, foreign sort of 
thing. So you are potentially engaging and blowing cooperation at the 
same time. I think that’s the same for the village reps - surrogates30 - and 
the research team... Social scientists on the whole don’t know much about 
DSS and are pretty wary of it so those sort o f project team members are 
likely to be wary of the very thing they are being asked to collect data for...
I can’t see any way around that except to break the principle o f consult 
early... and then you’ve got the risk o f a breach of trust at that point”.
30 The term “surrogates” refers to spokespeople for highland villagers, such as an NGO representative who 
has been working closely with a particular village.
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Reinforcing his earlier distinction between LUPIS and the technical modelling 
component o f the DSS, the project leader offered a different way of viewing the DSS as 
a resolution to the apparent conflict:
“I want to separate out the DSS into two components - a technical 
modelling system which is one of the inputs into the decision-making 
process so it’s as objective as scientists and economists can make it and 
includes the options of the social scientists in terms of what we want to 
simulate... I see LUPIS, however it’s managed in a stakeholder setting, as 
taking the outputs of the modelling component along with all the other 
preferences that stakeholders have and weighing them up in some way - 
then I don’t have your problem of a big sophisticated tool. I see this big 
sophisticated tool as something to be seen as very technical and from the 
start pigeonholed as such”.
Note that objectivity is explicitly identified as a goal o f DSS development, and that 
development of the technical modelling system is framed as primarily a task for 
(biophysical) scientists and economists, with the social scientists’ roles limited to 
provision o f information regarding simulation options. In the light of the project 
leader’s earlier description of LUPIS as separate from the main DSS, this quote 
reinforces his earlier framing of the DSS as a sophisticated and technical tool. The 
quote also illustrates how, through dialogue, an individual may confront an alternate 
framing o f decision support (a participatory approach which responds to stakeholders’ 
land use planning needs), and attempt to reconcile it with their own primary framing.
The other participants supported the project leader’s perspective; the sociocultural 
leader remarking that it made her feel much more comfortable about the relationship 
between the DSS and the participatory process. Note that this marks the point where the 
DSS came to be accepted by the group as involving both a technical modelling 
component and a stakeholder process component, and that at this stage the latter was 
technology-driven through its focus on LUPIS31.
Meanwhile, the DSS leader had argued that they still needed to pin down exactly which 
decision-making processes the DSS was supposed to be supporting, in particular, 
whether the Thais intended to put in place an innovative stakeholder based decision­
making process to facilitate the flow and use o f the information stemming from the 
DSS, or whether the DSS was destined to be cornered by the top-down government to 
support the status quo interests. Thus, a distinction was introduced between a DSS to 
support current interests versus one aimed at future innovations. Note also the implicit 
recognition o f the politics surrounding the use o f technology for highland environmental 
decision-making.
Embedded biases
The next topic o f discussion concerned embedded biases. In their questionnaires, the 
participants had identified several potential forms of embedded bias such as 
uncertainties in climate surface inputs, biophysical assumptions about discharge and
31 The sociocultural leader later commented that although at this stage the stakeholder process was 
technology-driven, she did not see it as being the sole locus o f participation. Instead, she hoped 
participation could be around issues, although she was having difficulties in seeing how participation 
could be integrated into the project without being tool-driven.
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water quality concentrations, economic assumptions about the calculation of off-site 
costs, and assumptions about the availability o f data to drive the models. During the 
discussion, a question I posed about how consideration o f what would be left out of the 
DSS might improve the project proved most useful in prompting participants to reflect 
on means o f managing embedded biases. The DSS leader suggested that although 
modellers tended not to document what they were leaving out of a system:
“We’re talking about information leading to decisions affecting people’s 
livelihoods... and especially if we’re using some optimisation procedures, 
you need to explain to people as part of explaining to people what the 
limitations are and the limits which can be put on interpreting the results”.
Note that in the preceding quote, the practical intent of the DSS, and consequent 
potential ramifications on those affected by use o f the DSS, is recognised. Within this 
context, the quote suggests an ethical imperative on the part of the researchers to 
communicate embedded biases.
Both the project manager and sociocultural leader suggested potential embedded biases 
in terms o f absence of knowledge. The project manager noted that the DSS would only 
be robust within the boundaries of the other three project components and therefore it 
would be difficult to capture gross externalities like the recent collapse of the Thai 
baht32. The sociocultural leader noted that the content of the DSS would be shaped not 
only by scoping, or selective inclusion o f those factors deemed by the researchers most 
important and relevant, but also by technical feasibility in that factors not amenable to 
computational treatment would have to be discarded on those grounds. To manage for 
embedded bias, the project leader suggested that a document was needed which outlined 
the limitations o f the DSS and how they might influence the model results.
Flexibility o f the DSS
In terms o f the potential flexibility of the DSS to respond to changes in the decision­
making environment, the project leader argued that there would be no problems in 
upgrading the technical part o f the DSS; that models could be changed or recalibrated as 
new data became available. When asked about the flexibility of the DSS to respond to 
changes in people’s visions and options, he remarked that catchment management 
groups were used for this task in Australia, but queried the practicality of a similar 
process in Thailand. This led the sociocultural leader to recognise a tension between 
developing the DSS for their research purposes and developing a DSS for use:
“...its one thing to look at where we are in three years time at the end of the 
project - everything neat for that point in time. In order to be capable of 
upgrades and to keep the tool relevant, you actually need a monitoring 
process to be able to be collecting the data to feed in. It’s one thing if 
you’ve got time series hydrological data being collected anyway, its quite 
another if you have to fund and organise separate data collection exercises 
if you had to update visions. So the long term future is a real issue we 
didn’t address in our proposal”.
One o f her suggestions to manage for flexibility was to consider carefully at the 
beginning o f the project the types of social science data that should be built into the 
DSS: “I know the temptation will be, having field staff available, to generate a very rich
32 baht = unit o f Thai currency
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database that will be very dependent on more labour to keep updated. The other 
extreme is to be much more targeted and to say that realistically the DSS is going to 
need 8 types of data to continue - they are the ones that need to be collected”. Thus, a 
trade-off between ideal process and practicality was introduced with embedded bias 
implications in terms of absence o f knowledge.
The project manager’s perspective on managing flexibility had been that “People who 
will be interested in upgrading the system will be the people who use it most - comes 
back to the original question of who the core group of stakeholders is who see 
themselves using the technology afterwards”. This prompted the DSS leader to reiterate 
his earlier sentiments that more knowledge was needed o f the decision-making 
environment because “how those stakeholders interact, use information and make 
decisions makes a huge difference to the sort of system we construct such as how the 
system is upgraded and who maintains it and flexibility”. He suggested that a DSS 
advisory group made up of key highland stakeholders, akin to the Australian catchment 
management groups mentioned earlier, needed to be put in place in parallel with the 
conduct o f the research project.
Biased access
The final topic of discussion concerned biased access to the information stemming from 
the DSS. In their questionnaires, each participant had suggested that the output o f the 
DSS could be portrayed in different ways for different users. In the group discussion, I 
asked the sociocultural leader to try to identify some of the characteristics of a particular 
user which might influence the way in which the output would be presented to them.
She raised literacy as one dimension: “there are some cultures who can’t recognise a 
photograph as a 2D representation of a 3D thing. That’s only been researched in Africa, 
but we need to be wary that what we put on the screen is going to be what people see”. 
To manage this potential bias, she suggested trusted surrogates, such as NGOs, 
academics, or educated village youth, may need to be included in the suite of DSS 
communication media.
A second dimension raised by the sociocultural leader related to embedded bias:
“There’s the question of the way they see the world. I’m very interested in 
building that in, so instead of the public servants and ourselves thinking 
there is only one way of viewing the world and going at it in a Western 
way thinking that when you draw the land units onto a GIS there’s only 
one way of seeing them... [One of the Thai social researchers] does lovely 
research on ethnographic land classification - how they classify land into 
different parcels. So steps like that would make it more user-friendly in 
being able to use their language and terminology - approaching their 
mindsets and classifications as we build it up.”
This implies that the sociocultural leader had identified the risk o f the nonreflective 
imposition o f a Western approach to resource management, manifested in the physical 
DSS through the demarcation of particular spatial units, thereby undermining alternate 
constructions. She had also pointed out a potential means o f managing this bias through 
incorporating within the DSS different modes of classification and description more 
consistent with alternate constructions.
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As the discussion turned to communication of assumptions and uncertainties, the DSS 
leader introduced a value judgement confronting the researchers in regards to access:
“Who has to have access to what level? Its the output of the system the 
stakeholders are interested in. I don’t know if we’re giving stakeholders 
access to underneath the surface of the system, where you are turning the 
buttons and pushing the levers. I think that will have to remain the domain 
o f the technocrats.... Its unresolved what extent stakeholders need to or 
want to actually turn levers - or will they be happy having technical 
intermediaries who do that and just dealing with the output which is 
visualised in a way which they can understand?”
In the preceding quote, note how the DSS leader initially responds to his own question 
by asserting that stakeholders (which are framed as distinct from a technical bureaucrat) 
are only interested in “the output”, implying that stakeholders would not be interested in 
the mechanics or reasoning underlying the output. As he continues reflecting on the 
issue, he becomes less sure, and shifts from focussing on the researcher’s judgement (“if 
we ’re giving”) to the stakeholders’ needs and preferences.
Injecting a pragmatic voice, and emphasising a tension between ideal participation and 
project manageability, the project manager suggested that the issue could be displaced 
onto one of the Thai government departments:
“Get the DLD to be the agency to say from the beginning ‘we will take on 
the internal set-up, internal availability and track how its used’. And other 
people can also access it through the DLD. If we start off accepting all 
stakeholders have the same rights of access from the beginning, won’t it go 
on for endless subcycles o f different needs and demands?”
The sociocultural leader suggested that it was a technical inevitability that some 
information would be hidden from certain users, and that the fundamental issue was 
therefore one of trust: “will all the stakeholders trust the guardians and managers of the 
box? If people have confidence in what the managers are doing and what the output is 
saying, that’s fine. If they distrust whoever’s managing it and think its being used to put 
one over them...”. The DSS leader then suggested that biased access could be managed 
through the proposed DSS advisory group:
“Which is why establishing some group - a stakeholder advisory 
committee or steering committee which would have some ongoing 
involvement - that would build trust in the system so that at the end when 
you come to a high level interaction they would have some confidence, 
some understanding, some opportunity to look at what was underneath that 
surface layer.”
Thus, a proposal to create a DSS advisory group initially arose as a possible body to 
take charge of and implement upgrades of the DSS in response to changes in the 
decision-making environment. It was subsequently framed as a means for the project to 
gain insight into the decision-making environment to assist the construction of a useable 
system, and finally, as portrayed above, was presented as a tool to engender trust and 
encourage skill-based learning in potential ‘stakeholder’ (i.e. non-technical) users.
It should be noted that as well as identifying biases in access, the sociocultural and DSS 
leaders both raised the potential for the DSS to improve stakeholders’ access to 
decision-making. For example, the sociocultural leader remarked: “Any mode of 
communicating with stakeholders is woefully inadequate... If GIS can explain to people
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better than verbal presentations or written workshops than anything else does, we can 
turn this into a real advantage”. Thus, although her scepticism towards the DSS 
remains, the sociocultural leader is beginning to frame the DSS as an opportunity.
Managing biases
As protracted debate over access issues had run the discussion over its allotted time, the 
group asked to meet again briefly to summarise the biases that had been identified and 
to discuss actions the group could take towards managing these biases. This second 
group dialogue was held the following week.
In the previous session, the project leader had suggested that the possibility of a 
stakeholder advisory committee be raised at the upcoming joint team workshop. While 
the sociocultural leader agreed that the idea could be floated at the workshop, she 
warned that “it may be premature to be forming groups before we’ve got the other 
stakeholder process underway... It may be that that’s not the best way to go and they 
may go leaping to fill all the positions and put people on a committee that we’re 
nowhere near ready to having to meet (sic)”. She commented that the team would need 
the first six months to design the visions process and that the ideas flowing from that 
exercise should inform the DSS process rather than vice versa. In light of the 
sociocultural leader’s concerns, the group agreed that the most appropriate action would 
be to flag the issue at the workshop, but not initiate any further action, and instead 
debate the issue further as the project evolved.
When the discussion turned to issues of access, and in particular to the necessary trade­
off between ideal participation and manageability, the DSS leader reiterated his support 
for the notion of a stakeholder advisory committee, commenting that he saw it as a 
reasonable compromise in terms of the participatory dilemma. In response, the 
sociocultural leader observed that the stakeholder advisory committee could be 
“stacked” to explicitly include representatives of groups that would normally be 
excluded from the process. Thus, the DSS advisory committee was framed as an 
empowerment opportunity.
The project leader then raised the issue of who ought to take responsibility for the 
stakeholder committee, suggesting that the Thais should take this role “since they’ve got 
to wear it”, supported by the Australian sociocultural and DSS teams. Thus, not only 
project manageability but now also research ethics has been introduced as a reason to 
delegate responsibility for practice issues to the Thais.
In response, the DSS leader cautioned that a stakeholder committee was likely to be a 
new method of working for the Thais. Note that this raises a further ethical issue 
regarding the imposition, not of Australian-derived technology, but of participatory 
principles stemming from Australian conceptions of best management practice.
The group felt preliminary discussion at the joint team workshop would be the most 
appropriate action to take towards gaining a clearer idea of the decision-making 
processes the DSS would support, considering the flexibility of the DSS, prioritising 
information to be incorporated in the DSS, finding out which form of presentation of 
output would suit different user groups, and preparing a document outlining the 
assumptions, limitations and constraints of the DSS.
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The discussion closed with the project leader suggesting that the issues raised through 
the application of my framework could be addressed during a short, dedicated DSS 
workshop in Thailand facilitated by myself, the DSS leader and the sociocultural leader. 
The DSS leader and sociocultural leader agreed, and a tentative date of mid-September 
was set for the workshop.
6.3.3 Postscript to Part B
In August 1997, shortly after the group discussion of Part B, the Australian project 
leader, sociocultural leader and project manager travelled to Chiang Mai for a joint team 
meeting. At this meeting, the Thai hydrologist was formally endorsed as the Thai DSS 
leader. The Australian DSS leader was unable to attend due to other professional 
commitments. In lieu o f his participation, the Australian project leader outlined his own 
thoughts on the state o f the DSS. He suggested that creating a single integrating DSS 
package during the first phase o f the project would be overly ambitious, and that a better 
alternative would be to develop three separate but linked modules: a land use planning 
system such as LUPIS; a ‘w hat-if simulation program such as Extend; and a GIS 
database, Figure 6.3.
Given a tight schedule and an abundance of protocol activities, few of the issues which 
had emerged during the application of the bias framework were raised at the joint 
meeting. However, in lieu of discussion at the meeting, it was agreed that the 
Australian DSS and sociocultural leaders would travel to Chiang Mai in September 
1997 to hold a workshop on the DSS component, focussing on how to integrate 
socioeconomic data into the DSS, how to ensure that stakeholders appreciated the 
capacity o f the DSS, and how to prepare them to access and use the DSS. It was also 
planned that LUPIS and Extend would be demonstrated to the Thais at this time. It was 
intended that one of the outcomes of the workshop would be a conceptual diagram of 
how the three modules o f the DSS would interrelate.
Upon her return from Chiang Mai, the sociocultural leader remarked that the visit had 
taken a load off her mind with regards to her earlier fear that the technicality of the DSS 
would dissuade active participation by the Thai sociocultural researchers and villagers:
“I had had a mental image of the Thai social researchers having difficulties 
with the DSS, but [the Thai anthropologist] is right into ARCINFO and 
mapping from the village point of view. For example, there’s a Karen 
village called Mae Lu which has been contesting land with the Forestry 
Department - some of the customary land boundary has been taken over by 
the Forestry Department for conservation forest. [The villagers] want to 
map their customary land uses in Mapinfo - some are interested in using 
the technology and others in having [the Thai anthropologist] do it and 
represent their interests. Mae Lu has an ethnobotanical centre where 
they’ve been collecting a community seed bank of species... They’re 
interested in mapping this information too to map forest biodiversity... So 
the villagers are not seeing the DSS as a threat but as an opportunity”.
Note that the DSS has been framed here in the context o f spatial mapping technology, 
which represented only one module of the conceptual model of the IWRAM DSS 
presented at the joint team meeting.
129
A Preliminary Structure for the DSS for Mae Chaem/Ping Basin: 3 modules and some of 
their interactions (Note: Upland catchment and instream models in hydrology module also 
link with GlS module for economic “optimization” but nature of link depends on level of 
sophistication of optimization)
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Figure 6-3 Framing the DSS: Australian project leader, August 1997
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Due to conflicting professional commitments on the part of the Australian DSS leader, 
the DSS workshop proposed for September did not take place. However, the 
sociocultural leader did travel to Chiang Mai during that month. On her return, she filed 
a report in which she described further discussions she had initiated with the Thai 
sociocultural team on the DSS. Among the issues discussed was the potential to 
incorporate, within the DSS, villager perspectives on the landscape, such as Karen forest 
classifications and Mae Lu’s records of forest biodiversity. The report also detailed the 
Thai sociocultural team’s suggestions about the DSS. They proposed that the form and 
content of the DSS be considered in relation to three analytical scales: the local 
community or subcatchment; the catchment; and the policy level. They suggested that 
for each of these levels, there would be different needs, different players and different 
requirements for access to the DSS. For example, they suggested that it may be 
appropriate to have a computer based system at policy level, while 3D topographic 
models33 may be a useful off-screen interface at the village level. The Thai sociocultural 
researchers also raised the issue of which Thai institutions would be appropriate to use 
and develop the DSS. They argued that in accordance with the new Thai constitution, 
“Thailand needs to create new resource management mechanisms, and the DSS needs 
this too”. Options suggested were the new Tambon Administrative Organisations, 
watershed committees, or the community forestry network. They stressed that the Thai 
sociocultural leader, a member of the drafting committee for the new constitution, 
“would be very happy if our DSS demonstrated a mechanism for community rights in 
resource management”. The comments of the Thai sociocultural team suggest that they 
had been construing the DSS as: firstly, a multilevel process necessarily engaging a 
complex and evolving political environment; and secondly, as a political opportunity to 
realise aspirations for social change which had thus far only been expressed abstractly 
within the new constitution.
6.3.4 Testing Part C: Biased access
I had intended to test Part C of the framework in early October. However, the 
participants felt it was too early to consider the explicit framework questions dealing 
with access, and that discussion should remain at a more conceptual level. In lieu of the 
trial of Part C, I interviewed the project leader and sociocultural leader about 
dimensions of access. The DSS leader was unavailable because of other professional 
commitments.
The project leader felt that the main problem regarding access was “the impediment the 
computer package itself presents to nontechnical stakeholders. It’s a question of the 
form of info the DSS yields for those less technical users. The form - and also the 
availability, its distribution”. Echoing his earlier sentiments regarding practice issues as 
the domain of the Thais, the project leader suggested that addressing less technical 
stakeholders’ needs was primarily “a task for the Thai group with back-up from our 
side”. None-the-less, the project leader felt that greater participation, equity and 
transparency for non-technical users could be engendered in the project through 
workshops and in the DSS through conflict management software:
33 The reference to ‘3D topographic models’ relates to 3D cardboard models o f the landscape, formed by 
cutting and gluing together contour shapes from 2D geographic maps. As discussed in Chapter 5, 3D 
models have been widely used within recent highland development projects.
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With the Lupis idea, we will be able to present spatial information on 
conflicts and alternatives - that will be suitable for certain non-technical 
users. The question is what do we need to do to address people who need 
something different to that, something more accessible and what it’s going 
to cost to do that - 1 don’t know that.
Note the introduction of a cost versus access tradeoff, suggesting that resource 
constraints may shape research outcomes.
The sociocultural leader proposed a resolution to the dilemma of the accessibility of the 
DSS to non-technical stakeholders by refraining the DSS:
“The way I’m thinking is that we should concentrate on decision-making.
People have always been making decisions. In the old days it was without 
computers - with files, asking other people... - a mixture of human and 
other sources. Its probably helpful if we see computer systems as that too.
So the decisionmakers are more important than the tool, and we still need a 
mixture of human and recorded sources, and we look at the computer 
system as an elaboration of that. So the whole project is about decision­
making, about helping in a process way and in an information way to make 
decisions. Therefore the DSS should be systemic - part of our process of 
providing information to them - part of the interpersonal, intergroup 
process”.
Thus, the DSS, construed as a computer system, is framed as one dimension of a social 
decision-making process. The focus is placed explicitly on the decisionmakers, and in 
particular, on the information and processes they need to make decisions, rather than on 
the technology.
In contrast to the project leader, the sociocultural leader framed the consideration of 
access as a whole team responsibility with an important role for the combined 
sociocultural team as “volunteers and watchdogs to help it happen”. In particular, she 
emphasised that dimensions o f access, such as equity and participation, were a systemic 
component o f the sociocultural research methodology, witnessed by:
“...the extent to which the sociocultural team from the beginning is looking 
at how village perspectives and information can go into the DSS from the 
very beginning. Integrating ‘what do we need to know for decision- 
making’, and ‘how can we collect and render it for the DSS’ and ‘what’s in 
it for villagers to have a DSS’ and ‘what role would DSS play in their 
current conflict’ - for example, having their own authoritative maps versus 
RFD puts them in a stronger position...”.
Thus, strategies are identified which are aimed at realising an explicit political position 
in regard to the conduct of research, namely the empowerment of villagers.
Both the sociocultural and project leader felt that the major impediment to promoting 
access was resources. Noting a threat that the stakeholder workshops intended as part of 
the participatory framework would suffer from resource constraints, the sociocultural 
leader commented that “we’re trying to do so much with so few people. Resources is 
the main threat to doability, not helped by the Thai budgetary crisis34 - they’re not well
34 Thailand began to experience an economic crisis in early 1997 largely as a result o f rampant speculative 
real estate investment and bad lending practices on the part o f Thai banks. By the time of these 
interviews, the gravity of the economic situation in Thailand was becoming apparent, as budgetary 
difficulties increasingly constrained the capacity of Thai collaborators to fund their research within the 
IWRAM project.
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endowed either”. The project leader also raised budget as an issue, together with time 
and stakeholder (in)flexibility:
Constraints - immovable if we have narrow minded stakeholders - the 
constraint is the flexibility of individual stakeholders. Budget and time 
constraints to produce process based models and to do the economic and 
social surveys - we don’t have a project without those. I’m not saying that 
participation, equity and transparency are second order issues - they’ll 
obviously embellish the project considerably and its utility. But if we 
don’t do the core modelling which provides the what-if tool, we’re not 
underpinning things.
Thus, participation, equity and transparency are cast as embellishments, while the 
modelling and scenario components of the DSS are framed as the foundations of the 
project. The quote also implies a focus on the tangible products (models, surveys) that 
are perceived to drive the project, evidencing the evolving contrast with the 
sociocultural leader’s emphasis on decision-making and interpersonal processes.
By the conclusion of the access interviews, two distinct and divergent modes of 
construing DSS had emerged which provided a key tension during this phase of the DSS 
development process. One mode framed the DSS as a sophisticated, transferable, 
software-based product and research tool. This mode tended to regard practice issues as 
largely beyond the domain of the project, and consequently was less interested in 
integrating strategies to minimise potential biases in access into the DSS development 
process. A second perspective construed the IWRAM project as aimed at supporting the 
process o f highland environmental decision-making. Within this mode, the DSS was 
framed as one element out of a suite of supporting processes and information. Due to its 
practice focus, this mode paid greater attention to identifying means of managing both 
embedded bias and potential biases in access.
6.4 The analytical framework and the Thai team
Given that the proposed DSS workshop had not eventuated in September as planned, 
and my efforts to test the framework with the Thais via email had been unsuccessful35, 
the Australian team suggested that I travel to Thailand and test the framework in person, 
and subsequently convene a DSS workshop. I tested the whole framework with eight of 
the Thai IWRAM researchers during October and November 199736. Other researchers 
deferred to the opinions of component or project leaders, and the Thai sociocultural 
leader seconded his junior associate to participate in his place.
6.4.1 How will the DSS be used by whom?
Most participants identified government policymakers and technical staff as the most 
likely direct37 users o f the DSS, but also felt that all stakeholders (where ‘stakeholders’
35 Reasons for the lack o f success in using email as the medium with which to communicate with the Thai 
researchers are detailed in my methodology, Chapter 2: Section 2.4.3.
36 Note that some o f the labels used to identify the different Thai participants (such as ‘project manager’ 
or ‘project leader’) are identical to the Australian participants’ labels. Within this section, all such labels 
refer to the Thai researchers. In the following section, where the Australian and Thai teams interact, the 
labels are prefaced by ‘Thai’ or ‘Australian’ to avoid ambiguity.
37 Note that the terminology ‘direct users’ referred to people who would interact (query, validate, 
feedback) directly with the DSS, in contrast to ‘indirect users’ who would interact with the information 
output o f the DSS via a mediating interface. This terminology was negotiated with the Thai researchers.
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usually referred to different government departments, villagers, NGOs and academics) 
should be users of the DSS, at least indirectly. Only one participant, the biophysical 
leader, did not identify villagers as a potential user group. He felt that the primary aim 
o f the DSS was to show government staff, researchers and some NGOs what was the 
best solution for the basin. This researcher also felt that the key advantage in having a 
DSS was to provide researchers and government staff with greater authority and 
credibility to tell the villagers to change their land use practices:
“Sometimes we want the villagers to change from their old cultivation to a 
new system but it’s hard to tell them. I think that if we have the DSS we 
can show them what will improve their standard of living. If it is easy 
enough for villagers to see, it will help us to have them believe us. If we 
can have a nice colour monitor and they can see a nice 3D model on the 
computer screen, it can help them to trust us, to believe what we will say”.
This statement may be interpreted in two alternate ways. On the one hand, a 
communicative motive may be the central issue, with the researcher concerned about 
enhancing trust and transparency in communicative interaction. On the other hand, it 
may be inferred that this researcher perceives villagers to be ignorant about what is best 
for them, and also that he is more concerned that expert suggestions are implemented 
than he is in promoting greater understanding by villagers. Also note that while this 
researcher envisages the villagers seeing the computer screen, he does not frame them as 
active users, implying that he construes them as passive recipients of the information.
O f the rest who had identified villagers as potential users, many felt that the DSS would 
allow the villagers to understand better both the state of the environment and the impact 
of their current practices. Others suggested that the DSS would allow villagers to 
evaluate biophysical processes, undertake sustainable development or better protect the 
environment. The project manager suggested that if the villagers were able use the DSS 
to explore the best development options, they could assume responsibility for this task 
in place o f government officials: “If they understand what they should do, no need for 
government officials to help them”. Thus, the DSS is cast as a means of decentralising 
decision-making.
The GIS researcher noted the potential for villagers’ use o f the DSS to assist conflict 
resolution:
Maybe we can use the DSS to reduce conflicts between highlands and 
lowlands. Because normally people on the highlands use a lot of fertilisers 
and pesticides and it affects people in the lowlands - the residues flow to 
the downstream. If the people in the highlands know this and reduce, it 
will resolve problems.
Thus, conflict resolution is cast not as an interpersonal negotiation, but in terms of 
overcoming the ignorance of one of the parties. The quote also implies that if 
highlanders became aware that their actions were causing harm downstream, they would 
change their behaviour; an analysis which seems to neglect the complex network of 
psycho-sociocultural pressures confronting villagers and shaping their decision-making.
The anthropologist also highlighted conflict resolution, emphasising the potential for the 
villagers to use the DSS to level the negotiation playing field:
The power to bargain now is not equal, because villagers can’t access the 
scientific information... Some of the villagers want to leam about GIS - if 
we can transfer the technology to the village to understand it that will be
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good. One time, the R FD 38 wants to calculate the land for cultivation for 
the villages. The village bargains with RFD that when they evaluate, they 
walk around and evaluate. But RFD wants to use the new technology.
The RFD official goes to the land cultivation o f  the Karen ethnic and reads 
the satellite from one point and calculates everything. After that, the 
villagers wanted RICOP - a NGO- to teach them the method o f  how to read 
GPS39. RICOP teaches them that they need 5 points to evaluate - but the 
RFD only uses one point. So, maybe the RFD were wrong. This gives the 
villagers bargaining power. If the villagers have the same technology as 
the government, they can argue - because the RFD w on ’t “walk around” 
which is what the villagers usually do.
This suggests that some villagers may feel that they have been duped in the past by the 
imposition of a technological approach unfamilar to them. It also suggests that villagers 
have recognised that if a more powerful stakeholder will not adopt village practices, 
such as walking around an area to demarcate land, then they must empower themselves 
by learning the other stakeholder’s practices.
All but two of the other participants also raised the potential for the DSS to assist 
negotiation or conflict resolution, but in more generic terms. For example, in a similar 
vein to the anthropologist’s sentiments, the economist thought that the main benefits to 
different users would be conflict resolution through standardising information access:
“People w ill get better agreement - it w ill reconcile the conflicts because 
people w ill get the same information. Otherwise the people think the 
decisionmakers just make the decisions for them. At least the village  
leaders can - they can persuade the rest”.
Note the inference that people will feel more involved in decision-making if they are 
receiving the same information as decisionmakers. Also note the distinction drawn 
between ‘the people’ and ‘the decisionmakers’, suggesting that presently, the general 
populace do not play an active part in decision-making.
The DSS leader suggested that the key benefit that users of the DSS would acquire 
would be scientific credibility for their position:
“They w ill have scientific proof o f  their preference for resource 
management. I f  its negative - no proof - 1 think they w ill lose their ground 
in the hearing - but they w ill know w hy they have to step back. I f  the 
system  works, then the authorities w ill be able to deal with the people on  
the basis o f  scientific proof, not because they have the power o f  law.
Scientific proof is not a solution - 1 see it as a thing that makes equity...
In the preceding quote, the DSS leader proposes that scientific proof should provide the 
basis for resource management decisions, and assumes that the DSS will be capable of 
providing definitive scientific proof of the benefits and costs of one preference over 
another. Thus, the DSS is framed as an expert arbiter. It is implied that the DSS leader 
believes that resource users whose practices are unsustainable will be more inclined to 
alter their behaviour if scientific proof of unsustainability is given than if the law is 
relied upon. However, an alternate interpretation could be that the DSS leader believes
38 RFD refers to the Royal Forest Department.
39 GPS refers to Global Positioning System, a hand-held device which relates the position of the device 
through reference to satellites.
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that authorities sometimes impose decisions which are grounded in law but which may 
be scientifically suspect.
The OHD director saw the potential for the DSS to promote political harmony by 
helping to identify an ecologically sustainable land use pattern that would allow the 
highland people to remain in the highlands rather than be forced to relocate in the 
lowlands: “We have to live together. We can’t bring the highland to the lowland. We 
have to be happy”. In this context, he emphasised the role for DSS in assisting 
government staff in land classification and zoning through identifying development 
options.
Two other participants, the project manager and the project leader, also felt that the DSS 
should propose development options for the highlands. The project manager suggested 
the DSS should provide an integrated evaluation of different development options:
“In Wat Jan in Mae Chaem, it is mountainous with pine trees, villagers is 
Karen. In the Philippines, I see a place like this which they develop as a 
recreation area. Maybe you can do this in Wat Jan - ecotourism say, 
because the weather is good and pine smells good. But the FIO40 wants to 
cut down the trees. Once we study the biophysical, economic and social, 
we will find out the best result. Cutting trees may be best economically, 
but not the best result. DSS should give the decision what we should do 
on Wat Jan. So DSS should come up with options and leave it to the ones 
who is going to manage the area to decide... The FIO think you should cut 
down trees according to sustainable yields. But the conservationist people 
will always say no. And the Karen don’t want to cut trees... I agree with 
Karen and conservationists. We can make profit from land, soil and tree 
by not cutting trees - by having resort we will not have to lose scenery”.
According to this approach, options would be proposed by different stakeholders, the 
DSS would provide a biophysical, economic and social evaluation of different options, 
and then the decisionmakers would make a decision informed, but not dictated, by this 
assessment.
The project leader favoured an alternate, formulaic approach, whereby the DSS would 
propose suitable development options for a particular parcel of land depending on how 
it fared in terms o f different biophysical and social criteria:
“Decision support - they could draw factors towards development - could 
give an idea to the decisionmakers or practitioners of development to use 
the data wisely in proportion. For example, if the biophysical come up 
with for a particular village, the soil is medium, they have ample water for 
upland crops only, and say what could be the field crop, and with that land 
and available water, which family could live there. That could be a basic 
to scale up. They should give some indication why this land is good for 
this etc., and when they come to people, the social team will come up with 
beliefs, way of living, how people work”.
All participants mentioned that development of the DSS would be useful in acquiring, 
organising and coordinating data into a central information or data system. Focussing 
on the potential utility of the DSS for his staff, the OHD Director recalled that one of 
their original motivations for initiating the project had been to better coordinate the
40 FIO refers to the Forestry Industry Organisation, a state enterprise within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Co-operatives.
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mass o f data relevant to highland zoning but scattered within a variety of different 
government departments: “We have a lot of data - DLD, RID, EGAT41 - so [the OHD 
hydrologist] thinking how to put this together”. Similarly, but in reference to a wider 
group of users, the project manager commented: “We work on the highlands for 15-20 
years, but data is scattered all around. If it is all in one system, it will help”. The 
economist and the biophysical leader both felt that a main purpose of the DSS should be 
to provide a quality database. However, it should be noted that they were the only 
participants who described the acquisition of information as a key purpose of the DSS; 
generally, it was cast as a welcome but incidental function.
Recognising the limitations of fragmented approaches, the project leader felt a key 
advantage o f the DSS would be its capacity to integrate data and analyses:
“If I was a planner, and took only the biophysical data, I would be lost - 1 
would have forgotten the people. The biophysical don’t have a full idea 
about investment - don’t know how much it will cost you to grow crops.
The economic needs to look at alternatives of crops - whether you should 
start with rice or com or vegetable. At the moment there are many papers 
on rural development, how to invest. But they try one by one. It has not 
been co-ordinated. If I was a plant science (sic), I only think of plant - 
forget about animals - don't have the total picture of development. That’s 
where the DSS will be helpful”.
Due to the information processing and integrative capabilities of the DSS, both the 
OHD director and the DSS leader (also from the OHD) felt that the DSS would be 
directly useful to OHD staff both to improve efficiency and to allow a greater range of 
factors to be considered. In terms of efficiency, the OHD director remarked that 
“computer technology will mean that we can do a better job and will save our time, than 
doing by hand... no need to do things that other people do already”. This quote seems to 
refer to two characteristics of contemporary Thai bureaucracy : firstly, the lower 
computerisation levels, and thus increased reliance on manual techniques, compared 
with Western bureaucracy; and secondly, the tendency for duplication within and across 
different Thai government agencies.
In reference to the perceived advantage of the DSS in allowing consideration of more 
factors, the DSS leader explained that:
“The major advantage is that if things go as I plan, we can have a complex 
computer system that will help the resource planner to analyse the 
scenarios without the resource planner needing to become a [computer] 
expert. In past every planner knows there are many factors they have to 
skip because of resource constraints. Also, they needed to be a computer 
expert. So if we develop a system which is simple enough for those people 
to use without computer expertise, that is a big advantage”.
Thus, the DSS leader had framed the DSS as potentially fulfilling an expertise function, 
and had articulated a hope that the DSS would be sufficiently user-friendly for people 
with low to moderate computer literacy to use the system, thereby signalling a desired 
characteristic of the form.
41 Department of Land Development, Royal Irrigation Department, Electricity Generation Authority of 
Thailand
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6.4.2 Who should develop the DSS?
In response to a question about who should be involved in development of the DSS, two 
different perspectives emerged. One group of participants suggested that the project 
researchers should provide relevant data and analyses, guided by the priorities and 
demands of the government users. Exemplifying the sentiments of this group, the 
biophysical leader explained:
“The biophysical have to contribute information about pattem of land use, 
available water etc. For social - they should contribute data about what is 
the main activity/cultivation pattem for each specific tribe - where their 
income generation come from and their willingness to change to new ideas 
- what would be a good approach to go talk to them... The economists 
should find out when we have a crop pattern, what is the income they will 
earn for each crop pattern. - their net income... I feel that the project has to 
ask the users - the RPF, DLD - what they want for the DSS, what the goal 
is - after that we can decide the data gathering system”.
Within this perspective, stakeholder involvement in DSS development was limited to 
(one-way) provision of information, as opposed to active, reflexive engagement. For 
example, the economist argued that the mechanism to involve stakeholders in 
development of the DSS was already being implemented in the project through the 
collection of different stakeholders’ visions and options:
“I think they are already incorporated in each component - through their 
visions, their options. In the economics component, we plan to build the 
existing pattem and then ask what pattem they would hope for, and the 
customs and traditions we already put them in the model. If you use input 
from these components, it is already incorporated. So, we ask them about 
traditional agriculture, if they have to raise some animal for their religious 
traditions, if they need rice for consumption, we’ll have them as 
constraints in the model. Even if another crop is more profitable, we’ll 
still put the rice as a constraint in the model”.
It is worthwhile noting that this mode of stakeholder involvement was seen by 
proponents of this perspective to promote increased stakeholder participation in 
decision-making. For instance, the biophysical leader argued that the DSS would 
increase participation because “when you design the DSS, you have to collect data from 
the stakeholders and it makes them aware of what you are doing”. Meanwhile, the 
economist felt that the DSS would increase the participation of stakeholders “because if 
we have the stakeholders views taken into account in the model, then when the 
decisionmakers use the model as inputs to make decisions, it is already there”. So long 
as their views were built into the model, and were updated from time to time, she 
thought it was unlikely that the DSS would decrease the participation of any 
stakeholders in environmental decision-making.
The second group felt that a range of stakeholder representatives, not just government 
officials, should be more actively involved in DSS development, although perhaps 
indirectly. For example, the DSS leader suggested that NGOs, officials, business 
representatives and villagers should all be consulted from the beginning of development 
about what they would want from the DSS, probably through an intermediary from the 
social team. Perceiving the social team to have better communication skills, he 
explained that “I will not deal with stakeholders directly, but through [the Thai 
anthropologist] - it will be up to him to reflect and express villagers’ attitudes”.
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Introducing the notion o f socially embedded bias, the project manager suggested a more 
direct mode o f stakeholder involvement in DSS development:
“We should have a meeting and share opinions once we have the data - the 
RFD may see data from one point of view, the DLD from another point of 
view. For example, my background is forestry - I may think a particular 
area is suitable forestry, others may want vegetables. Or RID who are 
used to big projects may not see a particular area as suitable for irrigation, 
but [the OHD] office are used to small-scale irrigation, so may think its 
OK. They all have different backgrounds so that’s why they have different 
points of view. And tribes too. We should have a meeting with the 
villagers there especially - they need to be involved from the beginning.
So we know from the beginning why they not accept some things”.
When discussing the topic of who should be involved in DSS development, the 
anthropologist raised two tensions in the way that the project was presently undertaking 
development of the DSS. Firstly, he recognised that stakeholders had not yet played a 
role in the development process: “Stakeholders should be part of the DSS development, 
but at the moment in this project, its only the researchers. The characteristics of the 
DSS should be suitable for the highland environment and its people”. Secondly, the 
anthropologist queried the identity of the researchers who had been involved in the 
development process thus far: “I think the DSS team have to have all components 
included - biophysical, social DSS. At the moment, the problem is that the team is only 
biophysical”. Implicit in the anthropologist’s perspective was a distinction between the 
provision o f data and analyses to be incorporated in the DSS, and direct participation in 
the conceptual development of the DSS. The anthropologist had observed that within 
the current mode of DSS development, stakeholders were involved through providing 
data on themselves and their land to the social team, and the social team was involved 
through providing this data and analyses to the DSS team, but neither group were 
actively contributing to framing the content or form of the DSS. Note also that the 
earlier quote suggests a link has been drawn between active participation of highland 
people in DSS development and the likely relevance o f the DSS to the highland 
decision-making environment.
The only other participant to draw a similar distinction was the DSS leader, who 
differentiated between researchers who would “contribute their work to the DSS and 
will help to set up the database” and researchers who would be “directly involved in 
developing the DSS - computer experts”.
6.4.3 Anticipating embedded biases
The project leader, project manager and economist each raised the difficulties in 
acquiring accurate interview data as a potential source o f uncertainty with bias 
implications for the DSS content. The economist remarked that “when we do surveys - 
the data we get we can’t rely on for sure... even when we speak the same language, 
when we double check the data, it doesn’t add up”. These sentiments were echoed by 
the project manager who implied that some villagers deliberately distorted their 
economic worth when interviewed: “Its not easy to get true income figures. For 
example, when you see the Hmong - they have 4WD, quite rich - but they don’t give 
you the real figure. For production data, you need to systematically monitor to get true 
figures - interviewing may not give true figures”. Meanwhile, the project leader
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suggested that data disparities were due to the ignorance of villagers as to scientific 
measures:
“Instead of just asking farmers how much yield he gets, you should do a 
real trial so you get the data with your own eye. With research before, we 
have proved that just asking farmers for the data is useless - they do not 
understand the units we use. For example, they do not understand 1 kg - 
they understand 1 bundle instead. So you shouldn’t just interview, you 
should stay there for a season and observe to see with your own eye”.
Two alternate communicative interpretations emerge. One possible inference is that 
farmers are unreliable research informants, and that to manage distortions, researchers 
should conduct their own experiments and observations as triangulation for interviews. 
Alternately, the inference may be that survey instruments are unreliable because of 
difficulties in asking yield questions in terms the farmers are familiar with.
The biophysical leader suggested that uncertainties would mainly derive from the 
economic component, both because the economics model would not incorporate all 
significant factors and because of the dynamic nature o f the decision-making 
environment:
“I think problems for uncertainties come from the economics model - when 
we think about the price, we haven’t thought about the transportation cost.
There are many middlemen who get highland products and they put the 
price lower than the standard. And they have a trend that if a particular 
product is successful one year, every farmer will change to that crop the 
next year. So it will fluctuate much more then biophysical data... You 
need to make corrections about the economic model - more crop varieties, 
changes in labour... From the beginning, you need to have in mind how to 
update the decision methodology”.
He also worried that the sociocultural component would introduce bias because their 
research would not capture enough different hill tribes to be representative: “They 
should do at least five tribes, maybe”42. Finally, he raised the choice of biophysical 
models as a possible source of bias, although he was confident that this bias would 
improve over time:
“Uncertainties will be about the decision - which model to use. When you 
do, for example, rainfall-runoff modeling you will provide different results 
when you calibrate the model. And in the future, when you have more 
data, the model will improve in the long-term. Assumptions are about 
rainfall patterns, effects of terrain on water availability”.
The biophysical leader’s concerns about inadequate representativeness and the 
capability of the models in the DSS to cope with a changing decision-making 
environment were echoed by the economist:
“I don’t know for the modelling, if we do optimisation, I don’t know if that 
optimisation is real because we can’t incorporate everything in the model...
If we try to use optimisation and we try to incorporate constraints, we may 
not be able to find those figures or even find the relationships. For 
example, if we want sedimentation constraint, we may not have that 
figure... [And] we have to assume homogeneous, but on highlands, we 
have many types of farmers and I don’t think the model represents that...
42 The subcatchments chosen had only two tribes strongly represented, and a small population of a third 
tribe.
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And from the model we plan to use, we will rely on just one year’s data, 
from the interviews. At the moment, we don’t consider the time trend.
And the situation may change for example if they do mining in the 
highlands, they may run out of minerals and stop - or if some tourism 
starts, or if there are crops in the future that are more profitable that we 
didn’t consider when we built the model, and population, migration, 
climatic things may change.”
To manage these potential biases, she suggested comparing a range o f models and 
undertaking sensitivity analysis.
The anthropologist raised a potential bias in terms o f absence o f knowledge if  only 
information from a single discipline was incorporated in the DSS, or if  only information 
derived from scientists was incorporated in the DSS, excluding pertinent local 
knowledge:
“If policymakers have one way or idea, if they get information only 
biophysical or only social, this leads to misunderstandings in constructing 
policy for highlands. I’m interested in the DSS if the DSS should have 
many, many information including social, biophysical and economic and 
opinions of the villagers, of the stakeholders”.
To illustrate how a villager’s perspective may diverge from a scientist’s, the 
anthropologist described how villagers had explained to him why they disagreed with 
scientific advice about pest control:
“I believe in both science and the position of the people to construct 
information... The science cannot know everything about the environment, 
the villagers have knowledge about dealing with the environment in forest 
and land and water - their environment is part of their culture. In the past 
two or three days, I went to Mae Chaem. I interview the villagers who are 
growing rice with shifting cultivation and animals - ask them about 
different methods they use. They use the method to share the benefit 
between humans and animals to protect rice - in the ricefield, they have 
many bird to eat their rice. He argued with new green revolution method 
proposed by the government to use gun or net to kill birds to increase 
economic profit. He thought it was wrong. The birds just eat some rice - 
man and birds can live together”.
Thus, the assumption by government scientists o f the mutual exclusivity o f  birds and 
maximum economic profit is contrasted with a symbiotic construing o f man and nature. 
Note that this particular government strategy shares similarities with the broader 
government contention that Thailand’s ecological and economic security would be 
enhanced if  villagers were removed from the highlands.
The project manager emphasised the potential for socially embedded bias in terms o f  
variables considered in option analysis:
“If I am a forester - the forest is mine - 1 should do whatever I want to do to 
develop forestry fully - 1 should use all factors I can to develop forests - 
but not think of others. This used to be the story of past development - the 
intermix between factors has not been there - they only think of forests. I 
think of myself - not of you - this is the bias. For successful development, 
you need full knowledge of factors”.
The preceding quote alludes to the history o f contentious and fragmented decision­
making in the highlands, and implies an embracing o f an integrated approach in terms o f  
both holistic analysis and equitable decision-making.
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Also highlighting the potential for socially embedded bias, the DSS leader cautioned 
that the people directly involved in development o f the DSS “are technocrat people so 
their ideas and perceptions will affect the output heavily. Because the people in the 
social group will have less participation in the system, I think their preferences will be 
less expressed in the system”. When asked to elaborate as to how technocrat ideas 
would influence the DSS, he responded that the DSS would most likely end up as 
“something very rigid according to the theory or the quantitative modelling; input to 
output”.
6.4.4 Anticipating biases in access
Literacy and other communication biases
The topic o f potential biases in access was dominated by discussion about literacy and 
communication constraints, which in turn was dominated by the issue of how to present 
the DSS output to villagers with limited traditional, computer or scientific literacy. For 
example, the DSS leader commented that:
“We are going to use [the DSS] in a forum for debating, so it should be a 
map and some sort of presentation so that everybody can understand the 
result without being literate. And we need some sort of academic report 
for officials as well, but I don’t think that will be a major concern. But the 
way the resuit will be presented to uneducated villagers is the major 
thing... Earlier, I thought we would try to have as many people as possible 
access the [computer] system - but then I decided it wouldn’t work - the 
information is too complicated. So, instead, we should have a trustworthy 
organisation that would provide the information to the forum.”
Thus, the DSS leader had identified (il)literacy as a key factor constraining access to the 
information output of the DSS. It may be inferred that the DSS leader has distinguished 
equal access, whereby everyone would be provided access to the computer system, from 
equitable access, whereby everyone would be entitled to receive and understand the 
information output of the DSS. To manage literacy constraints, he proposes that the 
information output of the DSS be communicated to the stakeholder debating forum via 
an unspecified trustworthy organisation. Thus, limits to transparency (because the 
information is perceived as too complicated for villagers to understand) are dealt with 
through enhancing trust.
The DSS leader went on to explain that concerns about this issue had prompted him to 
ask a building and design architect friend for advice on how the DSS output could be 
presented in different ways:
“That is the main reason that I try to employ my architect friend - he says 
that there are many ways you can present information to different levels of 
people - executives, politicians, scientists, villagers. Everyone will need 
different levels of presentation. Firstly, if the target is illiterate, how do 
we present the information. Secondly, if the target is very educated but 
from different fields, for example, businessman, scientist - how do we 
present output?”
This implies that the DSS leader construed that different policy communities would be 
familiar with different modes of presentation o f information. Thus, biases in access 
would not be limited to the illiteracy of villagers, and a communication strategy would
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be required to enable the project to provide each policy community with information in 
an appropriate form.
The anthropologist also highlighted the need for different communication media to suit 
different stakeholders:
“The main objective is to communicate - need to have many ways to 
communicate. For villagers who don’t use computers and fmd it hard to 
read, topographic models are useful to explain things - better than 
computers. For the academic, computers are OK. Posters to explain the 
way for land use or models to explain the way to control land use is OK 
for some villages... The information from the village level needs to be the 
same as the information that the academics have so they talk the same 
language - but the instruments of communication should be different... We 
have to accept that many stakeholders have different education and need 
different ways to communicate. In my office, we have the same problem - 
I can use MAPINFO, another person cannot use it and it is difficult to 
communicate”.
In addition to conventional literacy constraints, the anthropologist raised the issue of 
how science could be communicated to villagers with limited scientific literacy:
“Indirect users have difficulty with computer, scientific literacy. When 
they construct policy, the policymakers refer to scientific information - the 
biophysical data on the water - the villagers don’t understand how it 
changes, why it happened. For example, the policymakers blame the 
villagers slash and bum for sending carbon dioxide into the air for 
greenhouse. The villagers don’t understand how this happens. So, I think 
it may be difficult to communicate science to the villagers. I have a 
question - can we construct science that is easy to understand - possible or 
impossible?”
Like the anthropologist, the GIS researcher supported the use of topographic models and 
posters to communicate with villagers, as well as digital and analog products from the 
DSS for the other users. Similarly, the biophysical leader commented that “I think it 
should be presented graphically because for the stakeholders, people who can’t read or 
write very well, the graphic view will be easier to understand. And it should be in table 
form for researchers”.
In relation to the need to communicate assumptions and uncertainties, the biophysical 
leader recognised the limitations of the DSS in terms of accuracy of both analyses and 
predictions of impacts, and suggested that this needed to be communicated to users 
(who he had framed as government officers and researchers). However, he felt that 
communicating assumptions and uncertainties to stakeholders (who he construed as 
villagers) would be difficult:
“We have to tell them that this is a mathematical model - it can’t give you 
100% success. The users can understand but for the stakeholders it is 
more difficult. But I think if you show the stakeholders fancy graphic 
output, they won’t question it. I think the farmers in Thailand are trained 
to believe that if you do a lot of study and if you have good communication 
with them, they tend to believe more what the government tells them and 
what the academic tells them than do more educated people”.
Note that this researcher does not consider the possibility of alternate modes of 
communication o f the DSS output which might lead to deeper understanding by the 
stakeholders. Instead, he presupposes the imposition of a system suited to the educated
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users onto the uneducated stakeholders. This quote suggests that it is preferable if 
villagers do not question the output of the system, and that ‘fancy graphic output’ will 
ensure compliance. Indeed, the perceived ignorance and naivety of villagers are viewed 
as means to overcome embedded bias.
In contrast, the economist suggested that a human intermediary may be useful to 
communicate uncertainties and assumptions associated with the DSS to villagers:
“We might need say extension workers to advise them. And if they change 
the policy, we need some extension worker to educate them - or even 
better, maybe some educated village leader or someone else in the village - 
that would be better than the external person. I really want them to be 
educated somehow - that would be good for the village.”
Note that a hope has been articulated for future empowerment of villagers, and that 
empowerment has been linked to the villagers receiving education about the DSS 
output.
With regard to the literacy constraints of other users, such as policymakers, the 
biophysical leader, the GIS researcher and the economist all emphasised that the DSS 
should be in Thai. As the biophysical leader explained:
“I think in the beginning the system can be in English, but in the long run, 
you have to have the Thai version because people are getting used to, for 
example, the Microsoft Thai version - they get used to that. And its good 
for reports - they have to submit reports in Thai.”
The anthropologist suggested that to assist policymakers to comprehend the information 
output of the DSS, the output should have both tabulated, quantitative and descriptive, 
qualitative components:
“The information - in the past, the policymakers usually use database - 
many, many tables; many, many numbered records. The table records are 
sometimes misinterpreted if they don’t have a description under the table.
So should have both data and description. For example, soil erosion - if  
we read information from the table, we have the number of soil loss, 
sedimentation and know the cost of soil loss and sedimentation. We 
usually assume soil loss come from shifting cultivation, agriculture. If we 
explain as description, the activities of the stakeholders who do soil loss on 
some catchment and the historical record of soil loss and their activities - 
this description is useful for decisions.”
This implies that the anthropologist has observed or experienced problems when 
policymakers rely solely on tabulated, quantitative information. It may be inferred that 
incorrect assumptions are made about the quantitative information, and that the 
inclusion of qualitative descriptions is seen as a means of managing this absence or 
distortion in knowledge.
Biases in geographical access
The biophysical leader felt that geographic access was unlikely to present a problem to 
potential users since “if the user knows we have it they will come and find it”. In 
contrast, the anthropologist suggested that geographical access may prove a significant 
constraint and thus the geographic location of the system should be flexible. Reasoning 
that geographical access may pose difficulties for remote users, the GIS researcher 
suggested that the DSS package should be accessible at a range of locations,:
144
“If you want the villagers to use the DSS - they don’t want to travel a long 
w ay to use the DSS. Even if  the system  is in one place in Chiang Mai - 
other people in Chiang Mai may have problem - w e have to think about 
time dim ension too - they may be too busy to go to another office”.
The DSS leader also felt that highland villagers may have difficulty accessing the 
information output of the DSS because of the geographical location of the DSS. 
However, he felt that:
“V illager accessibility to DSS information is not crucial. For example, 
soil map, geologic map they w on ’t mind or even be interested in. What 
they are interested in is government policy im posed on their resource and 
the developm ent scheme. And I think that information can be distributed 
in many ways... W e are dealing with people in remote areas. It w ill be the 
job o f  the people who organise the forum to take out the information to 
those people and bring back their preferences to the direct user”.
Note the initial assumption that villagers would not be interested in the information 
output of the DSS, only the (second-hand) implications of the analyses for their resource 
use and development. None-the-less, he views geographical access as a problem that 
may be surmounted via human intermediaries.
Biases in financial access
The anthropologist felt that both government and other stakeholders should bear the 
costs of establishing and maintaining the DSS. However, the biophysical leader and 
GIS researcher both felt that requiring users to contribute to the financial cost of the 
system would be prohibitive43. As the biophysical leader commented, “ I don’t think 
they would pay to use it - it would have to be free”. The GIS researcher suggested that 
to minimise costs it would be necessary for the DSS to be PC-based rather than UNIX- 
based.
To overcome financial access constraints, the project manager suggested that use of the 
DSS should be free to all stakeholders except business:
“I think w e should give it free o f  charge so everyone can use. But i f  a 
com pany com es, maybe they should be charged. The owners should be the 
Royal Project and the A .N .U . In the North-East part, there is som e area in 
the highlands which is a plateau. Som e places is not reserve because its 
not hilly  and mountainous, but is flat land. But same conditions as 
Northern highlands. So maybe the com panies w ould want to have this 
know ledge o f  the D SS. If so, they should pay because they make profit”.
Note that the DSS has been framed as a transferable tool, a function often emphasised 
during the Australian application but only mentioned in this instance during the Thai 
application.
The DSS leader stated that he was certain that indirect users, such as villagers, would 
not have to pay, thus financial access would not pose difficulties to them accessing the 
information output of the DSS. However, he also felt that potential direct users may
43 When reviewing this narrative, six months after the interviews had taken place, and with the Thai 
economic crisis deepening, the GIS researcher commented that she now advocated requesting a service 
charge from rich users such as private companies and foreign research organisations, rather than providing 
free access for all.
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face difficulties because of the financial cost of the system, particularly given 
Thailand’s economic crisis:
“Probably, the financial cost because we had an economic drawback now - 
last year I would have said ‘no’. Right now, every agency in Thailand has 
financial difficulty, so whoever will be the user will face some difficulty 
[maintaining the system]...”.
Biases and political participation
Within a framing of the DSS as an expert arbiter, the DSS leader suggested that 
stakeholders’ participation would be enhanced because they would be more informed:
“Their participation should be greater than now because, right now, they 
debate on something that they don’t know for sure if it is right or wrong - 
they just imagine. If they have a scientific case, they will have something 
that will back them up in the negotiation process. [Now] everyone can 
contradict everyone else because there is no scientific information that will 
back anyone up”.
The inference is that conflicts are currently difficult to resolve equitably because of a 
lack of clarity regarding the validity of the different arguments. Equity is thus linked to 
authority and credibility in negotiation.
The DSS leader also foresaw the potential for the introduction of the DSS to decrease 
the participation of stakeholders whose preferences were not supported by the DSS:
In the past, there are a few groups who focus on short term benefits from 
exploitation - 1 expect their participation will decrease because surely they 
will lose their benefits in the process because now we are focusing on 
sustainability.
The preceding quote implies that sustainability has not been pivotal in existing decision­
making processes, and that the introduction of the DSS will raise sustainability to the 
fore.
Taking a delegated power and citizen control stance on participation, the anthropologist 
argued that:
If the concept of DSS is wide and covers mechanisms and information, it 
will increase participation because it will decentralise access to 
information and access to construct policymaking. If the concept of DSS 
is just software, just for policymakers, it will decrease participation of the 
people who cannot use the software.
Note in the preceding quote how different modes o f construing the DSS have been 
linked to different implications for participation.
When asked whether she thought the DSS might decrease the participation of any 
stakeholders in environmental decision-making, the GIS researcher responded:
Maybe - because they have something to help them, so they don’t use their 
brain. If they don’t have DSS, they make the decision themselves. Not the 
villagers, I mean the headman or district officers - some of the government 
people, me, even. I assume the DSS will be better. So, if people are going 
to rely on DSS, its important to have good information in it - verified 
information.
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In the early part of the preceding quote, the GIS researcher identifies the risk of 
unreflective adherence to the technocratic solution. The latter part of the quote suggests 
that such a situation is acceptable if the information embodied within the DSS is 
verified.
6.4.5 Thai group discussion of biases
As the preceding sections have illustrated, the individual interviews with the Thai 
project team yielded a range different perspectives as to who should use the DSS and 
how, and who should be involved in developing the DSS. Interviewees had also 
identified numerous potential biases associated with the DSS, particularly flexibility and 
communication issues.
In November 1997, the Thai project manager, DSS leader, GIS researcher, 
anthropologist and myself met to discuss issues which had arisen during the 
interviews44. Other interviewees who were unable to attend asked me to communicate 
their perspectives. The discussion opened with the topic of users. The participants were 
asked to identify all potential direct and indirect users. The participants agreed that at 
this stage, the targeted direct users should be the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) and 
the Department of Land Development (DLD). Targeted indirect users were identified as 
the Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO), some NGOs and a media 
organisation called THAI-VIF. The media organisation was identified in recognition of 
the impact that the media’s reporting of highland environmental issues and conflicts 
may have on the politics and process of highland environmental management. There 
remained divergence as to whether villagers should be explicitly identified as users.
The anthropologist and project manager felt that this was possible, but the DSS leader 
preferred to deal with villagers through the TAOs. The participants agreed at this stage 
to take the latter approach, but to revise their strategy as the DSS developed.
In terms of possible mechanisms to engage users in the process of DSS development, 
the project manager, an RFD officer, volunteered to initiate communication with a 
representative of the RFD. The DSS leader described how he had already initiated 
communication with a member of the Land Use Planning Office of the DLD. The 
anthropologist nominated the social team to communicate with a relevant TAO, some 
NGOS, and the media organisation.
It was agreed by the participants that the DSS should be a part of the participatory 
framework. It was also agreed that as the form of the participatory framework 
developed, the sociocultural and DSS teams would interact more closely about how the 
DSS should relate to the framework, particularly how information should be 
disseminated and to whom, how the DSS could be flexible to users’ needs, and feedback 
mechanisms.
In relation to the embedded bias and biased access issues which had been raised in the 
interviews, opportunities to make the DSS more accessible, equitable, transparent and 
flexible were discussed. Drawn from different interviewee’s suggestions, opportunities 
included incorporating: ‘plugged-in’ or easily replaceable models; multiple visions and
44 Readers may refer back to Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3 for methodological details o f this meeting. In 
particular, note that the meeting was conducted mainly in Thai. Due to my heavy reliance during this 
meeting on participants’ translations, this section contains limited analysis, and primarily reports 
significant agreements or decisions regarding the DSS or DSS development.
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options; multiple forms of data (scientific and indigenous, economic, biophysical and 
social, quantitative and qualitative); and scientific and indigenous land use 
classification. During the meeting each of these opportunities was supported in concept, 
except that the incorporation of scientific and indigenous land use classification was 
altered to scientific and indigenous land capability classification at the behest o f the 
DSS leader, who argued that this was a more appropriate term.
The meeting concluded with the anthropologist and the DSS leader each describing their 
vision o f the DSS, and reaching agreement, supported by the other participants, on their 
common vision o f the DSS. The anthropologist emphasised the potential for multiple 
forms of information output, and highlighted the opportunity for the DSS to assist 
negotiation or conflict resolution through equitable access to data. The DSS leader also 
raised the negotiation potential of the DSS, and described his realisation of the 
convergence o f visions:
“I just realise that we have a common idea because until last month, I have 
the idea that different components have different visions. But I find out 
this month that everybody has a similar vision about the whole project and 
we know the standpoint of each other. The common vision is that we have 
the participatory framework as the major output of the project. The 
structure of the output will have two steps. Firstly, the social team will 
develop mechanisms to form the forum for participatory framework.
Secondly, the other three teams will provide tool to combine in DSS which 
will allow forum to negotiate”.
Thus, the common vision reinforced earlier agreements that the DSS should be a part of 
the participatory framework, that the participatory framework should be viewed as the 
major output of the project, and that the DSS should assist negotiation amongst 
stakeholders within the policy forum intended to be developed as part o f the 
participatory framework.
Following this meeting, the participants agreed that the forthcoming joint project 
meeting to be held in December in Australia would provide an opportunity to present 
the common Thai vision of the DSS and compare it to the Australian perspective.
6.4.6 Postscript to the Thai application
In mid-November, the Thai ambassador to Australia officially launched both the 
ACIAR-funded IWRAM project and a new research centre within the Australia National 
University called the Centre for Integrated Catchment Assessment and Management.
The Director of the new centre was the Australian IWRAM project leader, and the 
IWRAM project was framed as one o f its flagship projects. Thus, an institutional 
building motive for the initiation and successful delivery of the IWRAM project is now 
apparent from the Australian end. Note also that while, from the Australian side, the 
IWRAM project has begun, tied to a funding timeframe of three years, the Thai 
collaborators have not yet secured funding. Although the RPF agreed to the project, 
they expected to fund it from external research funds. However, bids to the National 
Research Fund and Thai Research Fund failed in part because o f the Thai economic 
crisis o f 1996/97. The significance of this in terms of who takes primary responsibility 
for driving the IWRAM research, and therefore shaping the DSS, will be explored in 
Chapter 7.
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6.5 Confronting divergence? Meeting of the two teams
In December, the Thai biophysical leader, the anthropologist, the GIS researcher and an 
economist (not the same one as was interviewed during my process) travelled to 
Australia for a three-day joint team meeting. The Thai DSS leader and project manager 
both had family commitments and delegated their roles to the biophysical leader. The 
Australian team at the meeting included the project leader, project manager, 
sociocultural leader, and DSS leader, as well as a recently recruited economist, 
anthropologist and hydrologist.
The meeting opened with an information exchange about progress to date. The Thai 
delegates emphasised how the Thai economic crisis was affecting their progress and 
may require curtailing or restructuring of research activities. Thus, financial constraints 
had emerged as a significant factor shaping research.
As the meeting agenda shifted to an information exchange explicitly about the DSS, the 
Thai biophysical leader commented that he had met with the Thai DSS leader and 
understood better what the Royal Project Foundation wanted:
“We want to have interaction between stakeholders and have them 
interacting in decision-making and this tool can help them participate...
We think the DSS needs to be 3D so stakeholders can come and use it and 
help them understand and feel like they are a part of the decision-making 
process”.
This suggests that the biophysical leader, who had been absent from the Thai group 
discussion of biases, supports the common vision of the DSS and the project negotiated 
during that discussion.
The Thai biophysical leader then explained that they were planning to have a meeting 
early in the following year to which they would invite different agencies and discuss 
how they could be involved from the beginning of the DSS development. Note that 
DSS development is assumed not to have commenced yet, despite the conceptual 
discussion and shaping which had taken place over the preceding three years.
The Australian sociocultural leader commented that it appeared from the Thai 
biophysical leader’s report as if there was now a less sharp distinction between 
stakeholders and research collaborators. The Australian project leader supported this as 
a mechanism of encouraging ownership of the research. Later in the discussion, the 
issue of ownership with regard to the DSS arose again. The Australian DSS leader 
raised with the ACIAR (funding body) officer the tension between focussing on 
research outcomes in the form of academic outputs such as journal papers versus 
improved decision-making procedures in Thailand. The ACIAR officer responded that 
“At the end of the day, the outcome is the decision support system. And the project will 
be evaluated on that and also academic rigour. But mainly we have to show our 
stakeholders on the hill45 that we have made a difference, so the DSS should do that”. 
This statement suggests that the funding body favours a improvement in decision­
making procedures over conventional academic outputs, but the project will be assessed 
on the basis of the DSS-as-product. Thus, a new perspective is provided on the
45 The phrase ‘stakeholders on the hill’ refers to the Australian government which is sited on a hill in the 
national capital, Canberra.
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research/practice tension highlighted during the testing of the framework with the 
Australian participants.
Meanwhile, the Australian project manager argued that “We need to be careful to all 
remain committed to the primary objective of the project - developing frameworks. If 
we can encourage ownership beyond the life of the project, that is good; but we need to 
keep focussed on the primary objective”. In contrast to the ACIAR officer’s sentiments, 
the project manager reinforces the development of methodology as the central objective 
of the project rather than “making a difference” to the application context. The 
research-versus-use tension illustrated here between the timeframe of the project and the 
long term future will be revisited in Chapter 7.
According to the meeting agenda, each component was supposed to provide a report of 
their activities and progress. For the decision support component, the Australian project 
leader, chairing the meeting, mentioned that he favoured a modular approach to the DSS 
because the modules could be transferred to other projects later on. Thus, this segment 
of the meeting dedicated to discussion of the DSS opens with reinforcement of the mode 
of framing the DSS as a transferable modular software package.
The Australian DSS leader then presented his conceptualisation of the DSS and how it 
should integrate with the other project components. He emphasised that he saw 
stakeholders as the “pivot point” of the DSS. The Thai participants sat silently during 
this presentation and did not interject or ask questions. After some discussion amongst 
the Australians about the pros and cons of a modular approach, the day’s discussion was 
adjourned.
On the third meeting day, the discussion opened with a query from the Australian DSS 
leader as to the scale of decision-making. The Australian sociocultural leader responded 
that a range of decisions operated at different levels. The new Australian anthropologist 
argued that ethnographic evidence supported the notion that land use decisions are only 
made at the individual farmer or household level. The Thai economist felt that it was 
possible to focus on decisions at an individual level and view all other decisions, such as 
government policy, as constraints on that individual. The Australian project leader 
argued that the discussion was getting too embroiled in policy and that the appropriate 
scale of decision-making would emerge through “looking at the land use and cover 
maps and see where the land is being underutilised or overutilised and then do some 
scenarios and see how that affects economic decisions”. The new Australian economist 
countered that “land capability and land slope aren’t the only factors affecting decisions 
- there are other things that affect economic decisions - availability of labour etc”. This 
exchange illustrates how discipline may influence framing of a decision problem, both 
in terms of conceptualisation of scale and in terms of relevant factors that are perceived 
to drive or shape decision-making.
The afternoon session was devoted to another discussion of the DSS. First, the 
Australian project leader expanded on how the Australian team had conceptualised the 
DSS as three modules, consisting of LUPIS, ARCINFO and a stand-alone modelling 
system, probably EXTEND. The Australian DSS leader then presented his own 
conceptualisation of the DSS as a resolution to the earlier disagreement over scale, 
Figure 6.4. He suggested that there were two different types of decision problems, land 
allocation (larger scale) and land management (household or individual scale). 
Supporting the project leader’s framing of the DSS, he described how the three modules
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fitted within his diagram. A debate ensued amongst the Australian team as to the pros 
and cons of the different software and models, until the Australian project manager and 
project leader suggested adjourning the discussion to observe a demonstration of the 
Extend software. The Thai team had not interjected or commented on any of the DSS 
discussion thus far. When this was brought to the attention of the project manager, the 
Thais were provided ten minutes to explain their perspective. The GIS researcher and 
anthropologist both wished to present. The GIS researcher discussed the approach she 
hoped to take in terms of construction of a digital elevation model for the DSS. The 
anthropologist outlined the common vision for the DSS that had been agreed on during 
the joint Thai meeting, the need to communicate the same information in multiple ways, 
and features of the TAOs which he hoped to involve as a conduit to villagers. He 
emphasised that he saw the DSS as having two parts: firstly, data or information 
support; and secondly, a forum to debate options.
The discussion which ensued from the Thai presentation provides a useful point to take 
stock of the Australian participants’ perspectives before I draw the curtains on this 
narrative of evolving perspectives of decision support. Firstly, the Australian 
sociocultural leader suggested that according to the Thai perspective, “our whole project 
is now a Decision Support System - stakeholders, a participatory process, what the 
people want to do to resolve problems, and data is just a support to that”. Thus, her 
perspective on decision support had shifted from deep distrust of a software system that 
she felt was in conflict with participatory ethics, to positive framing of decision support 
as a participatory process of stakeholder interaction to guide resolution of their 
problems. She subsequently prepared a diagram illustrating her perspective of the DSS 
according to this latter framing, Figure 6.5.
In response to a question from the ACIAR officer seeking clarification as to whether the 
project was developing the DSS for both direct and indirect users, the Australian project 
leader remarked: “Do you think that as a minimum we could develop it just for the core 
direct users, and then do what we can to communicate the output to indirect users within 
budget and other constraints?”. Thus, the project leader’s perspective has remained 
consistent with his original concern for providing a suitable software product within the 
funded project timeframe. However, he is also open to the possibility of providing for 
wider access if managerial demands allowed.
The Australian DSS leader commented that “We need to concentrate on direct and 
indirect users and how they make decisions... We want to have one system that all 
users, direct and indirect, can take and use... The DSS has a software component and a 
non-software component which includes mechanisms for [the users] to interact with and 
feedback to the DSS”. Over the course of this narrative, he had shifted from regarding 
development of the DSS primarily as a research exercise in constructing an operational 
software system which could examine hypothetical trade-offs, to framing the DSS as a 
reflexive system necessarily embedded in and interacting with the users’ decision­
making environment
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Figure 6-5 Framing the DSS: Australian sociocultural leader, February 1998
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6.6 Postscript
The narrative described above must be emphasised as a time-slice of the IWRAM 
project. Since I ceased intensive interaction with the IWRAM project, the project, the 
nature of the DSS, and the decision-making environment have continued to evolve. The 
approach to DSS development proposed in Chapter 4 was intended to be iterative to 
reflect and respond to the dynamic nature of the development process. However, 
because of the time limitations of this thesis, my intensive interaction was necessarily 
restricted to the period detailed above. For several months following the meeting 
detailed above, I observed the evolution of the IWRAM project at a distance. During 
this period, a few events took place which had significant implications for the IWRAM 
DSS, and which influenced the extent to which biases received attention. Firstly, as the 
Thai economic crisis became protracted, the resource and funding situation for the Thai 
collaborators worsened. Fewer personnel were available to work on the project, and in 
some fields, public servants had to substitute for academic collaborators. Secondly, the 
Thai anthropologist moved to Australia, in the hope of starting a PhD. His absence 
from the Thai team for several months resulted in weak supervision at a vital stage of 
the socioeconomic field data collection and logistical difficulties in processing and 
translating the information. Later, the anthropologist lost his job, leaving the 
sociocultural component with very little research and liaison capacity. Thirdly, the new 
appointees to the Australian IWRAM team took increasing control over the DSS 
development process. These implications of these events will be expanded on in 
Chapter 7.
6.7 Conclusions
Through presenting the diversity of framings of decision support by different IWRAM 
participants, this chapter has demonstrated the interpretive flexibility of the term 
‘decision support system’. By detailing different participants’ perceptions of potential 
biases, this chapter has also provided grounded support for the relevance and 
significance of an interrogation of biases in this particular DSS development process.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of DSS tends to be portrayed as an 
objective technical exercise. However, this narrative has illustrated that prior to any 
tangible steps being taken to build the DSS, the process of framing and shaping the 
IWRAM DSS has already been enmeshed within networks of sociopolitical and 
personal commitments. Professional interests and aspirations, strategic institutional 
building, ethical concerns, disciplinary commitments to methodology, pressures to 
satisfy funding bodies, and aspirations for furthering sociopolitical empowerment are 
among the factors which appear to have contributed to the way in which different 
participants framed the nature and role of decision support. Participants’ modes of 
framing the DSS and DSS development also seemed to reflect normative constructions 
of the highland decision-making environment, including assumptions about stakeholder 
identities, the relationships between stakeholders, and problem definition. Tensions 
between divergent modes of framing the DSS or DSS development thus seem to 
represent tensions between competing interests and commitments. This theme will be 
explored in Chapter 7.
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This narrative has also illustrated that participant’s perspectives of the nature and role of 
decision support did not evolve linearly as a result of engaging with the questions from 
the framework for anticipating bias. Instead, issues which challenged participants’ 
perspectives often became subject to a circular process of consideration, rejection or 
internalisation, reconsideration, rejection or internalisation, and so on. The IWRAM 
DSS was continually (re) constituted and (re)constructed through this process. As a 
consequence of this circularity, problems of divergence in perspective were seldom 
resolved neatly, and thus tensions between alternate modes of framing decision support 
tended to recur throughout the narrative. The implications of this circularity for an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the framework will also be discussed in Chapter 7.
Probing the frames
Most highland villages continue to engage in traditional subsistence activities, 
including livestock raising. However, over the past two decades, many villages 
have diversified beyond their traditional activities, including stone fruit 
cultivation for the lowland markets and handicraft production for the tourist 
industry\ In the top photo, playing to tourists who seek hill tribe silver jewellery, 
a tinsmith (the Thai signage) has translated his services as a 'silversmith'.
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7. Probing the frames
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses both the framing of decision support and the interrogation of biases 
in the IWRAM project. The initial part of the chapter explores recurring tensions between 
alternate modes of framing decision support which emerged during the discursive 
interrogation of biases by collaborators in the IWRAM project. Although distinctions and 
potential incoherencies between alternate framings are emphasised for comparative 
purposes, it should be stressed that framings are not dichotomous. Rather, some 
participants concurrently voiced alternate framings, which constituted different dimensions 
of, and were realised to different degrees within, their whole construing of decision 
support. Consequently, tensions were evident both between participants and within the 
construing of an individual participant. Section 7.3 discusses sociopolitical networks 
which appear to have contributed to the conceptual shaping of the IWRAM DSS. Drawing 
on the experience of the IWRAM project, Section 7.4 assesses how the theoretically- 
derived analytical framework for interrogating and anticipating biases performed in 
practice.
7.2 Framing environmental decision support: Tensions 
7.2.1 Differing motives: DSS for research or practice?
One key tension which emerged was between framing development of the IWRAM DSS 
foremost as a research project or as a means of supporting the practice of highland 
environmental decision-making. Each perspective was associated with differing construing 
of environmental decision support, differing approaches to highland environmental 
problem-solving and decision-making, and differing expectations of how the DSS 
development process should be conducted, Table 7.1. For instance, the DSS-for-research 
perspective construed the primary objective of the IWRAM project as developing 
integrated frameworks, and the primary function of the DSS as a modular software system. 
In part, the modular approach was favoured because, because unlike a fully integrated 
system, it would enable individual component modules to be transferred relatively easily 
to future research projects. In contrast, the DSS-for-practice perspective construed the 
project as fundamentally about helping highland stakeholders to make decisions: “our 
whole project is now a Decision Support System - stakeholders, a participatory process, 
what the people want to do to resolve problems, and data is just a support to that”. From 
this standpoint, the DSS was framed as an interpersonal process necessarily embedded in 
the decision-making environment of the application locality. As recognised by the 
Australian DSS leader from the outset of the discursive process, the preceding framings 
were not inherently compatible, since it was conceivable that the researchers could develop 
“an academically interesting system”, but “fail to deliver an operational system”.
When queried as to the purpose of the DSS, researchers within the DSS-for-practice group 
tended to implicate conflict resolution and negotiation, often giving an anecdote from their 
personal experience about a particular highland conflict. Thus, the focus was on a
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grounded problem and how a DSS might support it. In contrast, the DSS-for-research 
perspective tended to raise the potential for the DSS to explore hypothetical solutions, 
placing the emphasis on the technology and how it might inform consideration of abstract 
options.
F ra m in g  d ec is io n  
s u p p o r t
D S S  f o r  research D S S  f o r  p r a c tic e
D SS prim arily  
fra m ed  as:
T ra n s fe ra b le  so ftw a re  too l L o c a lly  em b ed d e d  p ro c e ss
Purpose o f  DSS: T o  e x p lo re  h y p o th e tica l o p tio n s A w a ren e ss , c o n f lic t re so lu tio n , 
n e g o tia tio n
Users o f  DSS: U n su re P o te n tia lly  a ll s tak eh o ld e rs
Supporting IE M B y  in te g ra tin g  da ta  an d  an a ly ses B y  en c o u ra g in g  s ta k e h o ld e r 
in te ra c tio n
Participatory D SS  
development:
T o  e n a b le  e ffic ien t p ro jec t 
m a n a g e m e n t
T o  p ro m o te  lo ca l o w n e rsh ip
D SS development 
timeframe
F u n d e d  p ro je c t tim e fra m e U n sp e c if ie d , lo n g  te rm  tim e fra m e
Anticipating  
em bedded biases
M o d e ra te  in te re s t in  
a c k n o w le d g in g  u n ce rta in ty
M o d e ra te  in te re s t in  
a c k n o w le d g in g  d is to rte d  
k n o w le d g e  an d  a b se n c e s  in  
k n o w le d g e
Anticipating  
biases in access
L im ite d  in te re s t in  b ia ses  in  
ac cess
C o n s id e ra b le  in te re s t in  
c o m m u n ic a tio n  co n s tra in ts
Table 7-1 Divergent framings: Comparing DSS-for-research and DSS-for-practice
The two modes of framing also approached integrated management in different ways. The 
DSS-for-research perspective tended to emphasise supporting integrated assessment via 
integrating disciplinary analysis (primarily biophysical and economic). The DSS (framed 
as a computer-based tool) tended to be cast as a focus for this integration, by combining 
different models with an integrated database to allow systems modelling. In contrast, the 
DSS-for-practice perspective tended to portray the task of supporting integrated 
management as supporting communication and interaction within a stakeholder-based 
process, with software and other information playing a role in informing the stakeholders.
The DSS-for-research and DSS-for practice perspectives were associated with different 
timeframes. Those researchers for whom a DSS-for-research perspective had primacy 
focussed on the funded three-year project timeframe. This had significant implications for 
the management of biases in access since these researchers had limited motivation to 
consider practice issues which were likely to become prominent after the funded timeframe 
was completed. As the Australian project manager commented, “If we can encourage 
ownership beyond the life of the project, that is good; but we have to keep focussed on the 
primary objective”. Emphasis was placed on the need to deliver, at the end of the funded 
time-frame, the tangible research outputs and products specified within the research
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proposal. Consequently, technical research activities received prominence and were 
rapidly assigned to particular researchers, while responsibility for practice-related tasks, 
such as interacting with users, remained more ambiguous.
The DSS-for-practice perspective tended to have a longer term vision for the DSS and see 
it as a possible mechanism to promote a fundamental change in the conduct of highland 
environmental decision-making. This perspective was more interested in potential biases 
in access, particularly literacy or other communication constraints and the potential for 
capture of the DSS by elites. Highlighting the impacts that the DSS could have on 
people’s livelihoods, the DSS-for-practice perspective cast the communication of 
embedded biases, particularly distortions or absences in knowledge, as an ethical 
imperative. While also interested in identifying and quantifying uncertainty and 
confidence bounds, the DSS-for-research perspective treated the task more as a dimension 
of ensuring academic rigour. In terms of management of biases, the DSS-for-research 
emphasis on efficiency and delivery of tangible products translated into an interest, once a 
bias had been identified, in enacting an appropriate management strategy to enable closure. 
The DSS-for-practice perspective was more reluctant to take management action until 
wider consultation had taken place amongst a wider stakeholder group about possible 
strategies.
As recognised by the Australian sociocultural leader, the tensions between focussing on a 
research or a practice timeframe could have significant implications for the content of the 
DSS. She noted that, as a funded research project, the temptation would be to generate a 
rich database which would enhance the DSS product the researchers were required to 
deliver at the end of their three-year project. However, generation of a rich database 
through labour- and resource-intensive fieldwork could mean that updating the database 
might also prove labour- and resource-intensive. Without the injection of funds from a 
well-resourced foreign project, this task could prove difficult for Thai stakeholders. The 
dilemma raised here reflects a common tension between the differing methodological 
interests of researchers, who often want to demonstrate state-of-the-art methodology, and 
practitioners, who tend to favour the pragmatic choice (Syme and Sadler 1994:534). In the 
IWRAM project, the bias implications of electing to generate the richest database possible 
would include the risk that distortions in knowledge arise as the data becomes outdated, or 
that absences in knowledge arise as data becomes insufficient in light of the changing 
decision-making environment. The sociocultural leader noted that an alternate practice- 
focussed approach would be more targeted and scope the contents of the DSS according to 
realistic expectations of the capacity of potential users to update the data. The implications 
of this latter approach in terms of bias would be absences of knowledge, specifically 
absences of sociocultural and economic information which relied on extensive and 
intensive field surveying. This highlights how a new methodological approach, developed 
to manage the biases associated with a previous methodological approach, may introduce 
new forms of bias. Management of bias is not a one-off exercise in discerning and 
applying the most bias-free method, but involves a continuous process of critically 
appraising potential biases and iteratively adapting methods as an integral dimension of 
precautionary practice.
The notion of a stakeholder advisory committee arose during the dialogues as one means of 
responding to the upgrading dilemma. The differing framing by the DSS-for-research and 
DSS-for-practice perspectives of the rationale for a stakeholder advisory committee 
provides a useful means of exploring their differing construing of participation. The DSS-
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for-practice perspective tended to regard participatory methodology as fundamental to 
encourage local ownership and thereby facilitate effective research extension into practice. 
Consequently, within this perspective, the stakeholder advisory committee was framed as a 
means of promoting stakeholder trust in the research. Meanwhile, the DSS-for-research 
perspective tended to view participation as a mechanism enabling more efficient 
management of the project. Accordingly, the stakeholder advisory committee was framed 
as a means of delegating responsibility for practice issues, such as questions of access and 
upgrading the DSS, to the stakeholders. The DSS-for-research perspective also cast 
formation of the stakeholder committee as the responsibility of the Thai research team 
“since they’ve got to wear it”, thereby suggesting research ethics as justification to delegate 
practice issues to the Thais.
During his review of the case study narrative (Chapter 6), the Australian project leader 
queried the contrast made between a DSS-for-research and a DSS-for-practice, arguing that 
“no-one ever wanted a DSS-for-research only”. Indeed, this observation is largely 
supported by the case study narrative, which illustrates that most participants wanted the 
DSS to “be more than just a computer”. However, the preceding analysis suggests that 
even if all participants wish to develop a system that simultaneously fulfils both research 
and practice goals, there are inevitable tensions in attempting this task. This conclusion is 
supported by Barnes et al. (1997) who argue that models for research application are 
fundamentally different in objective, form and function from models for practical decision 
support. As an illustration of their position, Barnes et al. (1997) suggest that the 
complexity of models-for-research is determined by the hypothesis underpinning the 
model, whereas the complexity of models-for-decision support is dictated by the data 
available. Thus, in the former case, the data requirements are specified by the model, while 
in the latter case, the model is specified by the data. This observation clearly reinforces the 
upgrading dilemma identified by the Australian sociocultural leader.
Literature examining the influence of economic rationalism and managerialism on research 
practice suggests that the focus on the marketable, transferable products and shorter 
timeframes associated with the DSS-as-research perspective arises from a disintegration of 
conventional distinctions between pure and applied research. Marginson (1997:261) 
reviews the ensuing reconstruction of research as entrepreneurial: “basic research 
penetrated by an applied mission, with an eye on technology transfer”. Within Australia, 
political pressure on researchers to minimise costs, attract external funds and adopt private 
sector management models has resulted in greater emphasis being placed on delivery in the 
short-term of tangible, and increasingly saleable, research outputs and products (Stewart 
1997, Orchard 1998:21,23). As Mathews (1990 cited in Marginson 1997) argues, within 
the new research paradigm, “academics are expected to conduct their research to schedule, 
offer a product for which there is an identifiable market, and compete for a buyer in that 
market”. Community development researchers point out that this emphasis on tangible 
products may conflict with the more long-term and less tangible outcomes associated with 
effective community-based practice. As Gohlert (1991:58) argues, “the ability of the 
people to identify the source of their problems, to formulate, implement and assess 
responses to these challenges entails a complex, subtle and usually slow learning process 
that is reflected in a gradually growing awareness and consciousness of critical factors in 
their economic, social and political environments”.
A number of other systemic pressures act to dissuade researchers from giving primacy to a 
practice perspective. In particular, the research reward system tends to reinforce the
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mainstream perspective that linking research to grounded action detracts the researcher 
from their primary role of conducting basic research (Whyte 1991:8, Guerin and Guerin 
1994:563). For example, career promotion rests heavily on publication in peer-reviewed 
journals, with limited credit accorded to the substantial amounts of time necessary to 
engage in practice with participants in or users of research outcomes. As Ewing et al. 
(1997:2) observe, “the reward system is such that, beyond publication and research awards, 
active involvement with end-users is distinctly less glamorous and still at the margins of 
the academic system”. As a result, the low career enhancement potential of practice 
activities encourages many researchers to relegate such activities to second priority.
Combating the systemic discouragement within the scientific community of greater 
emphasis on practice, funding bodies increasingly require researchers to specify the 
practical relevance of their research and technology extension or adoption strategy (Ewing 
et al.. 1997:2). The funding body may thus be viewed as a broker between demand (the 
users of research) and supply (the researchers). Within the IWRAM experience, the 
funding body directed that the research be both policy-relevant and practically-oriented, 
thereby meeting demand imperatives, and academically rigorous to satisfy supply 
imperatives. Thus, opportunities exist for funding bodies to mediate discursively between 
incoherent research and practice commitments, and thereby to facilitate negotiation of a 
form of DSS, and DSS development, which is of mutual interest and benefit to both 
research and practice perspectives. However, these opportunities are constrained by 
contemporary norms of funding practice, whereby a requirement for material 
accountability and flexibility prescribe shorter funding timeframes and thus a short-term 
outcome orientation, reinforcing the research behaviour described previously (Gohlert 
1991:58).
7.2.2 Differing construing of stakeholders: Who should use the DSS and how?
The IWRAM case study illustrated that differences in the way that researchers construe 
stakeholders and the relationships between them may also lead to different ways of framing 
the DSS. In particular, different ways of construing stakeholder identities and relationships 
emerged during the Thai application which had divergent implications for the character of 
the DSS, who should use the DSS and how users should interact with the DSS. Two 
alternate perspectives are contrasted in Table 7.2. It should be noted that although the 
divergent ways in which the form of the DSS was construed under each perspective did 
correspond to the practice-research contrast, overall, each tended towards the practice 
perspective.
The first ‘empowerment’ perspective construed villagers as disempowered in highland 
environmental decision-making and cast the DSS as a possible mechanism to realise the 
visions of the new Thai constitution regarding increased local participation in natural 
resource decision-making. (In)equity was an important consideration within this 
perspective, with proponents relating anecdotes highlighting the conventional denial of 
local knowledge by government officials in concert with scientists, the complex web of 
historical political and economic pressures which had contributed to the contemporary 
highland environmental dilemma, and the barriers confronting villagers wishing to gain 
access to either environmental information or highland decision-making. Open access to 
the DSS, and the decentralisation of access to both information and the construction of 
highland policy, was cast as imperative for more participatory decision-making. To 
promote open access, and manage biases in access, the need for multiple modes of
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E m p o w e rm e n t p e r sp e c tiv e E x p e r t p e r s p e c tiv e
V illa g e rs  c o n s tru e d  as: D isem p o w e red N a iv e , s tu b b o rn
H ig h la n d H isto rica l p o litica l an d V illa g e rs ’ b a d  p ra c tic e s
e n v iro n m e n ta l  d ilem m a  
c a u s e d  by:
ec o n o m ic  p re ssu re s im p lic a te d
D S S  f r a m e d  as: M ec h an ism  to  re a lise  m o re M ea n s  o f  c o n v in c in g  v illa g e rs  to
p a r tic ip a to ry , o p e n  an d fo llo w  e x p e rt a d v ic e  a b o u t b es t
d e c e n tra lise d  d ec is io n -m a k in g la n d  u se  p ra c tic e
P u rp o se  o f  D SS: A w a ren e ss , c o n f lic t re so lu tio n , T o  p re se n t th e  b e s t lan d
n e g o tia tio n m a n a g e m e n t so lu tio n s
U sers  o f  D S S : O p e n  access G o v e rn m e n t o ff ic e rs , so m e  
N G O s, re se a rc h e rs
D e v e lo p e r s  o f  D S S : S ta k eh o ld e rs  an d  re se a rc h e rs R e se a rc h e rs  w ith  d ire c tio n  fro m  
g o v e rn m e n t o ff ic e rs
C o n te n t o f  D S S : M u ltip le  k in d s  o f  in fo rm atio n : B io p h y sic a l a n a ly se s  re  lan d  u se
q u a lita tiv e  an d  q u an tita tiv e ; p a tte rn s , so c ia l in fo rm a tio n  re
lo ca l an d  sc ien tif ic  ex p e rtise ; w illin g n e ss  o f  v illa g e rs  to  ch a n g e ,
so c io e c o n o m ic  an d  b io p h y s ica l e c o n o m ic  in fo rm a tio n  re  in co m e  
p o te n tia l
F o rm  o f  D S S : P o licy  p ro c esses  and C o lo u r  c o m p u te r  m o n ito r
m e c h a n ism s  in c o rp o ra tin g  
m u ltip le  m o d es  o f  
c o m m u n ic a tin g  ou tp u t, n o t ju s t  
so ftw a re
d isp la y in g  3D  m o d e ls
A n tic ip a tin g  e m b e d d e d V o c a l ab o u t em b ed d e d  b ia ses S h o u ld  c o m m u n ic a te  a s su m p tio n s
b ia s: e sp e c ia lly  d is to rte d  k n o w le d g e an d  u n c e rta in tie s  to  u se rs;
a n d  ab se n ce  o f  k n o w le d g e v illa g e rs  w o n ’t q u e s tio n  o u tp u t
A n tic ip a tin g  b ia se d V o c a l ab o u t b ia se s  in  ac cess D S S  sh o u ld  b e  free  to  u se  an d  in
a c c e ss : esp e c ia lly  c o m m u n ic a tio n  
c o n s tra in ts
T h a i
P a r tic ip a tio n  f r a m e d O p e n  ac cess  to  D S S , C o lle c tin g  d a ta  fro m  v illa g e rs
as: d e c e n tra lisa tio n  o f  
en v iro n m e n ta l d e c is io n -m a k in g
m ak es  th e m  aw a re  o f  th e  D S S
Table 7-2 Alternate framings of the DSS: Differing construing of stakeholder
relationships
communicating the information output of the DSS was emphasised. Communication 
modes identified included computers for academics, tables for policymakers, and posters or 
3D topographic models for villagers. To promote holistic analysis and decision-making, 
the need for multiple forms of information (qualitative and quantitative, indigenous and 
scientific, sociocultural and biophysical) within the DSS was also emphasised.
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Consequently, it was argued that the DSS should be a combination of policy mechanisms 
and information, rather than just software which only policymakers would be likely to be 
able to use. In this context, a distinction was made between ‘decision software’ and a 
holistic, process-based ‘decision support system’. However, it was also suggested that 
some villagers would be interested in empowering themselves by learning to use the 
technology, and the project should accommodate them. Finally, it was argued that 
stakeholders, not just researchers, should actively participate in both conceptual and 
practical development of the DSS to guard against embedded absences and distortions of 
knowledge, and to ensure that the characteristics of the DSS were suitable for the highland 
environment and people.
A second ‘expert’ perspective construed villagers as naive, stubbornly clinging to outdated, 
suboptimal cultivation practices which were causing environmental degradation and 
conflict. Within this perspective, the DSS was framed as providing expert users (identified 
as researchers, government officials and some NGOs) with greater authority and credibility 
when trying to convince villagers of the best land use solutions. As the Thai biophysical 
leader commented, “Sometimes we want the villagers to change from their old cultivation 
to a new system but its hard to tell them... If it is easy enough for villagers to see [on the 
DSS screen], it will help us to have them believe us”. Users were thus distinguished from 
villagers, who were cast as passive recipients of the DSS output. The form of the DSS was 
construed as a computer-based colour monitor displaying 3D graphical models, and as a 
foreign technology which would awe villagers into following the users’ opinions without 
question. Yet, it was argued that the DSS would increase villager participation because the 
villagers would be required to provide information and would thereby become aware of the 
DSS. In terms of content, it was proposed that the DSS should incorporate biophysical 
analyses regarding land use patterns, economic data about the income potential of different 
crops, and social information about the willingness of different tribes to change their 
cultivation practices. It was argued that the uncertainties and assumptions associated with 
this information and analyses should be communicated to the users so that they were aware 
of the limits to the system’s predictive accuracy. It was also argued that it was not 
necessary to tackle the difficult problem of communicating assumptions and uncertainties 
to villagers because, due to their naivety, they were unlikely to question the output of the 
DSS.
An issue raised during the Thai interviews regarding land capability illustrates how these 
alternate ways of construing stakeholders may shape the content of DSS. The issue 
concerned the type of land classification system that would be used to underpin land 
capability analysis. The empowerment perspective valued local knowledge and ways of 
knowing, and therefore felt that the indigenous land classification system should be 
incorporated in addition to the scientific system. However, the expert perspective, which 
dismissed villagers’ ways of knowing as naive and simplistic compared with the scientific 
system, argued that it would be sufficient to incorporate only the scientific viewpoint. 
Since, as illustrated in Ch 6, indigenous and scientific land capability assessments address 
different factors, then exclusion of one or other system would lead to different data and 
output, thus introducing different biases.
The perspectives contrasted above echo alternate conceptions of development described in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The empowerment perspective aligns with community-oriented, 
participatory development, while the expert perspective resonates with technocratic 
conceptions of development and reinforces elitist social structures. These perspectives
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represent extremes of a continuum, and many Thai participants held views in-between. 
Introducing the range of perspectives at this point is useful to explore subtle differences in 
the way in which participation was construed by different Thai researchers, and how this 
shaped their differing framing of the DSS.
Noting villagers’ perceptions that technology had been (mis)used in the past by officials to 
gain authority to impose their land use plans, the anthropologist suggested that the DSS 
could enhance villagers’ power to negotiate by ensuring equality of access to the 
technology. He favoured broad stakeholder participation in conceptual and practical 
development of the DSS to guard against embedded biases, particularly the risk that only 
conventional scientific options which promoted technology to maximise profit would be 
considered.
The project manager also favoured active participation by all stakeholders in development 
of the DSS. Noting that each stakeholder, including himself as a forestry official, could 
only see the issue from their limited point of view, he argued that many people from 
diverse backgrounds should meet and debate the information to be incorporated in the 
DSS. He framed the role of the DSS as promoting villagers’ understanding of what they 
needed to do to protect the environment, so that they no longer needed government 
officials to help them. Thus, the DSS represented a means of enhancing independence and 
decentralisation.
The economist suggested that the DSS could serve as conflict resolution tool by providing 
all stakeholders with same information. In contrast to the anthropologist, the economist 
framed a less active role for stakeholders in development of the DSS, but maintained that 
this mode of involvement would increase villagers’ participation in decision-making. She 
argued that inputting stakeholders’ visions and other information collected during field 
surveys into the DSS models would ensure decisionmakers considered their views, and that 
this would entail greater participation.
The GIS researcher construed the purpose of the DSS as assisting to reduce conflicts by 
informing highland villagers of the harmful effects of their bad practices. Implicating 
ignorance as the cause of conflict, she reasoned that if villagers were more aware of their 
impacts on downstream environmental quality, they would change their behaviour. She 
felt that the DSS would definitely improve participation by providing greater access to 
information. She also suggested that the DSS might decrease participation of villagers if 
the technology did not actually provide better information, or if the villagers automatically 
deferred to the technology rather than making informed decisions themselves.
The DSS leader also construed the DSS as a conflict resolution tool, but framed its role as 
an expert arbiter which would provide scientific authority to support different stakeholders’ 
arguments. He felt that the DSS would improve the quality of participation by improving 
the information base, and that it might decrease the participation in decision-making of 
those stakeholders whose position was demonstrated by the DSS not to be credible. The 
DSS leader suggested that stakeholders should be consulted from the beginning of 
development, that their perspectives should be conveyed by the social researchers, and that 
an effort should be made to accommodate them.
The biophysical leader's approach aligned with the expert perspective. He construed DSS 
development as a technical task for researchers, to be guided by the goals of officials from 
the Royal Project Foundation and the Land Development Department. While he did not 
foresee an active role for stakeholders in DSS development, he felt that the DSS would
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increase their participation in decision-making as data collection for the IWRAM project 
would make villagers aware of the DSS. Like the DSS leader, the biophysical leader 
framed the DSS as a source of expertise. However, rather than construing the DSS as an 
arbiter in negotiations, he suggested that the DSS would provide non-local actors with 
credibility and authority to enact policies within villages.
Amstein’s (1969) classic ladder of citizen participation, illustrated in Figure 7.1, is 
designed to evaluate the extent of citizen power in decision-making. The bottom rungs of 
the ladder are manipulation and therapy, whereby the powerful attempt to educate citizens 
as to the ‘right’ decision. Amstein describes the mid-rungs as tokenistic participation in 
the sense that citizens may voice their perspectives but have no power to ensure their views 
are heeded. At the top of the ladder, citizens gain increasing degrees of power in decision­
making, from negotiating decisions with other stakeholders through to full decision­
making power. Amstein’s top rungs accord broadly with the empowerment perspective, 
and the bottom rungs accord broadly with the expert perspective. However, as a one­
dimensional linear scale, Amstein’s ladder is less useful to contrast the range of Thai 
conceptions of participation, since perspectives tended to cut across the ladder’s rungs. For 
example, most of the researchers implicate the DSS’s informing role as the basis of 
expectations of increased stakeholder participation. Within this broader framing, different 
researchers cast the DSS as promoting greater citizen power in decision-making (e.g. the 
project manager), as enhancing access to negotiations (e.g. the anthropologist and 
economist), or in a therapeutic educative role (e.g. the GIS researcher). Of those 
researchers who construe the DSS as a source of expertise, the DSS is again cast as 
improving participation within negotiations by promoting accountability (e.g. the DSS 
leader) or in a therapeutic educative role (e.g. the biophysical leader). Within the context 
of DSS as fulfilling an informing role, Figure 7.2 reconstructs Amstein’s participation 
ladder as a two-dimensional schema to better reflect Thai conceptions of participation. 
Figure 7.2 could be extended to encompass further dimensions by considering framings in 
greater detail. For example, although the anthropologist and economist both frame the 
DSS as a negotiative tool, the anthropologist argues that participatory decision-making 
demands active stakeholder participation in DSS development, while the economist 
suggests that a more passive information-provision role is sufficient.
While Amstein implies that the upper rungs of her ladder entail ‘good’ participation, and 
the lower rungs ‘bad’, Dovers (1998) notes that different rungs of the ladder may represent 
appropriate participation under different circumstances. This also applies to the adapted 
schema illustrated in Figure 7.2. For example, a villager may wish to be intimately 
involved in conceptualisation of the decision which the DSS may inform, and validation of 
the information to be incorporated as relevant, but then use the DSS for educative, 
therapeutic purposes. Or, given limited resources, a DSS developer may decide to engage 
a few key stakeholders in the design and development phases, and rely on their credibility 
to promote broader acceptance of and trust in the DSS and DSS output. Neither of these 
situations is inherently ‘bad’ or ‘good’ participation. Instead, each involves positioned 
trade-offs between feasibility, adequacy and intensity of participation. In the case of the 
IWRAM project, the need to address these trade-offs is becoming more apparent as the
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Figure 7-1 Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation
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Figure 7-2 Thai team’s conceptions of participation and the DSS
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project moves closer towards finalising the selection of participatory mechanisms. Since 
both time and financial resources are constrained, and the project’s participatory capacity 
has diminished because of the withdrawal of most of the Thai sociocultural team, the 
intensity of participation which was originally planned has had to be scaled back. The 
remaining IWRAM sociocultural team is currently debating such as questions as:
• Should participation in the IWRAM project work through existing, participatory 
structures? On the one hand, this approach may be more feasible, but it may also 
reinforce conventional power inequities.
• To what extent should stakeholder access be promoted at the expense of the modelling 
power and sophistication of the DSS?
• How can local perspectives be incorporated into the DSS? Noting that the users of the 
DSS will not be local stakeholders, one of the Thai sociocultural team was concerned 
that local stakeholders’ visions might only be incorporated in the DSS as information, 
and would not directly drive scenario modelling. She suggested that if local 
stakeholders’ perspectives did not affect the users of the DSS unless they chose to pay 
attention to them, then users would be likely to ignore them. At present, however, it is 
planned that local stakeholders’ visions will play an important part in scenario 
generation, model development and output indicators.
Regardless of the form of participation selected, continued critical interrogation of the 
biases engaged in the process of DSS development and use, and of the emerging impacts of 
the DSS on stakeholders’ interactions, is necessary to monitor whether the participatory 
approach adopted is appropriate for the given circumstances.
7.2.3 Differing construing of decision-making: Disciplinarity emerges
Disciplinarity and social construction of science literature suggests that, through training 
and a sense of community, disciplinarity tends to colour a researcher’s identification of 
problems, methodological approach and assumptions, and their criteria for success 
(Messer-Davidow et al. 1993, Rhoades et al. 1986). The IWRAM case study provided a 
grounded illustration of how participants’ construing of both decision making and 
problem-solving may be influenced by disciplinarity. For instance, at a broad framing 
level, researchers from a biophysical background tended to align with a framing of the DSS 
as a technical product, while social researchers tended to reinforce a practice and 
empowerment focus. Different disciplinary conceptions of the appropriate scale of 
analysis to be incorporated in the DSS provides a more detailed example. From the outset, 
the IWRAM project focussed on the basin and catchment scales as appropriate scales of 
analysis; an approach which accorded with the research interests of the Australian project 
leader and sociocultural leader, as well as with current environmental management trends. 
As the project progressed, and individual researchers began to grapple with how their 
methodology and analyses would fit within the integrated project, alternate perspectives 
emerged as to the appropriate scale of analysis. As Norgaard (1994:161) notes, how we 
see scale and boundaries depends on who is asking which questions, and what is deemed 
important. In the IWRAM project, alternate conceptions of scale crystallised during the 
joint team discussions, where several researchers argued for primacy of their individual 
viewpoints, as illustrated in Table 7.3. Embedding commitments to one of these 
viewpoints within the DSS would serve to validate the corresponding analytical 
perspective and potentially disempower alternate disciplinary constructions.
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D iscip lin ary  background F ram ing decision making: sca les o f  analysis
S ocio logy/p sych ology Range o f  decisions operate at different social levels
Anthropology D ecisions made only at individual or household level
E conom ics Focus on individual decisions; v iew  all other scales o f  decisions as 
constraints
Hydrology/environm ental Appropriate scale w ill em erge from exam ining land use and land
system s m odelling cover data and performing scenario analysis
Geography/GIS M ultiple scales are possible, but accuracy varies according to 
scale.
Table 7-3 Disciplinarity within Australian team: Framing decision-making scales
The diversity and divergence of the disciplinary-based framings of decision support 
indicate a key challenge facing groups who are attempting to develop an integrated DSS. 
As disciplinary biases attenuated towards the conclusion of my involvement with the 
IWRAM project, they were only dealt with at a basic, cursory level during the group 
dialogues. However, the potential exists to use the theoretical critical and collaborative 
learning concepts underlying the analytical framework to deconstruct disciplinary biases 
and negotiate an appropriate framing of decision support to allow the joint enterprise to 
progress. During this process, it may be useful to draw conceptually on bodies of 
knowledge which already construe decision-making in a multifaceted way, such as public 
policy discourse, to guide an integrative strategy.
Within the Thai interviews, disciplinarity also emerged in relation to the differing roles of 
different research components in the development of the DSS. In particular, in the context 
of discussion about embedded bias, the Thai anthropologist raised concerns that the 
sociocultural component was being marginalised by playing only an information provision 
rather than a conceptual role in development. This introduces the interrelated issues of the 
differing degrees of authority accorded to different disciplines (Keller 1993:57), and the 
differing degrees to which the perspectives of different disciplines may contribute to the 
strategic goals and direction of the joint enterprise. Note that the potential of either a 
technical or a process-oriented DSS to catalyse integration may be undermined or 
compromised if particular disciplines are not validated to contribute to that particular form 
of DSS. Thus, to give a hypothetical example, if the IWRAM DSS is presupposed to be a 
technical, quantitative software-based system, and the sociocultural team is expected to 
contribute primarily in a qualitative, process-oriented way, then their participation in the 
development of the DSS is more open to marginalisation. However, the potential for DSS 
to act as an integrative mechanism may be enhanced through application of the analytical 
framework for interrogating bias by facilitating transparency of instances of disciplinary 
domination and bias. Similar to the Thai anthropologist’s concerns, Rhoades et al. 
(1986:24) discuss the frustrations experienced by anthropologists in an interdisciplinary 
team who felt that their role in the project was being defined by economists and 
agronomists, and that they were therein being limited to a service role. This suggests that 
disciplinary-based interactions may be significant in terms of the differential participation 
of different researchers in any interdisciplinary enterprise. Consequently, this raises the 
possibility for the analytical framework for interrogating bias to be modified and
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reconstructed as a tool for exposing disciplinary politics and biases in any interdisciplinary 
project, not only those focussing on developing a DSS.
It should be noted that in some instances dialogue about integration appeared to be partly 
constrained by researchers’ desire to exhibit respect of others’ professional disciplinary 
contribution. In theory, interdisciplinary research confronts and seeks to deconstruct 
conventional disciplinary boundaries. However, undiscussability may undermine this 
conceptual ideal. As Whyte (199lb:98) defines, “social undiscussability involves 
participants’ reluctance to get into topics that might prove personally embarrassing or 
likely to cause hard feelings. Structural undiscussability involves reluctance to broach 
topics that have been defined as out of order, according to the ground rules mutually agreed 
upon by the parties”. Within the IWRAM project, both structural and social 
undiscussability appeared to manifest within interdisciplinary discussions. Firstly, the 
assignation of component-based responsibilities reinforced a reductionist epistemology and 
provided a structural basis for different researchers to be validated within different spheres. 
Thus, the biophysical researchers were expected to comment on biophysical matters, the 
sociocultural researchers were expected to comment on social concerns, and so on. This 
structural respect for others’ disciplinary contributions appeared to discourage the 
broaching of potential disciplinary biases by researchers from outside that discipline.
Social undiscussability then became implicated through the interplay of professional and 
personal respect. Researchers appeared more willing to discuss others’ potential 
disciplinary biases during individual interviews. Consequently, the strategy of 
interviewing researchers separately, collating responses, and then engaging in a facilitated 
group dialogue was more successful in highlighting and discussing disciplinary biases.
7.3 Shaping the DSS: Contributing factors
Even though no physical construction of the DSS had taken place by the time my 
observations of and involvement with the IWRAM project ceased, several factors had 
already introduced biases in terms of the likely form and content of the DSS. Firstly, 
integrating different professional and strategic interests together into a project of mutual 
interest shaped the initial focus of the project and therefore of the DSS. For example, there 
was a widespread expectation from the outset that IHACRES, a model which the 
Australian project leader had developed and worked extensively with during his 
professional career, would be likely to be incorporated within the modelling system of the 
DSS. Similarly, there was an expectation from the outset that, given the Australian 
sociocultural leader’s research interests, efforts would be made to promote a participatory 
approach.
As the project progressed, emergent interests and commitments, such as institution­
building, motivated either reconstruction or reinforcement of conceptual and 
methodological dimensions of the project and the DSS. In particular, the participation of 
new team members introduced a new suite of research interests, including favoured 
techniques, models and theory. For example, the familiarity of the appointed Australian 
economic component leader with the Extend simulation system influenced the use of that 
system among the Australian team in further conceptual development of the DSS. In 
parallel, the Thai DSS leader proceeded with the use of a simulation system based on the 
Fortran computing language, which he had used previously, arguing that as he would be 
the one who would eventually have to maintain the DSS, he wanted the DSS to incorporate 
a simulation system which he would be more able to apply, maintain and communicate.
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Secondly, the IWRAM experience has demonstrated that within the present Australian 
political era, which is placing increasing pressures on academia to attract external funding, 
the influence of funding bodies on research practice should not be underestimated. Within 
the IWRAM project, the funding discourse, transmitted via guidelines, objectives, 
recommendations and accounting procedures demanded that prior to the official 
commencement of the project, decisions had to be made as to the scope, objectives, and 
methods of the project, who would be involved, what types of hardware, software and data 
was likely to be incorporated, and how the budget would be allocated. These decisions 
placed further bounds on what could be researched and how that research could be 
conducted, and thereby on the nature of the DSS. The need to specify objectives, 
methodology and so on before the funding application would be approved also placed 
significant constraints on the extent to which potential stakeholder users could participate 
in the initial conceptual development of the DSS, see Figure 7.3. Researchers must frame a 
proposed project in detail before they receive funds, and during this period, they must rely 
on a self-funded participation programme if they wish to engage in collaborative design. 
Thus, as Carr and Wilkinson (1997:742) observe, “It is very difficult in current funding 
cycles to have collaborative design in research because of time-lags, expense of 
consultation with local groups, and it is horrendously complex given the rigidities in 
funding cycles”. In this manner, funding processes act to reinforce development biases in 
terms of who is empowered to participate in initial formulation of a DSS development 
project, and thus whose perspectives are incorporated in the conceptual framing of the 
DSS. Consequently, as with previous highland development projects, highland villagers 
did not participate substantially in the original formulation of the IWRAM project which 
reflected bureaucratic and academic perspectives of the decision-making environment.
Once the project officially commenced, the funding procedures continued to influence the 
conduct of research via the prospect of performance reviews and staggered funding which 
exerted pressure on the researchers to achieve “quick runs on the board”. Research 
activities likely to achieve rapid outcomes were thus accorded prominence. Matters 
perceived to be outside or peripheral to the core funded proposal, such as issues of practice 
pertinent to a longer timeframe, were at best relegated to secondary priority. Supporting 
this analysis, some participants intimated that while reflection on potential biases and other 
use-related issues was an interesting exercise, it ran counter to “getting on with the task”.
Given the influence of the funding process, whoever takes primary ownership of 
preparation of the funding application for the project plays a critical role in shaping the 
DSS, even though this may not be obvious at the time. During preparation of the 
Australian teams’ funding proposal, many people were eager to be involved by name, but 
few were enthusiastic about expending substantial amounts of time contributing to the 
proposal. The result was that decisions were clustered around those individuals who were 
willing to take the most active ownership, and that the project agenda, focus and 
methodology was inevitably shaped by their interests. In terms of primary ownership, the 
CRES hydrologist, who tended towards a DSS-for-research stance, assumed (and perhaps 
was partially thrust into) this role through apathy, absence and conflicting professional 
commitments of other personnel, as well as his own interests.
The IWRAM case study illustrated that features of the decision-making environment of the 
Northern highlands of Thailand may also necessitate research decisions which serve to 
shape the DSS. For example, the Thai sociocultural team decided to exclude from their 
study one of the ethnic groups, the Lisu, in one of the focal catchments, because the Lisu
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village was thought to be involved in heroin refinement and trafficking. As well as the 
village presenting a dangerous situation for field research assistants to work in, there were 
doubts over the likely validity of interview data, which, if incorporated in the DSS, would 
have led to distortions in knowledge. Thus, the village was excluded from the study. As 
different ethnic groups tend to be associated with different patterns of land use, the 
exclusion of key groups amounts to an instance of bias in terms o f ‘absence of knowledge’ 
which may have implications for the representativeness and future extrapolation of the 
DSS. It should be noted that biases due to catchment selection criteria were compounded 
when limited financial and personnel resources lead the Thai team to select focal 
catchments that were the most well-documented but had the least ethnic diversity.
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Figure 7-3 Potential participation in DSS development
Within the Australian biophysical team, who were undertaking precipitation-runoff 
modelling, the (un)availability of data introduced a potential bias in terms of absences in 
knowledge. Fragmentation and rivalry between government departments and other data 
collection agencies had led to a tradition of non-sharing of information. The biophysical 
team encountered great difficulties in acquiring access to data, and in some cases, were 
denied access, leading to absences in knowledge. The quality of data also provided a key 
source of potential bias due to absences and distortions in knowledge. Initial examination 
of the data suggested possible data errors. For example, during the dry season, when it 
would tend not to rain for many days, it was expected that streamflow data would illustrate 
a gradual incremental decline. However, the data showed that the same level was recorded 
each day for a week, then would suddenly step down to a lower level which was recorded 
each day for the following week, and so on. It was thought that the villager or public 
servant hired to check the stream flow gauge probably visited the site once a week, and
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then would write down that level for the whole week46. The potential for other distortions 
in streamflow data was revealed in the catchment of Wat Chan, where streamflow readings 
did not register for the first few rainfall events of the wet season. At first, it was 
hypothesised that the dry streambed was soaking up the initial rain, leading to zero 
streamflow. However, a site visit to Wat Chan revealed that the streamflow gauge was 
removed during the dry season to prevent it being stolen or vandalised and was not 
replaced until after a couple of downpours had signalled the commencement of the rainy 
season. Doubts also arose regarding the accuracy of precipitation data as it was unclear 
what instruments were used to measure the rainfall, whether the data was recorded every 
day, or whether the data was recorded at the same time each day. The latter factor was 
significant because if the rain gauge was read at different times during the day, then rainfall 
events could be artificially large or small depending on whether the gauge was read later or 
sooner. In fitting the data, the precipitation-runoff model IHACRES tries to ensure that the 
largest rainfall events are modelled correctly. Thus, if apparent large events are actually 
over-estimated, uncertainty may be compounded. Although the modellers have developed 
rigorous techniques and conventions to deal with dubious data, such as presuming the first 
streamflow reading from each step of the streamflow data is correct and altering the 
intermediary readings to fit a linear curve, the potential for distortions and absences in 
knowledge remain.
Several factors during the course of the project have resulted in the Australian team 
assuming increasing control over the research process, thereby increasing their relative 
influence in shaping the DSS. Firstly, the economic recession which Thailand began to 
experience in 1997 compounded the resource difficulties facing the Thai team, who had 
been unsuccessful in attracting funding. As a result, some of the Thai academic 
collaborators withdrew from the project, and were replaced by public servants. In response 
to the diminished capacity of the Thai team, the Australian researchers assumed greater 
responsibility for research tasks where practicable. In some cases, the reduced capacity led 
to research tasks being simplified. For example, in the sociocultural component, the 
withdrawal of the entire original Thai sociocultural team, amounting to the loss of field 
research capacity for participatory research, lead to many participatory aspects of the 
project being simplified dramatically.
Differences between the way in which the Thais and Australians approach collaborative 
research also seem to have contributed to the Australian team taking increasing ownership 
of the research process. The Australian collaborators work more rapidly according to a 
Western model of efficiency; Thais work to an alternate model which to the Australians 
appeared slower and more protracted. In part, the interaction necessary for efficient project 
management amongst the Thai team was impeded because the collaborators were scattered 
amongst several government offices and university campuses in Bangkok and Chiang Mai, 
in contrast with the Australian team who were co-located in the same building. 
Furthermore, while the Australian team was funded to hire several additional researchers 
dedicated entirely to the IWRAM project, the funding problems encountered by the Thai 
team necessitated a reliance on existing team members, many of whom were unable to 
accord sole or even first priority to the IWRAM project because of their other professional
46 The occurrence of stepped streamflow data is a common data problem encountered during hydrologic 
modelling in both developing and developed countries. In addition to human data recorders occasionally 
missing a daily reading, particularly on public holidays, digital recorders also sometimes display steps, 
suggesting a possible instrumentation bias.
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commitments. As the Thais tended to concentrate on practice and the Australians on 
product, the preceding events have contributed to the DSS-as-research perspective gaining 
primacy in the development of the DSS.
Different researchers’ personal modes of communication and interaction was another 
important factor in terms of different researchers’ relative influence in shaping DSS 
development. Observations of Australian team meetings suggest that a vocal, assertive and 
factual style tends to override a quieter or a more conciliatory approach. Supporting this 
analysis, one Australian researcher, a DSS-for-use advocate, remarked that she felt her 
influence being eroded because she favoured a less aggressive style than others. Within 
both Thai and Australian teams, males tended to be more dominant than females, however, 
given the small number of researchers involved, there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that gender rather than personalities was involved. Within joint Thai-Australian 
meetings, the Australians tended to play a greater role than the Thais in discussions, 
thereby reinforcing the predominance of the Australian framing of decision support in 
development of the IWRAM DSS. The tendency for the Thais’ to make fewer substantive 
comments during group dialogues than the Australians may possibly be due to the 
meetings being conducted in English, or to the cultural style of meeting procedures. The 
latter interpretation is supported by comments made by some of the Thai collaborators and 
my observations of joint team meetings (see Section 6.6). Some Thai studies literature 
suggests that differences in Thai and Western ideals of interaction, implicated in 
differences in the ritualistic dimensions of meetings, often introduces tensions in cross- 
cultural collaborative development practice (cf Hinton 1992, Demaine 1986:110).
7.4 Effective reorientation? Assessing the frameworks
Given the limited time period of this thesis, the following evaluation of the theoretical and 
analytical frameworks should be viewed as preliminary rather than conclusive. None-the- 
less, analysis of the IWRAM case study provides insight into the utility of the frameworks 
in revealing convergences and divergences in framing, and in promoting critical, 
collaborative learning. Complementing the case study narrative, the following discussion 
reflects my interpretations based on the totality of my observations of and interaction with 
the IWRAM case study.
Firstly, the IWRAM case study suggested that the discursive interrogation of biases was 
useful in highlighting tensions of framing, allowing negotiation over the degree to which 
different framings should shape or manifest within the DSS. During the interviews with 
Thai researchers, it emerged that perceived divergences in perspective tended not to be 
discussed openly amongst participants. However, many interviewees treated the interview 
as an indirect conduit to expose and air these divergences more widely. The analytical 
framework thus provided an opportunity to reveal tensions, and a focus for constructive 
debate over reconciling alternate framings.
Analysis of the analytical framework dialogues in the context of the critical history of 
development of the IWRAM DSS highlighted some inconsistency between researchers’ 
espoused theories and theories-in-practice. For example, DSS-for-research advocates 
tended to advocate participatory ideology, while their practice routinely undermined broad 
participation by failing to support adequate resourcing and by moving forward in the 
research plan without waiting for participatory inputs. Probing within the dialogues was 
useful in pointing to the systemic commitments which pressured and promoted enactment 
of the theory-in-use rather than the espoused theory. This reinforces the value in ensuring
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that the conceptual underpinnings of the analytical framework remain at the forefront, 
rather than the form, and that the methodology of using the framework is flexible. Thus, 
the framework questions should not be regarded as either rigid or sufficient, since further 
probing may be necessary to encourage dialogue and challenge assumptions.
The critical history of the IWRAM project illustrated that apparent broad convergence may 
obscure subtle differences in framing. In particular, within the Australian trial, the 
presumption of close convergence at the beginning of Part A of the analytical framework 
was increasingly challenged as the interrogation of biases proceeded. For example, while 
both the Australian project leader and Australian DSS leader framed the DSS as a 
computer-based tool integrating models and GIS, the DSS leader construed DSS as 
necessarily supporting particular decision-making processes, while the project leader cast 
the DSS as a more generic technical and transferable system. The case study also 
illustrated that convergence at an initial stage may develop into divergence through 
changes in framing over time. As O’Neill (1998) suggests “In social settings where 
descriptions of concepts change over time, the participants may not realise that their 
meanings are no longer cohesive”. Thus, while the Australian researchers all framed DSS 
as a computer-based tool at the beginning of Part A, by the conclusion of Part B, an 
alternate framing of DSS as process had emerged. This finding reinforces the value of 
iterative use of the analytical framework to interrogate emerging incompatibilities in 
framing, and manage emerging biases.
The theoretical and analytical frameworks had variable success in promoting long-term 
critical learning within the project. Those participants most responsive to using the 
frameworks to catalyse critical reflection on individual and group biases were those who 
tended towards a DSS-for-practice stance, including the majority of the Thai team. Some 
Thai studies literature suggests that hierarchical tradition in Thailand would discourage 
critical thinking (Hirsch 1990, Gohlert 1991). However, with only a few exceptions, both 
government and academics challenged their own ignorance and invoked stories of political 
conflict to articulate alternate constructions of problems and problem-solving. Within the 
Australian team, most participants gained an increased conceptual awareness of potential 
biases, and some actively carried critical reflection of bias into their research practice. 
However, it appeared that other participants were tolerating rather than actively engaging 
in critical discussion of biases.
Some participants seemed to encounter difficulties in accepting the notion that being 
inwardly critical could be a legitimate intellectual activity. They perceived critical 
thinking and dialogue to be negative and non-constructive, and an impediment to 
efficiency. They also had difficulties in reconciling my role as a non-directive catalyst and 
facilitator, and often expressed a preference that I advise them of how I thought they 
should modify practice to recognise potential biases that I had identified. These 
participants’ negative sentiments about engaging in critical, reflexive dialogue appeared to 
deepen when systemic constraints, particularly pressures to work at a rapid pace to produce 
frequent tangible outputs, were heightened. A short-term efficiency instead of long-term 
effectiveness orientation has been recognised by Zuber-Skerritt (1996) as one of the main 
barriers to action research. Supporting the IWRAM experience, Zuber-Skerritt (1996:91) 
suggests that the desire to want to ‘get on with the job’ to achieve short-term results in 
minimum time discourages spending time on reflection, team building and discussion. 
Zuber-Skerritt (1996:91) also notes that emphasis on operational rather than strategic 
organisational issues presents a further barrier to action research, as it may lead to
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resentment at exploring philosophical assumptions and strategic directions. An operational 
focus may partially account for some IWRAM participants’ disinterest in critical reflection 
and dialogue on bias. As recognised in Chapter 4, the potential of the framework to 
catalyse learning is inevitably constrained by the extent to which a participant is open to 
learning occurring. However, at a minimum, the framework requires participants to 
explicitly confront certain questions and articulate positions which would otherwise remain 
unvoiced.
The IWRAM case study suggests another barrier to collaborative critical learning may 
stem from perceptions of professional vulnerability if ignorance is admitted to in the 
presence of fellow researchers. For example, some participants would be open about 
spheres of personal ignorance during discussions with me, a student, but would refrain 
from raising these potential biases during the group dialogues, and further, would 
sometimes portray themselves as completely knowledgable about these spheres.
Action learning was further constrained since research tasks tended not to conform to a 
model of habitual, repeated practice. Instead, development of the DSS entailed a linear 
sequence of one-off tasks, directed towards achievement of project goals. Consequently, 
unless researchers were involved in parallel DSS development projects, they would be 
unlikely to engage in some development tasks until the group had moved onto their next 
DSS development project. Furthermore, monitoring and reflecting on the effects of DSS 
development actions, in order to adapt practice, is not a short term exercise. These timing 
issues illustrate that some tensions arise when an action leaming-by-doing approach is used 
in future-oriented, anticipatory practice.
Where learning did occur, in terms of greater awareness of and responses to bias 
throughout the IWRAM project, situated learning theory prompted an expectation that this 
learning would reconstitute IWRAM DSS development practice, and that beyond my 
interaction with the project, learning would flow through to newcomers through peripheral 
participation in the IWRAM community of practice. However, this expectation did not 
materialise. Firstly, the new Australian appointees did not act as much like apprentices as 
presumed by peripheral participation theory (Lave and Wenger 1991). Rather than 
gradually internalising the norms and negotiated approach of the existing IWRAM team, 
the new staff were keen to establish their academic independence and credibility. They 
viewed the project proposal, and the three years of negotiations which had led to the 
formation of that proposal, as past history. They construed the DSS as a technical, 
software-based product and were reluctant to integrate a process-oriented framing. As the 
new staffs contracts were bound to the funded project timeframe, they faced magnified 
pressures to deliver a product at the end of three years, and to dismiss perceived non-core 
activities such as critical reflection on biases and other practice-related issues. They were 
also engaged full-time on the DSS development, unlike the existing researchers for whom 
the IWRAM project was one amongst a number of academic responsibilities.
Consequently, they assumed greater independent ownership over DSS development, and 
were initially less interested in accommodating the outcomes of the original researchers’ 
discursive interrogation of biases, than anticipated according to peripheral participation 
theory. However, over time, some of the new staff did express an interest in reading the 
critical history of the IWRAM project (Chapter 6) to inform continuing conflicts within the 
whole team regarding DSS-as-software vs DSS-as-product. This illustrates the potential of 
a textual record of even a single, non-iterative interrogation of bias to facilitate post-facto 
evaluation and inform backward learning.
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It should be reiterated that the new staff commenced their work with the IWRAM project 
towards the conclusion of my case study, and thus did not participate in bias dialogues.
One of the original researchers, who maintained a personal interest in iteratively reflecting 
on bias, suggested that the withdrawal from the project of not only myself but also a 
number of the original researchers who were responsive to the use of the frameworks, as 
well as the part-time status of others who had participated in the interrogation of biases, 
impeded the potential for learning to flow through to the newcomers. This suggests that 
long-term learning via iterative use of the frameworks requires a champion to enthuse and 
catalyse others to participate.
The process of using the analytical framework with the IWRAM project suggested several 
modifications to the original framework to improve its format, practicality and relevance 
for that specific case. Firstly, to facilitate comparison of participants’ modes of framing, a 
section was inserted to locate, firstly, the role of participants within DSS development and, 
secondly, their initial framing of the DSS. Secondly, where developers joined the IWRAM 
team at a later stage, and thus were not involved in the original conceptual development, it 
was more useful in terms of building a picture of that participants’ construing to inquire 
about the perceived purpose of the DSS, rather than how it was initiated. However, during 
the group dialogues, it remained useful to revisit earlier responses regarding the initiation 
of the DSS both to apprise newcomers of this dimension of the critical history and to 
inform negotiation of the shared group vision for the DSS. A number of semantic 
modifications arose as more appropriate language emerged to phrase certain questions. For 
example, the term ‘decision problem’, adopted from the DSS literature, was replaced by 
‘the decision’, as many participants not from a DSS background argued that they did not 
necessarily construe decisions as problems. Other modifications were made to improve the 
logical flow of questioning. For example, while uncertainties and assumptions relate to 
embedded assumptions, it proved more useful to interrogate these issues within the context 
of communication (access) biases. This highlights the interconnections between different 
questions, and the value in viewing the framework as a flexible heuristic tool rather than as 
a rigid methodology. Different elements of the framework complemented and reinforced 
each other in the gradual revelation of the narrative of decision support and bias for the 
IWRAM project. Table 7.4 presents the adapted framework.
7.5 Conclusion
Tensions of framing decision support within the IWRAM project illustrated that 
developers’ different motives for being involved in DSS development, their differing 
construing of environmental problems, problem solving and the decision-making 
environment may shape and thereby bias the form and/or content of a DSS in particular 
ways. Systemic professional pressures, ideological commitments, and disciplinary are 
among the factors which served to promote one framing over another in the construction of 
the IWRAM DSS.
Evaluation of the proposed reorientation of DSS development in light of the experience of 
the IWRAM case study has demonstrated that the theory informing the reorientation held 
together cogently, and has attested to the practical worth and relevance of the analytical 
framework for interrogating bias. As well as assisting in highlighting alternate framings, 
the analytical framework served to promote critical learning amongst some of the IWRAM 
participants. The case study also revealed several barriers which discourage collaborative 
critical learning via the interrogation of biases, including an efficiency orientation,
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professional vulnerability and the time horizons involved in DSS development. In 
particular, the case study also suggests that an interrogation of bias emerges as less relevant 
if developers are primarily interested in development of a technical DSS-for-research, 
rather than a DSS for practice.
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Table 7-4 Altered framework for anticipating and reflecting on bias in DSS
Locating the participant
What role will you have in developing the DSS?
Can you describe what you think the DSS should be like?
A: Background
A 1. Why was this development of DSS initiated?/What is the purpose of the DSS?
A2. What decision(s) do you think the DSS should support?
A3. Who are the stakeholders to this decision?
A4. Are there existing decision-making processes relevant to this decision?.
A5. Who are the intended users (direct and indirect) of the DSS?
A6. What benefits do you think different users will get from using the DSS?
A7. Will the DSS be used in conjunction with any other decision-making tools or processes?
A8. What are the criteria for success of the DSS?
B: Embedded bias
B1. Describe the people who you think should be involved in development of the DSS. Why, when and how should 
they be involved?
B2. Describe those stakeholders who will not be involved in the development of the DSS. Why won't they be involved?
B3. How do you think different stakeholders’ views need to be considered during the design or construction of the 
DSS?
B4. Who do you think should frame the decision in the DSS?
B5. How do you think the decision should be framed in the DSS?
B6. Can you think of any alternate ways of framing the decision?
B7. Describe the hardware, software, models and data which you think should be incorporated in the DSS. Why should 
they be incorporated? How will they be integrated?
B8. Have any hardware, software, models or data set options previously under consideration been rejected? If so, why? 
B9. How might the decision, or the decision environment, change over time?
B10. How well do you think the DSS will be able to respond to these changes?
C: Biased access
C 1. What outputs will the DSS have?
C2. How should the output of the DSS be presented to the different direct and indirect users?
C3. What uncertainties and assumptions can you think of that relate to the DSS?
C4. Should uncertainties and assumptions be communicated to different users? How?
C5. What are the likely up-front and running costs of the system? Who will bear the costs?
C6. Do you think any of the direct users will have difficulty accessing the DSS because of: the geographical structure of 
the DSS; the financial cost of using the DSS; and/or the literacy required to use the DSS; any other reason?
Cl. Do you think any of the indirect users will have difficulty accessing the information output of the DSS because of: 
the geographical structure of the information; the financial cost of the information; or the literacy required to access 
the information; any other reason?
C8. How will the DSS articulate with existing or intended policymaking processes and institutions?
C9. In the light of (A5) and (C4,5,6), is it likely that use of the DSS will increase the participation of any of the 
stakeholders in environmental decision-making?
CIO.In the light of (A5) and (C2,4,5,6), is there a risk that use of the DSS will decrease the participation of any of the 
stakeholders in environmental decision-making?
Iterative summary
• At this point, what do you consider to be the major advantages in using DSS in this decision-making environment??
• At this point, what do you consider to be the major problems with using DSS in this decision-making environment??
• What steps could you take to minimise or manage these problems?_______________________________________
Conclusions and discussion
State- and foreign-sponsored highland development projects have encouraged 
intensification o f agriculture and greater incorporation into the market economy. 
In the top picture, a highland villager has loaded up his pick-up truck to sell his 
crops at the Chiang Mai markets. The lower picture shows a tin shed storing his 
pesticides and fertilisers, which have accompanied the agricultural 
intensification and introduced new environmental problems.
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8. Conclusions and discussion
This chapter consolidates and reflects on the contributions of this thesis. 
Implications of the thesis for the development of decision support systems and for 
the practice of integrated research are advanced. Limitations of the research are 
canvassed, and future research directions are suggested.
8.1 Environmental decision support: Anticipating bias
Rhetorical justification of environmental DSS, and DSS development and extension 
ethos, have tended to stem from and be embedded within a positivist paradigm. 
However, influenced by interdisciplinary critical analyses, positivist assumptions of 
the objectivity and privilege of science are encountering widespread and mounting 
scepticism. The central concern of this thesis has been the effectiveness of DSS to 
assist Integrated Environmental Management within a post-positivist paradigm that 
recognises the constructedness of knowledge and the partiality of science. The 
contributions of this thesis are summarised in Box 8.1.
• Critique of conventional rationale for environmental DSS
• Development of taxonomy of bias relevant to environmental DSS
• Development of theoretical framework to underpin reflexive, precautionary DSS 
development
• Development of practical analytical framework to guide an interrogation of bias
• Through grounded case study, trial and improvement of theoretical and analytical 
frameworks in practice
• Contribution to methodological literature through testing of action research and 
integrated research theory
Box 8-1 Contributions of this thesis to theory, method and practice
Drawing on new paradigm alternatives to positivist inquiry, Chapter 2 constructed an 
innovative methodology which emphasised transparency, reflexivity, critical thinking 
and methodological pluralism. Throughout this thesis, informing constructs have 
been integrated from multiple bodies of theory, many of which have not previously 
received attention within the DSS field. This transdisciplinary approach has enabled 
a new perspective on DSS development. In particular, by framing DSS development 
as a process of social negotiation, rather than as a rational, objective, technical 
exercise, the political dimensions of DSS development have been highlighted. Both 
the research methodology, and mode of presentation of this thesis, reflected an 
endeavour to promote consonance between the conceptual concerns of the thesis, 
including the constructedness of knowledge, and my own academic practice. The 
thesis, as process and product, thus illustrates reflexivity in practice. The preceding 
methodological dimensions set this thesis apart from any previous critiques of
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environmental DSS. Hence, this research represents a considerable contribution to 
the emerging critical DSS literature.
Chapter 3 critiqued the conventional framing of environmental DSS as inherently 
objective, expert and efficient. Drawing on theory of the construction of knowledge,
I argued that a DSS will reflect and validate the worldview of those who have input 
into or influence over the design or development of the DSS. Consequently, the 
potential arises for bias to be embedded within a DSS during its design and 
development so that the output of the DSS systematically favours or promotes one 
perspective over another. Sources of embedded biases in output include 
commitments, absences of knowledge, and distortions of knowledge. Since a DSS 
may constitute a discursive method for validating one perspective over another, 
biases in terms of access to the technology, or to the processes in which it is 
embedded, may introduce, reinforce or augment power inequities between 
stakeholders. Sources of biases in access include the geographical, financial 
considerations, literacy, and political considerations. Identified sources of bias were 
synthesised in a taxonomy of bias.
Challenging the purported expertise of DSS, I drew on contemporary development, 
adaptive management and other literature to argue that, like knowledge, 
interpretations of expertise are also multiple and socially constructed. So long as the 
development of DSS remains in the hands of an elite technical or epistemic group, 
according to the conventional mode, the knowledge embodied within the system, the 
system structure and the output of the system will tend to conform to and reinforce 
the biases and ignorance of this group. Democratisation of expertise advocates 
opening the development process to a wider cross-section of stakeholders to assist in 
managing for bias and ignorance. However, participatory approaches are no 
methodological panacea to rid DSS development of bias, as they too are inherently 
political processes in which validation of the structure, form and content of the DSS 
is enmeshed in systems of power. Consequently, regardless of the DSS development 
approach adopted, a commitment to equity and transparency dimensions of the 
sustainability paradigm demands critical appraisal of the systems of power engaged 
during development, and their implications for bias. Chapter 3 closed by arguing 
that the interrogation of potential biases during DSS development is also imperative 
for effective - and efficient - delivery of decision support. While every DSS will be 
associated with some form of partiality and bias, the key question is whether the 
biases associated with a particular DSS are significant in light of stakeholders’ 
grounded concerns. Thus, processes are necessary which facilitate a situated 
interrogation and management of potential biases associated with a particular DSS.
Chapter 4 articulated a theoretical and an analytical framework to guide a 
reorientation of DSS development processes which would better respond to the 
constructedness of DSS and the potential for bias. Central to this reorientation was 
the reconstitution of DSS development as reflexive, precautionary practice. A 
cyclical, discursive approach, based on action learning and critical theory, was 
advocated to guide critical inquiry into, reflection on, and analysis of the interactions 
between developers’ practice, development biases and the decision-making 
environment. By enhancing self-awareness of individual and shared biases, reflexive
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DSS practice may promote individual learning. As individuals probe and debate 
competing framings of decision support in concert, a mutual vision for the DSS may 
be negotiated, and collaborative learning may emerge. Through communication of 
the critical history of DSS development, including the discursive interrogation of 
biases, post-facto learning is also promoted. Drawing on the taxonomy of bias, an 
analytical framework was proposed to facilitate an interrogation of bias by 
developers and users of DSS to enable the anticipation, avoidance and minimisation, 
both prior to and during DSS design and development, of potential biases likely to 
interact transformatively with the decision-making environment.
To inform and ground the theoretically-derived frameworks, they were used to guide 
an interrogation of bias in a joint Australian-Thai research project which was 
developing a DSS to assist Integrated Water Resources Assessment and Management 
(IWRAM) in the highlands of Northern Thailand. To locate the IWRAM project, 
Chapter 5 outlined the geographic, cultural and political decision-making 
environment of the Highlands of Northern Thailand. Drawing on a narrative of the 
highland environmental history as well as a discussion of the political culture of 
highland decision-making, tensions were highlighted which underlie interpretations 
of and approaches to highland decision support. Rather than presenting as a 
technical, politically benign problem amenable to rational optimisation, highland 
environmental decision-making, including framing of ‘the problem’ and approaches 
to solutions, emerged as a political battle-ground in which stakeholders seek to 
acquire legitimacy in claims over contested spaces and resources. Through 
foreshadowing potential biases, DSS was revealed as a potential discursive tool in 
these battles. Amongst other factors, centralisation, patriarchal rule, a tradition of 
bureaucratic elites controlling the expertise and tools of power, historic 
marginalisation of highland people, the remoteness of highland villages, widespread 
illiteracy and persistent low incomes within highland villages pointed to the potential 
for the IWRAM DSS to be biased in favour of a government framing of decision 
support and against the perspective of highland people. Chapter 5 also illustrated 
that awareness of the decision-making environment may heighten sensitivity to 
potential biases. Chapter 5 concluded that for the IWRAM project, a challenge was 
whether and how the processes of developing and implementing a DSS for the 
Northern highlands could be constructed to minimise and avoid potential biases.
Chapters 6 and 7 described and analysed the discursive interrogation of biases by 
collaborators in the IWRAM project. The narrative of development of the IWRAM 
DSS, presented in Chapter 6, illustrated that the process of framing and shaping the 
DSS has been enmeshed within networks of sociopolitical and personal 
commitments. Professional interests and aspirations, strategic institutional building, 
ethical concerns, disciplinary commitments to methodology, pressures to satisfy 
funding bodies, aspirations for furthering sociopolitical empowerment, and 
normative constructions of the highland decision-making environment were among 
the factors which appeared to contribute to different participants’ framings of the 
nature and role of decision support.
The IWRAM case study also illustrated that the interpretive flexibility of the term 
‘decision support’ underlies key tensions and dilemmas within environmental
182
decision support development, practice and discourse. The discursive interrogation 
of biases was useful in highlighting tensions of framing, and providing a focus for 
constructive debate and negotiation over the degree to which different framings 
should shape or manifest within the DSS. The value of exploring and making more 
transparent alternate constructions of decision support, and the networks that shape 
those constructions, lies not in seeking to structurally manifest the most ‘objective’ 
nor most ‘correct’ construction. Instead, the value lies in revealing the role that 
sociopolitical spheres of influence play in shaping the nature and form of decision 
support, thus enabling ‘effective’ decision support to be assessed not only in the light 
of a specific decision-making environment, but also in the light of the specificities of 
the development environment. Consequently, management of bias is not a one-off 
exercise in discerning and applying the most bias-free method, but involves: firstly, 
continuous critical appraisal of both potential and emerging biases; and secondly, 
iterative adaptation of methods as the development community evaluates the 
compatibility of the DSS development approach with the needs of the decision­
making environment in the light of the critical appraisal. Consequently, the 
questions listed in the analytical framework for interrogating bias should not be 
regarded as either rigid or sufficient. Instead, the conceptual underpinnings of the 
framework should remain at the forefront, rather than the analytical form, and the 
methodology of using the framework should be modified as required to encourage 
dialogue and challenge assumptions.
The IWRAM case study raised the potential for the theoretical critical and 
collaborative learning concepts underlying the analytical framework to inform a 
deconstruction of disciplinary biases and catalyse negotiation of an integrated 
framing of decision support to allow the joint enterprise to progress. Furthermore, 
the experience of the IWRAM case study suggested that the analytical framework for 
interrogating bias may be modified and reconstructed as a tool for exposing 
disciplinary politics and biases in any interdisciplinary project, not only those 
focussing on developing a DSS.
The narrative of the IWRAM case study illustrated that use of the proposed 
frameworks may catalyse individual, situated learning in practice. This was 
evidenced within both Thai and Australian teams by participants’ evolving framing 
of decision support as well as their increased conceptual awareness of potential 
biases. It also illustrated the potential of a textual record of even a single, non­
iterative interrogation of bias to facilitate post-facto evaluation and inform backward 
learning. Of those IWRAM researchers who participated in the interrogation of 
biases, only a few regarded the process as neither constructive nor catalytic of 
learning. In part due to the influential role of these latter participants in shaping the 
DSS, and also because of the withdrawal from the project of some of the participants 
who were most receptive to exploring bias, the interrogation of biases has to date had 
limited impact on the IWRAM DSS. However, at the point of submission of this 
thesis, interest in considering the issues raised during my research has been reignited 
within both the Thai and Australian teams.
The IWRAM case study illustrated that potential of the framework to catalyse 
learning is inevitably constrained by the extent to which a participant is open to
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learning. However, at a minimum, the framework requires participants to explicitly 
confront certain questions and articulate positions which would otherwise remain 
unvoiced. The case study also suggested that the extent to which precautionary DSS 
development is embraced does not rest solely with predilection of individual 
participants, but is instead mediated by systemic sociocultural and political pressures. 
In particular, established ideologies and systems of power, manifested in the 
established discourse, practice and organisation of research and funding 
communities, reinforce and entrench conventional practice, and dissuade DSS 
developers from engaging in reflexive, precautionary practice.
8.2 Implications for DSS development
As evidenced throughout Chapter 3, a new paradigm is tentatively emerging within 
environmental DSS literature which attends to some of the issues which flow from a 
critical examination of the conventional paradigm of DSS development. For 
example, a constructive and substantive role for DSS is supported so long as the 
conventional preoccupation with providing optimal solutions to environmental 
problems is displaced by an emphasis on supporting an evolutionary learning 
process. The fledgling paradigm also prompts DSS developers to make greater 
efforts to encourage participation by intended end-users within the development 
process to promote increased contextual relevance. No longer are users restricted to 
technical analysts; instead, DSS engages multiple stakeholders with differing needs 
and competences. By drawing on broad sociopolitical bodies of theory, this thesis 
has extended the concepts of learning, dialogue, and user participation in DSS 
development beyond their embryonic and cursory treatment within the emerging 
DSS literature. In so doing, this thesis has revealed tensions which underlie a 
learning-oriented, dialogic, participatory approach to environmental decision support, 
and which demand consideration if the DSS development community is to confront 
the challenge of effectively supporting integrated environmental management.
Firstly, this thesis suggests that DSS development may provide an arena for 
integration amongst multiple environmental perspectives. Dialogue amongst the 
different participants in DSS development may highlight convergence of vision and 
understanding about the joint enterprise (the DSS) and reinforce a mutually agreed 
trajectory for future development. Dialogue may also expose divergences and create 
space for debate about alternate framings of decision support, thus enabling 
negotiation amongst participants as to the appropriate framing of the DSS given the 
specificities of the decision-making environment. However, this thesis has also 
illustrated that effective dialogue may be constrained by a number of systemic 
pressures endemic within the DSS development environment, not least the mounting 
pressures on researchers to move further towards professionalism and profitable 
science. These pressures are unlikely to subside in the short or medium term as both 
Australian and Thai governments continue to extend their application of economic 
rationalist ideology within the research sphere, with no indication of imminent 
abatement. Against this background, there is a need to examine the pressures 
experienced by DSS developers, to assess the interplay between these pressures and a 
dialogic, learning approach, and to reconcile the need to work within the prevailing
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political decision-making environment with critical concerns about the 
(in)effectiveness of conventional decision support. In effecting this reconciliation, 
this thesis suggests that, in particular, the operating procedures of institutions which 
fund DSS development should be attended to. For example, it may prove useful for 
funding institutions (such as ACIAR in the IWRAM case analysed here) to 
incorporate a DSS feasibility stage in which, prior to in-depth specification of 
technical details of the project, those proposing development of a DSS receive a 
small amount of funds to assess whether a DSS is likely to be more appropriate, 
useful and effective in the relevant decision-making environment than any other 
decision-making mechanism, and if so, what sort of DSS would be appropriate. 
Incorporation of such a stage may enable greater participation of the intended users 
in the initial conceptual stages, assisting in managing for bias and guarding against 
ineffective decision support.
Given the systemic pressures dissuading developers from engaging in dialogue about 
bias, steps may also need to be taken to institutionalise dialogic learning, including 
validating and resourcing a champion to enthuse and catalyse others to participate.
A move towards product-driven and efficiency-conscious professional science also 
points against the viability of the fluid developer-user entity (users as developers, 
developers as users) to which both participatory and discursive approaches aspire, 
and towards the notion that a DSS developer provides a finite service for a future 
consumer. Where developers’ engagement with a DSS is spatially and temporally 
separate from users’ engagement, continuity is impeded, and a greater likelihood 
arises for a loss of knowledge of the history of development decisions to occur. In 
this context, there is a need to develop means of binding the critical history of DSS 
development to a particular DSS to assist future transparency and learning. For 
example, within a DSS software package, an account of development could be 
embedded within the package, so that users could access it, and add to it if 
appropriate.
The IWRAM case study illustrated that the interpretive flexibility of the term ‘DSS’ 
may lead to confusion within the development process if participants who frame the 
DSS in alternate ways are not aware that they are referring to different constructs. In 
particular, with regard to the research/practice tension, confusion frequently arose as 
to the scope of the project. Research advocates, who framed the DSS as a technical 
computer-based product, maintained that DSS development should focus on software 
provision. They thus felt that process-oriented decision support was a separate aim 
of the IWRAM project, distinct from DSS development. Meanwhile, practice 
advocates, who framed the DSS as encompassing both software and non-software 
tools and processes, were often perplexed as to why the research advocates were not 
more willing to discuss process issues within the context of DSS development. 
During the Thai portion of the IWRAM case study, it emerged that greater clarity 
during dialogues was facilitated by distinguishing decision technology from decision 
support processes to indicate whether the discussion was strictly about a computer- 
based tool or more broadly about providing the most effective support to a particular 
decision-making environment. This indicates that if a precautionary approach to 
DSS development is adopted, care should be taken that the development community
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gives adequate attention to and explicit acknowledgment of alternate framings before 
engaging in negotiation over the mutual vision of the DSS.
8.3 Implications for integrated research
The IWRAM case study illustrated that development of a DSS may facilitate 
integration by enabling different researchers to focus on a joint enterprise. It also 
illustrated that integration requires continuous interaction, as inconsistencies between 
disciplinary approaches (for instance, scales of analysis) may not be immediately 
obvious, but instead may emerge through time. This suggests that a commitment to 
integration necessitates both a common focus and a willingness to engage with other 
researchers repeatedly during pursuit of the joint enterprise, rather than merely at the 
outset of research.
During the IWRAM DSS development, it emerged that differing degrees of authority 
seemed to be accorded to different disciplines to contribute to the strategic goals and 
direction of the joint enterprise. It also emerged that the potential of either a 
technical or a process-oriented DSS to catalyse integration may be undermined or 
compromised if particular disciplines are not validated to contribute to that form of 
DSS. The analytical framework for interrogating bias proved useful to enhance the 
potential for any DSS to act as an integrative mechanism by explicitly revealing 
alternate framings of the DSS and the DSS development process, and by facilitating 
transparency of instances of disciplinary domination and bias. The experience of the 
IWRAM case study suggests that any attempt to engage in interdisciplinary research, 
regardless of whether a DSS is involved or not, may benefit from critical appraisal of 
the differential participation of researchers in the collaborative research, and of how 
this differential participation may be biasing the research product such that 
integration is undermined.
The IWRAM case study suggested that integrated research may be impeded if 
perceptions of professional vulnerability lead to a reluctance to admit ignorance in 
the presence of fellow researchers. The IWRAM case study also illustrated that 
dialogue directed at integration may be impeded by a researcher’s desire to exhibit 
respect of others’ professional disciplinary contribution. Hence, integration may be 
enhanced amongst a group of researchers if time is taken initially to engage in 
dialogue or activities that: firstly, promote mutual trust; and secondly, validate both 
admission of ignorance and critical challenges of others’ perspectives as pivotal to 
effective integration.
8.4 Limitations of the research: Opportunities for future research
Given time limitations, the proposed taxonomy of bias is neither comprehensive nor 
complete, but instead reflects a distillation and synthesis of factors which emerged 
from the reviewed literature as significant for environmental DSS. In 
acknowledgment of my own biases (commitments and absences of knowledge), there 
is scope to develop the taxonomy further:
• For environmental DSS by expanding the review of environmental policy
literature. Also, further review of public understanding of science literature may
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yield useful insights into the interplay not only between access and bias, but also 
between perceptions of access and bias.
• For alternate DSS spheres of application. For example, with its industrial 
democracy underpinnings, Scandinavian participatory systems development 
literature may offer insights into organisational, production- and employment- 
related sources of bias.
Both the conceptual framework for reflexive, precautionary practice and the 
analytical framework for interrogating bias would benefit from further testing in 
other DSS development and decision-making environments. In particular, a key 
direction for future research is exploration of alternate methodologies of framework 
application which are more effective in promoting critical learning in the case of 
participants who construe the dialogue methodology as non-constructive. This type 
of research is particularly important given the increasing pressure on researchers to 
adopt an efficiency orientation. In this area of research, further exploration and trial 
of organisational learning methods which have already confronted the strategic 
learning-efficiency tension may be useful.
Largely because of the stage at which the IWRAM project was at, I have focussed in 
this thesis upon framing of decision support rather than upon production of the DSS 
or upon the DSS as product. Further research in these latter areas could include:
• Contrasting the material DSS with the discursive processes that generated and 
validated the embedded knowledge
• Exploring the interpretive flexibility of the material DSS as ‘text’ with respect to 
subsequent users or ‘readers’, and the political implications of alternate 
interpretations
• Through action research, developing processes by which users may interrogate, 
reveal and respond to biases post-facto development of a DSS.
As mentioned in my methodological limitations, this thesis has focused, in 
descending order of emphasis, on the Australian IWRAM collaborators, then Thai 
IWRAM collaborators, then other highland stakeholders. A fertile area for inquiry 
would involve eliciting in greater detail the constructions of the decision-making 
environment and decision support of highland stakeholders who have been 
un(der)represented in the IWRAM DSS development, to enable a more in-depth 
analysis of their convergence and divergence with constructions embedded in the 
DSS.
As a result of the development approach adopted by the IWRAM project, an 
opportunity was not afforded to engage a broader discursive community in the 
dialogues about potential bias. This thesis has thus focussed primarily on the 
different framings of decision support by collaborating researchers and public 
servants. However, as the IWRAM project proceeds, the participation of other 
stakeholders in development of the DSS is anticipated to increase. Over time, 
stakeholder ‘users’ are likely to have progressively more involvement in and 
ownership of DSS development, while the researchers are will have progressively 
less. A reinterrogation of bias as different stakeholders become involved would
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illuminate convergence and divergence of framing amongst and between 
stakeholders, including different government agencies, different villages, NGOs and 
commercial interests. Broader participation of stakeholders in bias dialogues would 
also further test and inform the frameworks developed in this thesis as discursive 
tools for critical learning.
8.5 Reorienting environmental DSS: A critical future...
As the twentieth century draws to a close, two fundamental challenges facing 
humanity are the rapid expansion of computerisation, and the escalating ecological 
crisis. While the former has a key role to play in responding to the latter, this thesis 
argue that a blind faith in computer-based approaches may undermine an effective 
response to the environmental problematique. To avoid failure, this thesis suggests 
that the development and use of environmental DSS must be reoriented to embrace a 
reflexively critical approach. In other words, being critical is argued to be critical for 
the future of environmental DSS. This thesis further argued that central to a critical 
approach is recognition and management of potential biases associated with 
environmental DSS. I do not pretend to have developed within this thesis a 
penultimate response to bias. However, I have offered a nascent and substantial 
theoretical and practical step, which I hope will prompt expanded dialogue about the 
nature of bias and the opportunities for reflexive DSS practice.
At the outset of this thesis, the imperative for DSS was positioned within the 
information complexity of contemporary environmental management. However, the 
notion of bias suggests recasting the imperative, and the dilemma, of decision 
support in the context of social complexity. As humanity continues to grapple with 
decision-making for sustainability, 1 suggest that negotiation between competing 
social framings and a precautionary approach to bias will be increasingly imperative 
for collaborative action to promote a sustained future. The experience of the 
IWRAM case study suggests that in this endeavour, alternate non-computer-based 
approaches will need to be empowered alongside computer-based DSS, akin to the 
democratisation of expertise which allied ‘local’ and ‘scientific’ ways of knowing.
Although this thesis revealed several tensions between framings of decision support, 
I do not hold to an either/or dichotomy between different framings. Even in the case 
of the research versus practice tension, where key dimensions of framing clearly 
conflict, the choice is not necessarily one or the other. Instead, it is a matter of 
degree and emphasis, and of understanding better the implications of different 
commitments. Yet, discursive battles over alternate framings in order for one 
framing to win outright over another are likely to prevail within DSS development 
processes while integrative methodologies remain under-researched and under­
communicated. As Norgaard (1994:141) notes, as yet, “we have little basis for even 
thinking about how disciplinary science, values, coordinating understanding, social 
structure, and collective action fit together”. In this light, even though the process 
fell short of my hopes regarding collaborative interrogation, dialogue, learning and 
mutual negotiation, participants in the IWRAM project should be praised for being 
prepared to venture outside their research comfort zones and engage in a critical and 
transdisciplinary interrogation.
Appendices
Although some government departments have supported the forced removal o f 
highland villages in the name of watershed protection, others have implicitly 
encouraged continued settlement by establishing schools and extending the 
electricity grid. These photos were taken in a village earmarked for relocation. 
In the right-hand photo, a group o f villagers are smoking opium in the
background.
Appendix 1 Questionnaires for Part A of Australian trial of frameworks
Framework for anticipating bias: Group discussion of Part A 
30 May 1997 2:00pm
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Name:
What are the main professional and personal skills which you think you bring to this 
project?
What are your main reasons for being involved in this project?
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Framework for anticipating bias: Part A
A l.W hy was this development o f DSS initiated?
A2.What decision problem(s) is the DSS intended to support?
A3.How might this problem change over time?
A4. Who are the stakeholders to this problem?
A5.Characterise the existing policymaking processes relevant to this problem.
A6.Who are the intended users (direct and indirect) of the DSS?
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A7.What benefits are these users expected to derive from use of the technology?
A8.In the light of (A2,A6 and A7), what are the information requirements of the 
technology?
A9.WU1 the DSS be applied in conjunction with any other policy mechanisms?
A 10. What are the criteria for success of the DSS?
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A l 1 .At this point, what do you consider to be the major advantages in using DSS in this 
application?
A 12. At this point, what do you consider to be the major problems with using DSS in 
this application?
A 13.What steps could you take to minimise or manage these problems?
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Framework for anticipating bias: Evaluation of Part A 
Name:........................................
1. Did you find any of the questions in Part A difficult to understand? If so, do you 
have any suggestions as to how they could be improved?
2. Did you think that the time spent reflecting on and responding to the questions in
Part A was:
too short sufficient too long
◄------------------- ----------------- >
3. Do you think that the process of reflecting on and responding to the questions in Part 
A has altered your attitudes towards DSS in any way?
4. Do you think that the process of reflecting on and responding to the questions in Part 
A has altered your vision of a Decision Support System for the ANU-RPF project in 
any way?
5. Which three questions do you think were most important or useful to have reflected 
on and responded to? Why do you consider them important or useful?
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6. Which question(s) in Part A did you find most useful in terms of:
(Write question number (e.g. AI, A5 and A8). See facing page for a list o f the 
numbered questions.)
a. indicating potential problems with the Decision Support System?
b. indicating different ways that people in the group had perceived the problem?
c. indicating different ways that people in the group were planning to approach 
the problem?
d. indicating different ways that people in the group had envisioned a Decision 
Support System?
e. helping to shape up your ideas about how the project component(s) you are 
involved in will relate to the Decision Support System?
f. helping to shape your ideas about the capacity in which you will be involved 
in development of the Decision Support System?
g. improving your understanding about the roles and responsibilities of other 
people/component teams in future development of the Decision Support 
System?
195
7. Do any elements of Part A of the framework (including both the questions and any 
problems which the framework has highlighted) seem useful enough to be used again 
during future development of the Decision Support System?
If so, when do you think would be the most appropriate stage or time to revisit Part A 
of the framework (or selected questions in Part A)?
8. Do any elements of Part A of the framework (including both the questions and any 
problems which the framework has highlighted) seem useful enough to be 
incorporated in some way into the project research design? (e.g. as a discussion 
point at a project meeting, to monitor progress, to shape a milestone etc.)
9. Is there anything else you would like to add about the usefulness or relevance of (or 
improvements to) Part A of the framework?
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Appendix 2 Interview guide for Thai trial of frameworks
Identification
11 What role will you have in developing the DSS?
12 Can you describe to me what you think the DSS should be like?
A: Background
F I. How do you see a DSS being useful in the Northern highlands of Thailand?
F2a. What disadvantages do you think introducing a DSS into the Northern highlands may 
bring?
F2b. What are the major problems you foresee in developing the DSS in this project?
A5. What do you think the criteria for success of the DSS should be?
A1. What decisions do you think the DSS in this project should support?
A2. Who do you think should be the (direct and indirect) users of the DSS?
A3. What benefits do you think different users will get from using the DSS?
X2. How do you think the DSS should relate to the participatory framework?
B: Embedded biases
B1. Can you describe to me the people who you think should be involved in development of 
the DSS. Why should they be involved? When should they be involved? How should 
they be involved?
B2. Which stakeholders probably won’t be involved in development of the DSS? Why not?
B3. How do you think different stakeholders views need to be considered during the design 
and development of the DSS?
B4. Who do you think should frame the problem in the DSS?
B5. How should the decision problem be framed in the DSS?
B6. Can you think of any other ways of framing the problem?
B7. What types of data and models would you like to see incorporated in the DSS?
B8. How do you think the decision problem or decision environment will change over time? 
B9. How well do you think the DSS will be able to respond to these changes?
C: Biases in access
C 1. What outputs do you think the DSS should have?
C2. How should the output of the DSS be presented to the different direct and indirect users? 
C3. What uncertainties and assumptions can you think of that relate to the DSS?
C4. How should uncertainties and assumptions be communicated to the different direct and 
indirect users?
C5. Do you think any of the direct users will have difficulty using the DSS because of:
• the geographical location of the system?, the financial cost of using the system?, 
the literacy required to use the system?
C6. Do you think any of the indirect users will have difficulty accessing the DSS because of:
• the geographical location of the system?, the financial cost of using the system?, 
the literacy required to use the system?
C7. Do you think that it is likely that the use of the DSS will increase the participation of any 
of the highland stakeholders in environmental decision-making?
C8. Do you think that it is likely that the use of the DSS will decrease the participation of any 
of the highland stakeholders in environmental decision-making?
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Appendix 3 Agenda for Thai group dialogue, November 1997
Progressing the Decision Support System
Friday 14th November 2540 (1997)
Meeting agenda
1. USERS
• Identify and categorise all potential direct and indirect users.
• Identify mechanisms for engaging potential users and other stakeholders on an 
ongoing basis to guide development of DSS and to build up trust in the DSS by 
users.
• Who will be responsible for engaging users and other stakeholders as per above?
2. PARTICIPATORY FRAMEWORK
• How should the decision technology relate to the participatory framework?
3. FORM AND CONTENT OF THE DSS
• Identify opportunities to make the decision technology more equitable, participatory, 
transparent and flexible:
Input multiple visions, options.
Input multiple forms of data: sociocultural, biophysical, economic; scientific and 
indigenous.
Scientific land use classification and indigenous land use classification. 
Plugged-in (replaceable) models 
Other opportunities
• At this point, what is the common vision o f the form of the decision technology?
1 A ‘direct’ user will interact (query, validate, feedback) directly with the technology; an 
‘indirect’ user will interact (query, validate, feedback) with the information output of the 
technology via an alternate medium.
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Appendix 4 Coding frame for analysis of transcripts
Code Theme Related
theme
A CO NSTRUING  OF BIASES
A a Access Bu
Aaa What is access/partipn?: Construing o f  access/partcpn
Aap Re how D S S  m ay affect partipn/access
Aapo Sees opportunity fo r  D SS to improve access/partcpn
A apr Sees risk fo r  D SS to decrease access/partcpn
Aaprt I f  D SS  ju s t  technology - access restricted Buzs
I f  top-down corner D SS
I f  D SS  supplants other mechanisms
Aap, Re identifying and  managing constraints on geographical access
A a f Re identifying and  managing constraints on financia l access
Aac Re identifying and  managing communication constraints/Literacy
Aacc Identifies communication /literacy constraints
Aaccb Users m isinterpreting biased output
Aacw Whose responsibility to develop means o f  interfacing with users 
and when?
Aaa
Aacm Identifies common media, interface mechnms to manage 
commcn./lit. constraints
A acm d D iff  m ethods fo r  d if f  people (equitable c f  equal modes)
M aps
Graphical user interface
Tables
Surrogate person/trustworthy orgzn
Aacm t Thai c f  english D SS
Aacmm D eveloping mechanisms/processes
Aam M iscellaneous
A b Re em bedded bias
Abj Lists justifications fo r  trying to m inmise em bedded bias
To m inim ise misinterpretations
To m anage fo r  ignorance
Abb Identifies potential biases
Identifies uncertainties
Identifies assumptions
Sees problem s i f  D SS doesn ’t incorporate multiple info.
Sees problem s i f  D SS d o esn ’t incorporate multiple perspecs.
Abm R e m anaging em bedded bias
A b m f Re m anaging fo r  flexibility/relevance B c f
Abm c Re com m unicating uncertainties, assumptions Aac
Abx Perspective infers potential fo r  embedded bias
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B CO N STR U IN G  OF THE DSS (AND DSS DEVELO PM ENT) Related
themes
Be What should  it be/look like?: D esired /in tended characteristics o f  
D SS  (nature/form)
Bu
B er Relevant and  useful in real world
B ed Produces good  data
B e f Flexible/updateable
Bew W idely usable/user-friendly Buo
Bee Equitable
Bex What D SS  should  incorporate/ info, required fo r  D SS
Bexs Re how stakeholders views incorporated in D SS Bdp
Bern M iscellaneous characteristics
Bu H ow  can/should/w ill the D SS be used by whom?
Buw Who should  identify users?
Buz G eneral statem ents o f  purpose
Buzs B roader D SS  c f  just software info, system
Computer and non-com puter information
Assist participatory p lanning
Buzsp Re how D SS interacts with particip. fram ew ork/ 
other policy mechanisms
Buzi Acquire, organise, coordinate data/information: info, 
data system
Propose alternatives fo r  development
Clarify options/issues
W hat-if simulation to view im pacts o f  d i f f  options
Explore/generate better understanding o f  
impacts/consequences o f  d i f f  options
Show pros andcons/costs and benefits/tradeoff d i f f  
options (quantitative/qualitative)
D eterm ine optimal resource use respecting stakeholder 
needs and  environm ental needs
A ssist more systematic consideration o f  resource 
m anagem ent issues
Provide sam e info/understanding to a ll stakeholders:
Buzc Reduce/reconcile conflicts, prom ote po litica l harmony
Prom ote fa irness/justice/equity
Buzn Acquire scientific proof, authority, credibility fo r  
negotiation
Im prove efficiency
Present complex science in fo rm a t easily understood
B ur Research purposes
Im prove researchers ’ understanding o f  system
A ssist research integration
L ong term memory o f  project
Initiate D SS  research
Pilot fo r  transferral to other basins
B uv R e villagers/farmers using the D SS
Evaluate biophysical processes
Protect environment
Sustainable development
U nderstand the state o f  the environm ent
Acquire authority fo r  negotiation
Bug R e g o v t.s ta ff usingthe D SS
Technical s ta ff  as users
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Policy advisers as users
Tell villagers what to do
Efficiency
Buo Other uses/users
Political harmony
A ll stakeholders as users Aa
Bua Re adoption o f  D SS  /  research dissemination/extn A ai
No interest in D SS i f  position not supported
B d Re developm ent process
Bdm M otivations fo r  developing D SS other than Bu
Politics - resources
Personal contact
B d f Factors inhibitng /shaping progress
B d ff F inancial problem s
Bdfc Coordination problems
Equipment problem s
Technical problem s
Bdp Re involvement /partcpn. in D SS development Aap
Bdr Tension betw  research project and practice
Bdrr Tension between research and use
Bdrt Tension betw technicality and particpn in devlpm t
Bdrm Tension between manageability and  ideal process
Bdrp Tension betw project timeframe and long term
Tension betw locally relevant and generalizable
Bdrz Tension betw progress and particip approach
Bdx M iscellaneous re development process
Bom O ther m iscellaneous construing o f  D SS
Re cost o f  the system
Re fu tu re  o f  computers
C CO NSTRUING  OF DECISIO N-M AK ING  ENVIRONM ENT
Ca Construing o f  actors
Construing o f  particular actors
Farm ers as uneducated, gullible
Car Re (power) relations between actors
Co Other construing o f  decision-making environment
Re decision-m aking as political
Cp Re participation
Z Theme code irrelevant
References
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